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ABSTRACT  
After September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration decided to detain certain 
individuals suspected of being members or agents of al Qaeda or the Taliban as enemy 
combatants and hold them indefinitely and incommunicado for the duration of the war on 
terror. The rationale behind this system of preventive detention is to incapacitate 
suspected terrorists, facilitate interrogation, and hold them when traditional criminal 
charges are not feasible for a variety of reasons. While the rationale for preventive 
detention is legitimate and the need for preventive detention real, the current 
Administration’s approach has been reactionary, illogical, and probably unconstitutional.  
This paper explores the underlying rationales for preventive detention as a tool in 
this war on terror; analyzes the legal obstacles to creating a preventive detention regime; 
discusses how Israel and Britain have dealt with incapacitation and interrogation of 
terrorists; and compares several alternative ideas to the Administration’s enemy 
combatant policy under a methodology that looks at questions of lawfulness, the balance 
between liberty and security, and institutional efficiency. In the end, this paper 
recommends using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to monitor a narrow 
regime of preventive detention only to be used under certain prescribed circumstances 
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We need to debate the long-term sustainable architecture for the process 
of determining when, why, and for how long someone may be detained as 




Mr. Chertoff made this statement in 2003.  As of this writing, it is July 2008 and 
the United States still does not have an architecture in place for “when, why, and for how 
long” someone, including U.S. citizens, can be detained as enemy combatants.  While 
this war on terror has encompassed many policies such as warrantless surveillance, data-
mining, coercive interrogation, and a preemptive war in Iraq – and certainly many articles 
and books have been and will continue to be written about the aforementioned topics – 
this paper focuses on one aspect of the war on terror: the labeling of U.S. persons as 
enemy combatants.  
As journalist Benjamin Wittes writes in Law and the Long War, “[w]ith the 
exception of battlefield killing, no action the government takes in this conflict more 
impinges on human freedom than does long-term incarceration.”2  As we approach a new 
presidential election, it is perhaps time to focus less on “debating” and more on actually 
enacting a legislative scheme that can finally – after seven years – address preventive 
detention of terrorist suspects.  As such, this paper recommends a concrete solution to the 
next Administration. 
                                                 
1 Richard Schmitt, “Patriot Act Author Has Concerns,” L.A. Times, November 3, 2003, 
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5325.htm (accessed June 20, 2008).  At the time of this 
comment, Mr. Chertoff was a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. He became 
the Secretary of Homeland Security in February 2005. 
2 Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War (New York: The Penguin Press, 2008), 151. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1. Status Quo 
One tool in the current war on terror involves the Bush Administration’s labeling 
of alleged terrorists as enemy combatants and detaining them indefinitely, without access 
to counsel, and without having to file any criminal charges.  This enemy combatant 
policy is really an ad hoc system of preventive detention whereby U.S. citizens or legal 
residents (hereafter U.S. persons) are detained against their will without the filing of 
criminal charges for the purposes of incapacitation and interrogation.  While the 
Administration has mostly applied its enemy combatant policy to foreign nationals 
captured overseas (i.e., aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay) – and this paper addresses 
those issues – for purposes of scope, this paper primarily focuses on the enemy 
combatant policy as it applies to U.S. persons who are being detained within the United 
States.3  
Immediately after 9/11, 762 aliens were arrested in connection with the 
investigation of the September 11 attacks.4  Each detainee was held until specifically 
cleared by the FBI of any connection to terrorist activities.  Most of these individuals 
were ultimately charged with violating immigration law such as remaining in the U.S. 
after the expiration of their visas or for entering the U.S. illegally.  While this “hold until 
cleared” policy was the Administration’s first approach to preventive detention, it only 
concerned aliens and not U.S. citizens.  For citizens, the Administration initially used 
material witness warrants under 18 U.S.C. § 3144. 
 
                                                 
3 While there are a handful of U.S. citizens being detained in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are not 
addressed in this thesis because they are being detained by multinational forces or have been convicted in 
foreign criminal proceedings, hence raising a host of other issues not directly pertinent to preventive 
detention of U.S. persons in the United States.  In June 2008, the Supreme Court held unanimously in 
Munaf v. Secretary of the Army (06-1666) and Secretary of the Army v. Omar (07-394) that, while U.S. 
citizens detained overseas by American forces have the right to habeas corpus, the U.S. government 
nonetheless has the authority to transfer them to foreign custody.  
4 Paul Rosenzweig and Jay Carafano, “Preventive Detention and Actionable Intelligence,” Legal 
Memorandum Published by the Heritage Foundation, no. 13, (September 2004), 5 
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/upload/68849_1.pdf (accessed September 7, 2007). 
 3
Material witness warrants are traditionally used to arrest and detain material 
witnesses to criminal activity when it is believed that the witnesses will leave the 
jurisdiction to avoid having to testify.  The threshold for detention as a material witness is 
that the person has testimony “material” to a criminal proceeding and that securing the 
testimony through a subpoena is “impracticable.”5  After 9/11, the Attorney General 
announced a policy of “aggressive detention” of material witnesses, and at least 70 
people (including Jose Padilla and Ali Saleh al-Marri, discussed below) were detained 
under the rationale that they were “material witnesses” without any criminal charges 
filed.6  Under the statute, however, “[n]o material witness may be detained . . . if the 
testimony of such a witness can be adequately secured by deposition, and if further 
detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.”7  As Law Professor Stephen 
Schulhofer aptly points out, unless this exception is expanded to swallow the rule, the 
material witness statute is a poor choice to detain terrorist suspects pending further 
investigation and trial.8  Furthermore, as Paul Rosenzweig and James Carafano from The 
Heritage Foundation have noted: “[T]he approval of material witness warrants as a legal 
tool cannot obscure the practical reality that they were being used for a purpose different 
from that which Congress initially intended – the detention of witnesses despite the lack 
of any real need for their testimony.”9  
The Bush Administration recognized the inherent limitations of creating a 
preventive detention regime using the material witness statute and transferred Padilla and 
al-Marri to military custody as enemy combatants in 2002 and 2003, respectively. 
President Bush justified his unilateral decisions to label individuals as enemy combatants 
on the exercise of his war power as Commander in Chief under Article II of the  
 
                                                 
5 Release or Detention of a Material Witness, U.S. Code 18 (1986), § 3144. 
6 Serrin Turner and Stephen Schulhofer, The Secrecy Problems in Terrorism Trials, Liberty and 
National Security Project (New York: Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, 2005), 38, 
www.brennancenter.org/secrecyproblem.pdf (accessed September 7, 2007). 
7 U.S. Code 18 (1986), § 3144. 
8 Schulhofer and Turner, The Secrecy Problems in Terrorism Trials, 38. 
9 Rosenzweig and Carafano, “Preventive Detention and Actionable Intelligence,” 5. 
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Constitution and the Joint Resolution passed by Congress after 9/11 to use all “necessary 
and appropriate force” against those who “planned, authorized, committed or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”10  
Significantly, after 9/11, the Administration determined that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to the conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda.11  Hence, all 
Taliban and al Qaeda operatives were automatically unlawful “prisoners of war” and 
could be subjected to interrogation.12  In August 2002, Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney 
General in the Office of Legal Counsel, sent President Bush a memorandum stating: “As 
commander-in-chief, the President has constitutional authority to order interrogations of 
enemy combatants to gain intelligence information concerning the military plans of the 
enemy.”13  As Law Professor Howard Ball observes, “[t]he Administration has offered 
one fundamental rationale for such treatment [designations of enemy combatants]: the 
acquisition of actionable intelligence.”14  
In addition to the need for information, the Administration argues that its enemy 
combatant policy is necessary to incapacitate terrorists so they do not return to the 
battlefield.  Yet, if the battlefield includes the United States and the war is indefinite, the 
implication of incapacitation as a rationale for prevention detention is staggering. 
Essentially, under the enemy combatant policy, the executive branch can unilaterally 
designate any U.S. person in the United States as an enemy combatant and hold that 
individual incommunicado, indefinitely, and with no criminal charges for the purposes of 
                                                 
10 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), Public Law 107-40, U.S. Statutes at Large 115 
(2001): 224. 
11 On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued an executive order determining that members of al 
Qaeda and the Taliban are unlawful enemy combatants who are not entitled to the protections of the Third 
Geneva Convention.  The full text of the executive order can be seen at: 
http://lawofwar.org/Bush_torture_memo.htm (accessed July 8, 2008). 
12 Under the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, prisoners of war cannot be interrogated.  Rather, they 
are required to provide only “surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal 
or serial number.”  In fact, “[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be 
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatsoever.” Geneva 
Convention, Part III.A.17. (Emphasis added.) 
13 Howard Ball, Bush, the Detainees and the Constitution (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 
47. 
14 Ibid., 54. 
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coercive interrogation and incapacitation.  Furthermore, as will be explained in Chapter 
II, the chance of detaining an innocent person seems high if terrorists purposely try to 
blend into the population.  As journalists Ben Wittes and Mark Gitenstein observe: “The 
paradox is that, precisely because terrorists flout the rules of warfare and make 
themselves harder to distinguish from civilians when captured, they necessitate a level of 
due process that conventional forces, which make no secret of their status as belligerents, 
do not require.”15 
Jose Padilla (U.S. citizen arrested in Chicago), Yaser Hamdi (U.S. citizen arrested 
in Afghanistan), and Ali Saleh al-Marri (legal resident arrested in Peoria, Illinois) have 
all been designated at one point as enemy combatants and subjected to this 
Administration’s preventive detention regime.  While it appears there have only been 
three U.S. persons subjected to such treatment, the government threatened to designate 
others such as John Walker Lindh (American Taliban), Iyman Faris (who was planning to 
destroy the Brooklyn Bridge) and the Lackawanna Six (Buffalo terrorist cell) as enemy 
combatants if they did not plead guilty to a variety of criminal charges and cooperate 
with authorities.16  Not surprisingly, they all pled guilty.  
2. Problems with Status Quo 
Designating U.S. persons as enemy combatants and holding them incommunicado 
and indefinitely for a war on terror that may never end raises serious legal and policy 
concerns.  
a. Legal Concerns 
As will be addressed in depth in Chapter IV, it is presently unclear 
whether President Bush’s broad application of his enemy combatant policy as applied to 
U.S. persons captured in peaceful civilian areas will prove to be lawful.  A plurality of 
                                                 
15 Benjamin Wittes and Mark Gitenstein, “A Legal Framework for Detaining Terrorists, Enact a Law 
to End the Clash over Rights,” Brookings, Opportunity 08 (2008), 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/1115_terrorism_wittes_opp08.aspx (accessed June 26, 2008). 
16 Jesselyn Radack, “The Government's Opportunistic Use of the ‘Enemy Combatant’ Label: How 
This Category Is Being Used as a Prosecution Tactic,” Findlaw, October 11, 2004, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20041011_radack.html (accessed June 24, 2008). 
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the Supreme Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the President can designate citizens 
caught in an active zone of combat as enemy combatants for the duration of the particular 
hostilities as long as the individual can challenge that designation in a neutral forum.17 
After the decision, the Administration released Hamdi to Saudi Arabia without any kind 
of adversarial hearing.  Significantly, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed 
whether a U.S. citizen, such as Padilla, or legal resident, such as al-Marri, can be arrested 
in the United States (as opposed to a battlefield), labeled an enemy combatant, and held 
indefinitely without charges.  As will be detailed in Chapter III, the Administration 
transferred Padilla to the criminal justice system in 2005 presumably to avoid a show-
down at the Supreme Court over the enemy combatant policy.18  Padilla was 
subsequently convicted of terrorism-related charges and sentenced to seventeen years in 
prison in 2007.  
As of this writing, it appears that Ali al-Marri is the only U.S. person 
currently being detained as an enemy combatant.  On July 15, 2008, the full Fourth 
Circuit ruled in a split decision 5-4 that the Administration does have the authority to 
designate U.S. persons captured in peaceful civilian areas as enemy combatants but that 
the government needs to submit more than a declaration based on hearsay to support such 
a designation, or explain why a declaration is the “most reliable available evidence” to 
support indefinite detention of al-Marri as an enemy combatant.19  Consequently, the 
Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further evidentiary proceedings to allow al-Marri to 
better challenge the underlying evidence. It is presently unclear whether the Bush 
Administration or al-Marri will ask for an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court; 
whether the Supreme Court would grant certiorari; or whether the Bush Administration 
will submit additional evidence on remand to support its designation of al-Marri as an 
enemy combatant.  In sum, as of July 2008, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the 
                                                 
17 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality). All subsequent cites to Hamdi will be to the 
plurality opinion unless otherwise noted. 
18 “Court Overrules Bush’s ‘Enemy Combatant’ Policy,” MSNBC, June 11, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19172214/ (accessed September 28, 2007).  
19 al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, No. 06-7427,      F.3d     , 2008 WL 2736787, * 45 (4th Cir. July 15, 2008) 
(en banc).   
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pivotal constitutional question of whether U.S. citizens, such as Padilla, or legal 
residents, such as al-Marri, can be detained indefinitely as an enemy combatant with no 
criminal charges.  
b. Policy Concerns 
Independent of whether the enemy combatant policy as applied to U.S. 
persons is ultimately found to be lawful, there is the significant question of whether it is 
an effective policy.  Because there has not been another terrorist attack in the United 
States since 9/11, and because, as will be addressed in Chapter III, information from 
captured enemy combatants has resulted in the thwarting of specific terrorists plots and 
the capture of more al Qaeda operatives, it can be argued that the enemy combatant 
policy has made the nation considerably safer.  
Nonetheless, designating U.S. persons as enemy combatants and holding 
them incommunicado and indefinitely for a war on terror that may never end may 
ultimately undermine the United States’ objectives.  Assuming there is genuine need for 
preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror, and assuming a regime can be created 
that is lawful, there remains the underlying question of sound policy: to what extent can 
the United States create a system of preventive detention that is perceived as fair, applied 
consistently, and narrowly-tailored to meets its objectives. A significant negative 
repercussion to the enemy combatant policy is that other democratic countries may be 
hesitant to cooperate with the United States in pursuing terrorist suspects due to 
displeasure at the United States’ preventive detention policies.  Not surprisingly, the 
enemy combatant policy has sparked criticism from individuals across the political 
spectrum. 
While it appears the Bush Administration has only employed its enemy 
combatant policy sparingly to three U.S. persons (although it has threatened to use it 
numerous more times), its implications are far-reaching, especially if another terrorist 
attack occurs rivaling 9/11.  As Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman notes, “[t]hese 
cases [Padilla and Hamdi] present a unique threat to the survival of the republic.  If the 
president can throw citizens into solitary confinement for years on end, our democracy is 
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in very deep trouble.”20  Despite the implications of the enemy combatant policy – or 
perhaps because of them – the Administration has not repudiated its policy.  Given that 
the war on terror is unlikely to end soon, it would be imprudent to wait for the Supreme 
Court to rule before creating a more sustainable, thought-out approach to preventive 
detention that is consistent with America’s principles of due process.  Furthermore, given  
the inevitable change in Administration that will occur in 2008, it is an opportune time to 
think through the complex legal issues now and be ready to propose a better solution to 
the new Administration. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the above discussion outlining the problems with the status quo 
approach to detaining U.S. persons as enemy combatants, this paper will address the 
following questions: 
• To what extent, if any, does the United States need a system of preventive 
detention where suspected terrorists are detained against their will without 
the filing of criminal charges as a tool in the war on terror?  
• How can the United States create a system of preventive detention that is 
lawful and good policy without undermining its credibility, reputation, and 
democratic principles?  
• Are interrogation and incapacitation of terrorist suspects legitimate and 
justifiable rationales for creating a system of preventive detention? 
• How do Israel and Britain, which have dealt with terrorist threats for 
decades, handle preventive detention and can their approaches provide 
useful insight to the United States in the war on terror? 
• What are the other ideas that policy-makers, lawyers, and academics have 
proposed for creating systems of preventive detention as a tool in the war 
on terror and how do these approaches compare to one another and the 
status quo? 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
To answer the aforementioned questions, it is necessary to look at the existing 
literature addressing these issues.  While a plethora of literature exists criticizing the 
                                                 
20 Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 35. 
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Administration’s enemy combatant policy as unlawful and/or unsound policy, and many 
professors and policy-makers have proposed alternative approaches to preventive 
detention, there is a dearth of literature that thoroughly analyzes and addresses more 
fundamental questions such as whether the United States needs a system of preventive 
detention as a tool in the war on terror; whether the rationales for preventive detention are 
justifiable; whether Israel and Britain’s respective approaches to preventive detention to 
deal with terrorism provide useful insights for the United States; whether a system of 
preventive detention can be lawful; and whether it is worth the consequent deleterious 
effects to America’s reputation.  While articles, legal decisions, and books have 
addressed aspects of these questions (especially questions relating to the legality and 
policy implications of preventive detention), there does not appear to be a body of 
literature that examines all these questions while also comparing and contrasting the 
alternative approaches advocated for preventive detention under a methodology that 
includes fundamental democratic principles.  
Before analyzing the substance of the literature, it is necessary to briefly describe 
the authors and kinds of literature that exist to answer these questions.  Except for the 
myriad of newspaper editorials lambasting the enemy combatant policy, most of the 
scholarly literature addressing preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror is 
written by lawyers who are law professors, judges, or policy-makers.  This fact should 
come as little surprise because preventive detention is fundamentally a legal question 
implicating the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution, Articles I and II 
of the Constitution, the writ of habeas corpus, and the Non-Detention Act of 1971, which 
provides that: “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States 
except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”21  Therefore, most of the literature relevant to 
preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror consists of law review articles, legal 
decisions, books addressing civil liberties, and reports compiled by think tanks or policy 
organizations.  
                                                 
21 Non-Detention Act of 1971, U.S. Code 18, § 4001(a). 
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Because no body of literature addresses all aspects of the questions identified 
above concerning preventive detention, this review divides the literature into sub-
literature focusing on: (1) the rationales for preventive detention; (2) the lawfulness of 
preventive detention; (3) other countries’ approaches to preventive detention; and (4) 
alternative ideas to the current enemy combatant policy. 
1. Rationales for Preventive Detention 
As will be explained in detail in Chapter III, the Administration’s main rationale 
behind preventive detention is to facilitate interrogation of suspected members of al 
Qaeda or the Taliban.  While many legal scholars have argued for alternative approaches 
to preventive detention that would allegedly provide more due process rights to detainees, 
there does not appear to be much scrutiny of the Administration’s underlying reason for 
preventive detention: interrogation.  In other words, it appears that commentators have 
accepted as given that interrogation produces actionable intelligence and focused the 
inquiry on the legality and policy ramifications of Bush’s enemy combatant policy.  
As the concept of preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror is based on 
the underlying rationales for preventive detention, foremost interrogation, it is necessary 
to look to a body of literature that addresses whether, and under what circumstances, 
interrogation of suspected terrorists actually produces actionable intelligence.  If we 
accept the Administration’s assertions as true, there is certainly evidence that 
interrogation of high value al Qaeda operatives has produced useful intelligence.  John 
Yoo, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General under the Bush Administration, states 
that “intelligence gathered from captured al Qaeda and Taliban fighters allowed our 
intelligence, military, and law enforcement to frustrate plots that could have killed 
thousands of Americans.”22  He explains in his book War by Other Means: An Insider’s 
Account of the War on Terror how the captures and subsequent interrogations of Abu 
Zubaydah (al Qaeda’s chief military planner) and Ramzi bin al Shibh lead to the capture 
of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), who has been described as the “principal architect” 
                                                 
22 John Yoo, War by Other Means, An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror (New York: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 2006), 45.  Mr. Yoo is currently a law professor at University of California at Berkeley’s 
Boalt Hall law school. 
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of the 9/11 attacks.23  Furthermore, in a June 2004 press release by former Deputy 
Attorney General James Comey, Comey describes how all three of these men played an 
instrumental role in training and preparing Jose Padilla for his mission to detonate a 
radioactive bomb in America.24  Conversely, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Ron 
Suskind, notes in his book The One Percent Doctrine, that al Qaeda operative Abu 
Zubaydah may have been a mentally ill low-level logistics person who did provide useful 
information to the Administration.25  
An obvious piece of literature assessing the validity of the Administration’s 
assertions that captured al Qaeda operatives have produced useful intelligence would be 
the Detainee Interrogation Reports, mentioned and relied on by the authors of the bi-
partisan 9/11 Commission Report.  While the commissioners note that they used 
corroborating evidence as much as they could to assess the accuracy of the information, 
they state “[a]ssessing the truth of statements by these witnesses – sworn enemies of the 
United States – is challenging.”26  Because the Detainee Interrogation Reports are 
understandably classified, there is an inherent gap in the literature needed to evaluate 
whether interrogation of detainees produces actionable intelligence. 
This gap is partially mitigated by the December 2006 Intelligence Science Board 
(ISB)27 374-page report examining several aspects of interrogation methods.  The ISB 
notes that no significant scientific research has been conducted in more than four decades 
about the effectiveness of many interrogation techniques that are regularly used by the 
                                                 
23 Yoo, War by Other Means, An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror, 167. 
24 Deputy Attorney General James Comey, remarks concerning Jose Padilla, June 1, 2004, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2004/dag6104.htm (accessed November 10, 2007). 
25 Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 95-100. 
26 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, n.d.), 146. 
27 The Intelligence Science Board was chartered in August 2002 and advises the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence and senior intelligence community leaders on emerging scientific and technical 
issues of special importance to the intelligence community.  This study was sponsored by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center, and the Defense Department’s 
Counterintelligence Field Activity. 
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military and intelligence groups.28  The ISB recommends additional scientific research of 
interrogation methods (both retrospective analyses of data about past interrogations and 
new studies that relate different practices to the value of the information obtained) to 
determine what is effective.29  While the ISB does not focus on preventive detention but 
rather the effectiveness of interrogation, given that interrogation is the main rationale for 
preventive detention, the ISB report is a significant piece of the sub-literature for a paper 
on preventive detention. 
Another rationale argued by the Bush Administration for its enemy combatant 
policy is incapacitation, i.e., the prevention of terrorist suspects from returning to the 
battlefield.  This was one of the main justifications articulated by the Bush 
Administration for detaining Hamdi.  According to the facts presented in an affidavit 
from a Defense Department official (Mobbs declaration), Hamdi surrendered to the 
Northern Alliance who turned him over to U.S. authorities.30  Justice O’Connor, in her 
plurality opinion in Hamdi, explicitly upheld incapacitation as a justification for 
preventive detention as long as the individual was held only for the duration of hostilities 
and allowed an opportunity to challenge the designation as an enemy combatant.31  
Yet, significantly, after this ruling, the Administration did not provide Hamdi a 
meaningful opportunity to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant.  Rather, in 
October 2004, the government released Hamdi to Saudi Arabia after it determined that he 
no longer posed a threat to the United States, thereby undermining – to some extent – the 
Administration’s rationale of needing to detain this dangerous individual so he does not 
return to the battlefield.32  Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that al Qaeda 
                                                 
28 Robert Fein, “Introduction, Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information,” in Educing 
Information Interrogation: Science and Art (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 
June 2006), 6, www.fas.org/irp/dni/educing.pdf, (accessed October 11, 2007). 
29 Fein, “Introduction, Intelligence Science Board Study on Educing Information.” 
30 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507. 
31 Ibid., 519. 
32 Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, “Out of the Brig: ‘Enemy Combatant’ Yaser Hamdi Will Soon 
be Released from a Military Prison without Facing Any Charges,” Newsweek, September 15, 2004, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6012286/site/newsweek/ (accessed September 4, 2007). 
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detainees who have been released have returned to the battlefield.33  However, again, as 
with the literature on interrogation, it is hard to assess the accuracy of incapacitation as a 
rationale for preventive detention when the executive contains the information, which is 
largely classified or not able to be challenged in a court of law, such as the Mobbs 
declaration, which is based on hearsay from Northern Alliance members.  
A third plausible justification for preventive detention could be difficulties with 
trying terrorist suspects in Article III courts, although as will be explained in Chapter III, 
this rationale is more concerned with where terrorist suspects are to be tried as opposed 
to whether they need to be preventively detained.  This is the weakest of plausible 
reasons for preventive detention, yet it has spawned the most amount of literature. 
Evidence establishing individuals as terrorists may not be able to be produced in a federal 
court without disclosing clandestine intelligence assets and/or there may not be enough 
evidence to obtain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.  Serrin Turner, Associate 
Counsel for the Liberty & National Security Project at the Brennan Center for Justice at 
NYU School of Law, and Stephen Schulhofer, law professor at NYU, have addressed 
these questions in an article entitled The Secrecy Problems in Terrorism Trials.34  While 
their focus is not on creating a preventive detention regime per se but rather on trying 
terrorism suspects in federal courts as opposed to military tribunals, their article sheds 
important light on the challenges and complications with using current statutes and 
federal court to handle terrorism suspects.  
Similarly, human rights lawyers Richard Zabel and James Benjamin, Jr., argue in 
their exhaustive white paper In Pursuit of Justice, Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the 
Federal Courts that the criminal justice system is capable of detaining and trying 
                                                 
33 Ruth Wedgewood, “The Supreme Court and The Guantanamo Controversy,” in Terrorism, the Laws 
of War, and the Constitution, ed. Peter Berkowtiz (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press Publication, 
2005), 176. 
34 Turner and Schulhofer, The Secrecy Problems in Terrorism Trials, 3-4. 
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terrorists and that there is no need to create a regime of preventive detention.35  Former 
federal prosecutors Kenneth Roth and Kelly Anne Moore make the same argument.36  
Conversely, Yoo devotes an entire chapter in War by Other Means to discussing 
the difficulties with protecting the nation’s military and intelligence secrets with the goal 
of providing a fair trial for terrorists.37  Unlike Schulhofer, Serrin, Zabel, Benjamin, Roth 
and Moore who conclude that most, if not all, terrorism prosecutions should occur in 
federal court, perhaps, with modifications to existing statutes, Yoo maintains that 
separate military commissions are essential.  As will be explained in Chapter VII, several 
prominent individuals agree with Yoo and argue that the criminal justice system is 
inadequate to try and detain terrorists.  Whatever the ultimate conclusions about where 
terrorism suspects should be tried, there is abundant literature discussing the difficulties 
with trying terrorism suspects in federal court.38  This stands in stark contrast to the 
classified nature of much of the literature dealing with the effectiveness of interrogation 
and incapacitation. 
In sum, the sub-literature discussing the rationales for preventive detention is 
varied depending on which rationale is being analyzed.  While there is more literature 
discussing the inherent difficulties in trying terrorism suspects in federal court, there is 
comparatively less literature discussing interrogation of intelligence assets and general 
incapacitation, which are the primary justifications for the Bush Administration’s enemy 
combatant policy.  A challenge with the existing literature is the inability to thoroughly 
assess the validity of these assertions.  Nonetheless, this challenge can be somewhat  
 
                                                 
35 Richard B. Zabel and James J. Benjamin, Jr., “In Pursuit of Justice, Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in 
the Federal Courts,” Human Rights First (May 2008). 
36 Kenneth Roth, “After Guantanamo, The Case Against Preventive Detention,” Foreign Affairs, 
(May/June 2008), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501facomment87302/kenneth-roth/after-guant-
namo.html (accessed June 13, 2008); Kelly Anne Moore, “Take Al Qaeda to Court,” New York Times, 
August 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/21/opinion/21moore.html (accessed June 15, 2008). 
37 Yoo, War by Other Means, An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror, 204-230. 
38 See, e.g., Amnesty International, USA: Justice Delayed and justice Denied? Trials under the 
Military Commissions Act (London: International Secretariat, 2007); James Renwick and Gregory 
Treverton, “The Challenges of Trying Terrorists as Criminals,” RAND Center for Global Risk and Security 
(2008); Turner and Schulhofer, The Secrecy Problems in Terrorism Trials; Zabel and Benjamin, “In Pursuit 
of Justice, Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts.” 
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mitigated by relying on bipartisan government reports, such as the 9/11 Commission 
Report, which discuss the results of interrogation and on the ISB report which discusses 
the challenges of interrogation. 
2. Lawfulness of Preventive Detention 
Assuming the rationales for creating a preventive detention regime in this war on 
terror are legitimate, the next question is whether a system of preventive detention can be 
created that is lawful.  The lawfulness of preventive detention is thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter IV.  To date, it appears that President Bush has applied his enemy combatant 
policy to three U.S. persons, Yasir Hamdi, Jose Padilla, and Ali al-Marri, who have all 
challenged their respective designations in federal courts.39  Hence, the legal decisions 
written in these cases by federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices, and the legal 
briefs submitted by the respective parties in these cases is a critical part of the literature 
review.  While as explained above the cases involving Hamdi and Padilla are resolved, as 
of this writing, the fate of al-Marri is still pending as the Fourth Circuit remanded his 
case for an evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, the legal decisions affecting the enemy 
combatant policy are still being debated and will be an ongoing part of the literature 
review. 
Other relevant legal decisions discuss the contours of preventive detention in 
other contexts such as pretrial detention,40 mental health confinement or quarantines,41 
and the war powers of the President.42  To this end, the City of New York Bar 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp.2d 42, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Padilla, 423 F.3d 386 
(4th Cir. 2005); Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); al-Marri v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 774 (D.S.C. 2006); al-Marri v. 
Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), rehearing en banc granted (August 22, 2007); al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 
No. 06-7427,  __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 2736787 (4th Cir. July 15, 2008) (en banc).   
40 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
41 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Jacobson v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
42 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) Youngstown Sheet 
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
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Association wrote a 153-page report discussing the due process concerns of the indefinite 
detention of enemy combatants.43  While the report does not compare and analyze 
alternative approaches to preventive detention, its exhaustive description of the legal 
landscape provides a solid foundation for any paper on preventive detention.  
As discussed above, a significant book discussing the Administration’s enemy 
combatant policy is War by Other Means, written by Yoo, the former Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice who played 
an instrumental role in creating and shaping the enemy combatant policy.44  In this book, 
Yoo explains the legal justifications that are behind the enemy combatant designations. 
Given Yoo’s role in creating this preventive detention regime, his book serves an 
important part of the background for any discussion of preventive detention as a tool in 
the war on terror. 
In sum, there is an abundant amount of literature – whether legal decisions, law 
review articles, or books – that comprehensively addresses the legality of preventive 
detention.  While some authors believe that the enemy combatant policy is legal, others 
do not.  At first blush, there do not appear to be any inherent weaknesses with this body 
of literature addressing the legality of preventive detention.  Yet, upon scrutiny, most of 
the literature addressing the legality of preventive detention serves to either criticize the 
current enemy combatant policy or justify it without creatively looking at how the law 
can be fashioned to create alternative preventive detention regimes consistent with due 
process standards.  
3. Israel and Britain’s Approaches to Preventive Detention 
As will be discussed in Chapter V, Israel and Britain have been combating 
terrorism for decades, and each country has created administrative or preventive 
detention regimes to deal with incapacitation and interrogation of terrorist suspects. 
                                                 
43 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Federal Courts, “The Indefinite 
Detention of ‘Enemy Combatants’: Balancing Due Process and National Security in the Context of the War 
on Terror,” (New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 2004), 111, 
www.abcny.org/pdf/1C_WL06!.pdf (accessed September 7, 2007).  
44 Yoo, War by Other Means, An Insider’s Account of the War on Terror. 
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Hence, the literature discussing how these countries deal with preventive detention 
provides a useful perspective to compare to the current enemy combatant approach.  In 
2004, Professor Schulhofer wrote a law review article entitled Checks and Balances in 
Wartime: American, British and Israeli Experiences where he compares the preventive 
detention regimes of these three countries.45  While his article provides an abundant 
amount of detail on the British and Israeli preventive detention regimes, his ultimate 
conclusion is that America’s current enemy combatant policy bypasses judicial review 
and checks and balances that have played a role in Britain and Israel’s regimes.  Despite 
this article doing a formidable job of what it attests to do (compare the three countries’ 
approaches to preventive detention), it does not provide an alternative approach to the 
enemy combatant policy except for generally criticizing the current approach. 
4. Alternative Approaches to Preventive Detention 
Many individuals from across the political spectrum have criticized the 
Administration’s enemy combatant policy and suggested alternative ways to create 
preventive detention regimes during this war on terror.46  While the details of these 
various proposals will be discussed and categorized in Chapter VII, as a whole, they 
                                                 
45 Stephen Schulhofer, “Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and Israeli Experiences,” 
Michigan Law Review, 102 (August 2004): 1906-1958. 
46 See e.g., Thomas Powers, “WHEN TO HOLD 'EM, The U.S. Should Detain Suspected Terrorists—
Even if it Can't Make a Case Against Them in Court,” Legal Affairs (September/October 2004), 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2004/argument_powers_sepoct04.msp (accessed 
September 4, 2007); Andrew McCarthy, “Abu Ghraib and Enemy Combatants: An Opportunity to Draw 
Good Out of Evil,” National Review, May 11, 2004; 
http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200405110832.asp (accessed September 4, 2007); Jack 
Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, “The Terrorists’ Court,” New York Times, July 11, 2007, Opinion section, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/opinion/11katyal.html (accessed June 15, 2008); Harvey Rishikof, “A 
Federal Terrorism Court,” Progressive Policy Institute, (November 2007), 
http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=124&subsecID=307&contentID=254507 (accessed June 
26, 2008); Bruce Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism; 
Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem, “Long-Term Legal Strategy Project for Preserving Security 
and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terrorism,” National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism (MIPT) (April 2003 – November 2004), 33-50, 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/longtermlegalstrategy (accessed August 15, 2007); Turner and 
Schulhofer, The Secrecy Problems in Terrorism Trials; Rosenzweig and Carafano, “Preventive Detention 
and Actionable Intelligence”; Tung Yin, “Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A 
Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees,” Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy, 29, no. 1 (September 2005): 150-212; George Terwilliger, III, “‘Domestic 
Unlawful Combatants’: A Proposal to Adjudicate Constitutional Detentions,” Engage, 7, no. 2 (October 
2006): 55-63. 
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largely fail to thoroughly address whether the Administration’s underlying rationales for 
preventive detention – interrogation, incapacitation and to a lesser extent difficulties with 
trying terrorism suspects in federal court – are legitimate and justifiable.  Furthermore, 
while all these approaches to preventive detention have strengths and weaknesses, a 
weakness of the literature as a whole is that there is minimal comparative analysis among  
the various approaches.  None of the literature contains a methodology for evaluating its 
approach versus the other alternative approaches and few contain an in-depth analysis of 
whether a system of preventive detention is needed as a tool in the war on terror. 
5. Summary 
There is abundant literature written by lawyers and policy-makers that addresses 
the lawfulness of preventive detention, other countries’ approaches to preventive 
detention, and alternative preventive detention regimes to the enemy combatant policy. 
There is minimal literature that analyzes the underlying rationales for preventive 
detention, namely interrogation and incapacitation, due to the classified nature of the 
inquiry.  Nonetheless, by using bipartisan government reports, one can begin to evaluate 
whether interrogation produces actionable intelligence to justify a system of preventive 
detention.  While preventive detention has significant consequences for any democracy, 
what is lacking in the literature is a comprehensive analysis of all the different 
components of preventive detention that compares and contrasts alternative approaches to 
preventive detention under a methodology upholding democratic principles. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Many lawyers, professors, and policy-makers have advocated alternative regimes 
to the Bush Administration’s enemy combatant policy for detaining suspected terrorists. 
As will be explained in Chapter VII, the ideas proposed range from the “purist” approach, 
which essentially means no system of preventive detention, to creating entirely new court 
systems to deal not only with detaining suspected terrorists for purposes of interrogation 
and/or incapacitation but also for ultimately trying them for various war crimes or 
violations of criminal statutes.  Other ideas advocated for preventive detention include 
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making modifications to the current criminal justice system, creating an “emergency 
constitution” with provisions for preventive detention after another terrorist attack, or – 
as proposed by this author – having the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) 
monitor a regime of preventive detention regime. 
In order to evaluate these alternative approaches against each other as well as 
against the status quo enemy combatant policy, it is helpful to identify a framework for 
assessing criteria that are important underpinnings of a democratic society.  For purposes 
of this paper, each approach to preventive detention will be analyzed using four 
parameters, namely whether and to what extent the approach is likely to (1) be legal; (2) 
protect security; (3) enhance liberty; and (4) be efficient from an organizational/ 
institutional standpoint.  The details of this methodology will be explained in Chapter VI.  
E. ORGANIZATION 
The crux of this paper compares alternative approaches to preventive detention 
and recommends the FISC approach.  This analysis will be discussed in Chapter VII.  For 
a policy-maker looking to understand the current proposed options for preventive 
detention, this chapter may be enough. Yet, the bulk of this paper is background 
information that is essential to fully understanding and appreciating preventive detention 
as a tool in the war on terror.  In other words, the policy options in Chapter VII will be 
placed in a better context if the chapters are read in order.  
In Chapter II, the nature of terrorism is explored to better understand the threat 
level and how it compares to previous conflicts the United States has faced.  It also 
addresses to what extent, if any, this conflict should be thought of as a “war” as opposed 
to “crime.”  This chapter serves to better define the problems with the enemy combatant 
policy and its implications for creating a system of preventive detention as a tool in this 
war on terror. 
Chapter III looks at the underlying rationales for preventive detention as a tool in 




detention, one cannot begin to evaluate alternatives to the enemy combatant policy or – 
more fundamentally – whether a system of preventive detention is even needed as a tool 
in this war on terror. 
Chapter IV looks at the question of lawfulness from a constitutional and statutory 
perspective.  If preventive detention is needed as a tool in the war on terror, this chapter 
explores how a regime of preventive detention could be created that complies with the 
Constitution and Non-Detention Act of 1971. 
Chapter V discusses how two other Western democracies, namely Israel and 
Britain, have dealt with incapacitation and interrogation of terrorist suspects throughout 
decades of dealing with terrorism to see if any insights could be beneficial to the United 
States. 
Chapter VI discusses a methodology to evaluate alternatives to the enemy 
combatant policy that are explored in Chapter VII.  The methodology generally looks at 
questions of lawfulness, the balance between liberty and security, and institutional 
efficiency.  While the methodology is not scientific, it does emphasize some important 
concepts that can be used to make a meaningful comparative analysis. 
Chapter VII – the crux of the paper – describes and analyzes all the alternatives to 
the enemy combatant policy under the methodology described in Chapter VI.  While it 
proposes a range of solutions depending on the threat level and priorities of the American 
public, it argues that a preventive detention regime run by the FISC is the optimal choice 
for the United States.  
Chapter VIII, the conclusion, requests Congress to enact a comprehensive 
preventive detention regime for U.S. persons.  Congress has been remarkably silent for 
the last seven years and it is time for a new solution.  While this author believes the FISC 
approach is superior to the other alternatives proposed, the overriding recommendation is 
that Congress create a more moderate solution that is lawful, efficient, and better 
balances liberty with security.  
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II. DEFINING THE THREAT 
We need a climate more sensitive to the awesome task at hand: designing 
a law for a long war, a war that isn’t quite a war, but isn’t quite anything 
else either, a war that we still have not compelling defined and may never 





On September 20, 2001, in a joint session to Congress, President Bush declared: 
“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”48  In March 
2006 – almost five years after 9/11 – President Bush began The National Security 
Strategy by stating that “America is at war.”49  By defining 9/11 as an act of war – and 
not merely mass murder – President Bush made a strategic choice to shape America’s 
response to al Qaeda (or any terrorist group that attacks America) as war as opposed to 
criminal investigation and trial, which had characterized America’s response to terrorism 
before 9/11.  From a public perception standpoint, it is easier to justify a substantial 
amount of resources to win a war than fight crime.  Political scientist William Rosenau 
observes that calling the conflict a “war” is “inspirational” as it “is meant to arouse the 
U.S. public and signal the U.S. government’s commitment to defeating a formidable and 
cruel foe.”50  Furthermore, by using the term “war,” President Bush pre-determined that 
the military would need to remain engaged in the conflict.  
                                                 
47 Wittes, Law and the Long War, 260. 
48 George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People (Washington, DC: White House, September 2001), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed March 20, 2008) (Emphasis 
added). 
49 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, March 2006). 
50 William Rosenau, “US Counterterrorism Policy,” in How States Fight Terrorism, eds. Doron 
Zimmermann and Andreas Wenger (London: Lynne Rienner Publications, 2007), 133. 
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In fighting this war on terror, the Bush Administration implemented its enemy 
combatant policy – an unprecedented form of preventive detention whereby the executive 
branch unilaterally decides whether to detain a terrorist suspect incommunicado without 
criminal charges for the duration of the war on terror for the purposes of incapacitation 
and interrogation.  (These purposes will be explored in-depth in Chapter III.)  As law 
professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes describe: “The most controversial legal 
power that the U.S. government has not just asserted but actually deployed at this point in 
the war on terrorism is probably the power to detain preventatively both citizens and 
noncitizens who the executive considers are ‘enemy combatants.’”51  
Significantly, the Bush Administration’s justification for its enemy combatant 
policy is couched in terms of the laws of war, i.e., detaining prisoners of war until the end 
of the conflict so they do not return to the battlefield.  Yet, in reality, President Bush’s 
treatment of enemy combatants – who are automatically deemed unlawful combatants 
and not necessarily arrested on a battlefield – has been more akin to the treatment of 
criminals, although without the legal rights provided by the criminal justice system.  For 
instance, in war but not law, it is legitimate to use lethal force on enemy soldiers, but it 
also permissible for the enemy troops to fight back.52  Yet, because terrorists are viewed 
more as criminals, they are not privileged to fight back, even though they are being 
labeled “combatants.”  Furthermore, neither prisoners of war nor criminal suspects can be 
interrogated incommunicado for long periods of time.  Yet, as will be discussed in 
Chapter III, isolated and prolonged interrogation is the primary rationale for the Bush 
Administration’s enemy combatant policy.  As Law Professor David Luban notes: “By 
selectively combining elements of the war model and elements of the law model, 
Washington is able to maximize its own ability to mobilize lethal force against terrorists 
while eliminating most traditional rights of a military adversary, as well as the rights of 
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innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire.”53  In other words, the Bush Administration’s 
approach to fighting terrorism seems to be a hybrid approach borrowing language from 
the laws of war to treat enemy combatants worse than criminals.  Professor Luban 
describes the fate of Bush’s enemy combatants as in a “limbo of rightlessness.”54  Such 
an approach is not necessarily an unwise strategy, but it does have serious consequences 
for creating a system of preventive detention.  This chapter discusses whether the conflict 
with al Qaeda should truly be thought of as a war and the implications for preventive 
detention if it is treated as such. 
B. WHAT IS AN ENEMY COMBATANT? 
While the Bush Administration has referred to captured terrorists since 9/11 as 
enemy combatants, the term “enemy combatants” is legally meaningless.55  As Law 
Professor Howard Ball explains, the term “enemy combatant” (as opposed to lawful or 
unlawful combatant) “had no place in the lexicon of military justice” until President 
Bush’s declaration of the War on Terrorism after 9/11:56 
With the declaration of the war on terror, the administration no longer saw 
the need to distinguish between lawful and unlawful combatants, or 
between combatants and innocent civilians. All those captured or handed 
over to the U.S. military and held by the United States, whether in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or in the special facilities quickly created at Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Station, were “enemy combatants,” and they were not entitled 
to any of the protections afforded captured enemy prisoners. There were 
no innocents and no prisoners of war in the war on terror.57 
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Gary Solis, an expert in military law, explains that, until it was used by the 
Attorney General after September 11, the term “enemy combatant” did not appear in the 
U.S. criminal code, international law, or law of war.58  Rather, according to domestic and 
international law, detained individuals during a war are either lawful or unlawful 
prisoners of war (POWs or combatants) or innocent civilians.  Under the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Conventions), lawful 
prisoners of war or combatants are allowed to be held until the duration of the conflict 
(but removed from the battlefield) and must be repatriated at the end of the hostilities. 
While detained, they are entitled to specific privileges such as food, medical care, 
religious and intellectual pursuits, and even payment.59  Significantly, besides names, 
ranks, dates of birth, and serial numbers, they may not be interrogated.60  A lawful POW 
or combatant is a person who (1) is in uniform; (2) is openly carrying arms; (3) is waging 
war under a structured military hierarchy; and (4) is waging war according to the customs 
and laws of war.61 
Conversely, unlawful POWs, such as spies, saboteurs, or individuals who act in 
violation of international laws of war, are not entitled to such rights (although they must 
be treated humanely) and can be tried and punished in accordance with the detaining 
power’s military or criminal codes.62  Significantly, in order to determine whether a 
detainee is a lawful POW, unlawful POW, or an innocent civilian (not a combatant at all), 
the capturing state must convene an Article 5 hearing by a “competent tribunal” to 
determine the appropriate status.  Until the Article 5 hearing occurs, “such persons shall 
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enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.”63  The United States conducted Article 5 hearings 
during the Korean War, Vietnam War, and first Gulf War against Iraq.  Yet, after 9/11, 
the Bush Administration decided that anyone captured was an enemy combatant and 
could not be a POW or innocent civilian.  
C. WARRIORS OR CRIMINALS? 
One obvious question is whether the conflict with al Qaeda is truly a war or 
whether some other way of understanding the conflict would prove beneficial.  In 1998, 
Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa stating that it was “an individual duty for every Muslim” 
to kill Americans and their allies, including civilians.64  On September 11, 2001, al 
Qaeda murdered 3,000 civilians from fifty different countries when al Qaeda operatives 
hijacked and crashed four airplanes into the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and a field in 
Pennsylvania.  In February 2003, bin Laden wrote “that targeting the Americans and 
Jews by killing them in any corner of the earth, is the greatest of obligations and the most 
excellent of ways to gain [the] nearness of Allah.”65  Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
al Qaeda intends on procuring and using weapons of mass destruction.66  Investigators in 
Britain obtained “the Encyclopedia of the Jihad” which contains two volumes devoted 
specifically to nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons.67  It certainly 
appears that America is at war with al Qaeda.  Yet, upon scrutiny, it is necessary to 
analyze the implications for calling this conflict a war – especially in the context of 
preventive detention – when war has historically been fought against very different kinds 
of adversaries. 
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War has traditionally been fought by states with soldiers who wear uniforms and 
who have a territory to defend.  In 1977, some countries – although not the United States 
– ratified Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions to give POW status and other legal 
protections of the laws of war to members of resistance or guerilla groups who 
intentionally did not distinguish themselves from the civilian population except when 
actually engaged in an attack.68  America as well as Israel and Britain objected to signing 
the Protocol, arguing that it would enable terrorist organizations to be recognized as 
combatants, thereby allowing them to be granted the rights of prisoners of war.69 
Furthermore, under Protocol I, the groups must be fighting “against colonial domination 
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination.”70  Even if al Qaeda could argue that it was exercising its right of self-
determination, it has not requested a declaration seeking such a status and it has not 
assumed the rights and obligations under Article 96 of that Protocol.71  
Terrorists such as al Qaeda operatives are nonstate actors who do not wear 
uniforms, do not distinguish themselves before an attack but purposefully try to blend 
into the population, are not considered an insurgent or guerrilla group with specific 
territorial ambitions, do not operate in conventional military units, and, most 
significantly, do not seek to attack its enemy’s military on a battlefield.  Rather, al 
Qaeda’s primary objectives are to launch surprise attacks on civilian targets.  As Law 
Professor Peter Berkowitz explains, “the main cause of difficulty today is that the laws of 
war were developed with a particular conception of war in mind – involving states with 
incentives to engage in reciprocal restraint – that does not apply to the conflict with the 
United States’ new adversaries.”72  
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There are three main challenges with calling the conflict with al Qaeda a war and 
attempting to apply the traditional laws of war to this conflict.  First, unlike traditional 
wars, the hostilities are not limited to any battlefield but can occur in the middle of 
otherwise peaceful civilian areas.  As journalist Benjamin Wittes observes, “given that al 
Qaeda does not fight along a front but seeks to infiltrate American society and destroy it 
from within, how can one reliably distinguish between combatants and mere 
sympathizers, or even uninvolved parties caught in the wrong place at the wrong time.”73 
Wittes’ concerns are only magnified by the Bush Administration’s (initial) refusal to 
convene Article 5 tribunals to determine a detainee’s status.74  Hence, to fight this 
conflict, the battlefield becomes the entire world.  As law professors Robert Chesney and 
Jack Goldsmith note, traditionally the “main criterion for military detention was some 
form of associational status” and that “erroneous detentions were rare” because captured 
soldiers wore uniforms and “were usually keen to obtain POW status.”75  Conversely, al 
Qaeda operatives have no incentive to admit an association with al Qaeda and have 
“every incentive to insist that a mistake” has been made.76  Considering the intentional 
clandestine nature of al Qaeda operatives, their purposeful blending into the society they 
wish to attack, and the fact that arrests are made in civilian areas (not just an active zone 
of combat), the risk of detaining an innocent civilian as an enemy combatant seems 
higher than traditional wars fought on battlefields.  As Law Professor Monica Hakima 
observes, there is a “substantial risk that any counterterrorism detention regime will 
capture a disproportionately high number of innocents.”77  Without judicial oversight – a 
hallmark of democracy – how does the executive branch know it has actually detained a 
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terrorist when it subjects the individual to its preventive detention regime?  Law 
Professor Eric Freedman observes, “[t]he difference between a government that acts on 
what it ‘knows’ and a government that is required to prove its charges in adversarial 
proceedings before a neutral tribunal is the difference between a government of laws and 
a police state.”78 
Second, as explained above, all members of al Qaeda or the Taliban are 
automatically unlawful prisoners of war and as such may be detained because of their 
membership in the enemy group rather than their individual conduct.  Because President 
Bush decided that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda or the Taliban, there 
is no way for an al Qaeda operative to be considered lawful – by definition he/she is 
understood to be more like a criminal, although without any legal rights of the criminal 
justice system.  Wittes notes: “The premise of detention in traditional warfare is that the 
warring parties have no issue with the individual solider detained, who is presumed to be 
honorable.  That premise is simply false in the current war, in which America’s battle is 
very much against the individual jihadist.  After all, unlike, say, Germany or Japan, al 
Qaeda is nothing more than a sum of its members.”79   
There are compelling reasons for concluding that al Qaeda members should not 
get the privileges of the Geneva Conventions – after all, the Geneva Conventions are 
contracts between sovereign nations who can negotiate treaties.80  While an argument can 
be made that the Geneva Conventions have become customary international law and 
therefore applicable to non-signatories, the “laws of war” are premised upon the notion of 
reciprocal restraint and commitment to minimize civilian deaths.  Considering al Qaeda’s 
modus operandi is to maximize civilian death and injury and its idea of reciprocal 
restraint is to sever heads, there is no reason to offer its members lawful prisoner of war 
status when captured.  Nonetheless, an Article 5 tribunal or equivalent would still be 
needed because a detainee could claim he was a civilian and not a combatant at all (as did 
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Hamdi).  In any event, concluding that all al Qaeda members are automatically unlawful 
enemy combatants – when they can never be lawful – seems problematic.  A better 
approach would be to maintain that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to the conflict 
with terrorist groups – they are neither lawful nor unlawful enemy combatants because 
they are not “combatants” at all.  Before 9/11, terrorists were never understood to be 
combatants but merely criminals. 
A third challenge with understanding the conflict with al Qaeda as a war is 
recognizing when it is definitively over. Terrorist groups, especially al Qaeda, are 
unlikely to negotiate a surrender or cease-fire.  Wittes questions: “In a conflict with a 
shadowy, international, nonhierarchical, nonstate actor as enemy, what would victory 
look like if we achieved it.?”  Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has stated that 
the war on terrorism will be over when there are no longer any terrorist organizations of 
potentially global reach for the terrorists to join.81  Former federal prosecutor Andrew 
McCarthy aptly notes, “[t]he war on terror is not like other wars. No war has a 
determinate end, but this one does not have a foreseeable ending scenario.”82  
According to the 1993 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, victory is defined as 
the achievement of a world in which terrorism does not define the daily lives of 
Americans and their friends and allies.83  Yoo also proposes an end to the conflict: 
“[v]ictory does not come from defeat of the enemy’s forces and eventually a negotiated 
political settlement, rather it comes from demoralizing an enemy’s society and coercing it 
to take desired action.”84  Yet, on some level, these endings of terrorism seem 
unsatisfying and impossible to measure and recognize.  
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Importantly, Harvard Professor Philip Heymann notes that “terrorism is not a 
threat that is temporary [because] we cannot count on ending a phenomenon that can be 
brought about by any small group in a world of seven billion people.”85  Terrorism expert 
Martha Crenshaw suggests that “measuring success may not be possible, especially if one 
considers the number and variety of actors that could practice terrorism.”86  Similarly, 
Professor Ackerman observes that “[t]here are more than six billion people in the world – 
more than enough to supply terrorist networks with haters, even if the West does nothing 
to stir the pot.  Thus, if we choose to call this a war, it will be endless.”87  Georgetown 
Law Professor David Cole notes that “[t]his war is permanent, and we will be living with 
the choices we make today for the rest of our lives.”88 
Significantly, the U.S. State department has designated terrorist groups into three 
different classifications: (1) foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) (foreign organizations 
that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with the Immigration and 
Nationality Act); (2) terrorist exclusion list (TEL) (a list of terrorist organizations for 
immigration purposes);, and (3) other terrorist organizations (OTO) (selected terrorist 
groups also deemed of relevance in the global war on terrorism.)89  As of August 2007, 
there were 42 FTOs, 58 TELs, and 39 OTOs (although 28 are overlaps).90  Therefore, it 
appears we are at war with 111 different terrorist groups, 54 of which appear to be 
motivated by Islamic extremism (defined as wanting to create an Islamic state).  
In other words, this war on terror appears indefinite.  Saying we are fighting a war 
on terror with 111 different enemies, labeled by the U.S. State Department, assures the 
American public that the war will never end. Israel has been a perpetual state of war since 
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its founding in 1948.  As Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak has astutely noted, “[t]he 
line between war and peace is thin – what one person calls peace, another calls war. In 
any case, it is impossible to maintain this distinction over the long term.”91  Therefore, 
calling the present conflict with al Qaeda a war is problematic, and having policies such 
as the enemy combatant policy based on an assumption that it is a war may divert 
America’s attention from other solutions to the real long-term threat of terrorism.  In 
other words, when it comes to preventive detention, thinking about this conflict as a war 
may lead America down the wrong path to unsound and perhaps unlawful policies.  
Given these significant differences between traditional war and the war on terror, 
Bush’s enemy combatant policy has staggering implications.  While lawful prisoners of 
war are repatriated at the end of a conflict and unlawful prisoners of war are tried for 
their crimes, Bush’s enemy combatants – who are automatically unlawful prisoners of 
war and not necessarily caught on a battlefield – can be held indefinitely for a war that 
may never end.  Is the indefinite threat of terrorism really worth the sacrificing of 
America’s democratic principles?  It seems more prudent for America to provide a more 
well thought out and nuanced solution to preventive detention that can be sustainable in 
the long run, which means fundamentally rethinking its enemy combatant policy. 
President Bush’s 2006 National Security Strategy states that the strategy is 
founded on two pillars, the first one being to “promot[e] freedom, justice, and human 
dignity [and] to promote effective democracies.”92  Similarly, in the 2006 National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, President Bush states that “[n]ot only do we fight our 
terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as 
alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule.”93  Such 
language seems to be incongruous with the enemy combatant policy whereby the  
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President can unilaterally detain terrorist suspects without trial through the end of a 
conflict that may never end for purposes of interrogation without lawyers or Miranda 
protections.  
Recognizing this conflict with al Qaeda is different than traditional war is not to 
suggest that terrorism does not pose a significant threat to national security.  Rather, it 
suggests that using the language of the laws of war and framing al Qaeda operatives as 
enemy combatants may not ultimately be an effective way of winning or resolving this 
conflict and may in fact serve to undermine America’s objectives as articulated above in 
its national strategies.  As Heymann notes: “‘War’ is neither a persuasive description of 
the situation we face nor an adequate statement of our objectives. It misleads us as to the 
means that we will have to use.”94  Interestingly, even former Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld had second thoughts about labeling the conflict with al Qaeda as a war: “I 
don’t think I would have called it the ‘war on terror.’ . . . I’ve worked to reduce the extent 
to which that [label] is used and increased the extent to which we understand it more as a 
long war, or a struggle, or a conflict not against terrorism but against a against a relatively 
small number of terribly dangerous and violent extremists.”95 
Some law professors and policy makers have argued that the threat of terrorism is 
overblown and that terrorists should be treated as criminals and arrested and tried using 
the criminal justice system.  Professor Ian Lustick argues in Trapped in the War on 
Terror that the “War on Terror preoccupies our people, distracts them and our political 
system from real problems and real solutions, and embroils us in unwinnable, 
demoralizing conflicts.”96  He asserts that the “War on Terror destroys the standing and 
reputation of the United States in the Muslim world, thereby turning our efforts in the 
name of freedom and the victims of 9/11 into more power and more opportunity for 
Islamic radicals.”97  Alternatively, Lustick argues that America should treat terrorists as 
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criminals: “Instead of glorifying terrorist groups as enemies of civilization on the order of 
the Axis powers, we should follow Europe’s example by treating terrorists as the 
dangerous but politically insignificant criminals they would be without our help.”98 
Former Supreme Commander of NATO Wesley Clark agrees:  
Labeling terrorists as combatants also leads to this paradox: while the 
deliberate killing of civilians is never permitted in war, it is legal to target 
a military installation or asset. Thus the attack by Al Qaeda on the 
destroyer Cole in Yemen in 2000 would be allowed, as well as attacks on 
command and control centers like the Pentagon. For all these reasons, the 
more appropriate designation for terrorists is not “unlawful combatant” 
but the one long used by the United States: criminal.99 
Historically, terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh and Theodore Kaczynski have 
been treated as criminals.  Furthermore, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, 
the simultaneous bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well as 
the 2000 attack on the USS Cole did not transform the conflict with al Qaeda into a war. 
During the Clinton Administration, arrests of suspected al Qaeda operatives led to more 
than thirty successful prosecutions in federal courts.100  As Rosenau notes, “law 
enforcement, and specifically the practice of apprehending terrorists and bringing them to 
trial, remained Washington’s preferred instrument for combating al-Qaida” during the 
Clinton Administration.101  From 1993 to 1999, the number of FBI agents working on 
terrorism rose from 550 to 1,400.102  Defense attorney Joshua Dratel notes that the 
criminal justice system pre-9/11 was successful because it “incapacitated a significant 
number of people in terms of jail and conviction” and produced “reliable and valuable 
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intelligence” that “did not offend the conscience of the nation.”103  Other countries such 
as England, Spain, France, and Indonesia label terrorists as criminals and subject them to 
their respective criminal codes.104  Israel, on the other hand, views terrorism as acts of 
war and asserts its right to apply the laws of war including the right of preemptive 
action.105  Thus, there is precedent for viewing aspects of the conflict as a war.  (Chapter 
V will discuss Israel’s experience with preventive detention in its dealings with 
terrorism.) 
Significantly, in the United States, the Bush Administration has used both its 
language of war and the criminal justice system to prosecute its enemy combatants.  Most 
telling is the case of Padilla who is serving seventeen years for conspiracy-related 
terrorism charges after being detained three and one-half years as an enemy combatant. 
Significantly, the Bush Administration stated that, should Padilla be acquitted of the 
criminal charges, the Administration reserved the right to detain him again indefinitely as 
an enemy combatant.106  So, in essence, the Bush Administration’s enemy combatant 
policy works in conjunction with the criminal justice system.  Terrorism is apparently 
such a grave threat that the Administration is allowed to unilaterally decide when to use 
the criminal justice system and when to use aspects of the laws of war – and change 
course when one method does not produce the desired result without any oversight by 
Congress or the judicial branch. 
Yet, al Qaeda does pose a greater challenge than ordinary criminals who are 
motivated out of personal and financial gain.  Yoo characterizes 9/11 as a “classic 
decapitation strike designed to eliminate the political, military, and financial leadership of 
the country.”107  As terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman notes “the ordinary criminal’s 
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violent act is not designed or intended to have consequences or create psychological 
repercussions beyond the act itself” whereas “the fundamental aim of the terrorist’s 
violence is ultimately to change ‘the system’ – about which the ordinary criminal, of 
course, couldn’t care less.”108  Furthermore, a significant aspect of the conflict with al 
Qaeda is that “it is a wholly foreign threat that emanates from outside the United States” 
and “seeks purely political ends.”109  Law professors Goldsmith and Chesney note that 
when the United States seeks to prosecute an individual situated overseas, its practical 
alternatives for securing the defendant, such as extradition through a possible treaty or 
diplomacy, are limited.  As they explain, the United States tried to locate bin Laden and 
other high level al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan before 9/11 but was obviously 
ineffective.110  
Therefore, America’s intelligence and military must play a role in disrupting 
terrorist operations, especially when another country such as Afghanistan harbors 
terrorist groups.  Besides Afghanistan and Iraq, America has conducted operations 
against al Qaeda in Yemen, Philippines and parts of Africa.111  Furthermore, al Qaeda 
has unequivocally stated its intent on procuring and using weapons of mass destruction.  
Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Ron Suskind recounts in The One Percent Doctrine how 
Osama bin Laden inquired from a Pakistani nuclear scientist about “nuclear logistics” and 
asked the scientist: “What if you already have the enriched uranium?”112  Considering al 
Qaeda succeeded in killing 3,000 people and causing billions of dollars in damage by 
converting airplanes into missiles, treating al Qaeda as mere criminals would be to 
seriously undermine its capabilities and intent.  Significantly, after 9/11, the priority 
became preventing future terrorist attacks, which requires information and intelligence, 
and not merely the prosecution of terrorists after the attacks.  In other words, the conflict 
with al Qaeda requires more and different resources than the criminal justice system, 
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which focuses on gathering admissible evidence for prosecution after an attack, can 
provide.  At times, the military will need to be engaged, and international diplomacy and 
cooperation, including the sharing of intelligence, with other countries must play 
significant role in this endeavor. 
So what should American call this conflict?  Lustick asserts that what America 
needs is “not a new name for the war we are trapped within but a fundamentally new 
approach to the problem.”113  Immediately after 9/11, French President Jacques Chirac 
questioned whether “war” was the right word to describe the conflict and observed that 
we faced a “conflict of a completely new nature.”114  Calling the conflict with al Qaeda a 
“war” would not be so problematic if America developed new methods for dealing with 
this threat instead of trying to manipulate old tools to fit this new problem.  Addressing 
Congress in 1862, President Lincoln stated: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate 
for the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise to the 
occasion.  As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall 
ourselves, and then we shall save our country.”115  While the Civil War certainly 
presented a bigger threat to America than this war on terror, Lincoln’s point is well taken: 
we need to think anew, and if preventive detention is truly needed as a tool in this war on 
terror, then we need a new system for preventive detention that incorporates more due 
process and is, overall, more sustainable than the current enemy combatant policy. 
The United States should not be forced to view the conflict with al Qaeda as 
either a war or a criminal justice problem.  Ackerman makes a compelling argument in 
Before the Next Attack that neither the language of war nor that of the criminal justice 
system is adequate to understand the conflict with terrorism. Ackerman rejects the “war” 
terminology because it “tilts the constitutional scales in favor of unilateral executive 
action, and against our tradition of checks and balances.”116  He similarly finds criminal 
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law to be fundamentally inadequate to deal with terrorism because terrorism – unlike 
crime – “aims to destabilize a foundational relationship between ordinary citizens and the 
modern state: the expectation of effective sovereignty.”117  Ackerman asserts that “the 
normal operation of the criminal law presupposes the effective sovereignty of the state, 
but a major terrorist attack challenges it.”118  Hence, Ackerman argues that September 11 
and the threat of terrorism justifies the creation of a “state of emergency” as an 
alternative to the state of war:119 
So neither “war” nor “crime” is really adequate. War does express the 
public affront to national sovereignty left in the aftermath of a successful 
terrorist attack. But war talk threatens all of us with arbitrary power 
exercised without the restraint of legal safeguards developed over 
centuries of painful struggle. “Crime” has proved itself adequate when 
dealing with dangerous conspiracies, but only within a social context that 
presupposes the government’s effective sovereignty. What is required is a 
third framework which confronts the distinctive interest that comes into 
play in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.120 
Similarly, Law Professor Mark Tushnet argues that the war on terror should 
instead be thought of a “condition”: 
The already long duration of the “war on terrorism” suggests that we 
ought not think of it as a war in the sense that the Second World War was 
a war. It is, perhaps, more like a condition than a war – more like the war 
on cancer, or the war on poverty, or, most pertinently, the war on crime. 
Suspending legality during a time-limited war is one thing. Suspending it 
during a more or less permanent condition is quite another. The latter is 
the end of rule of law itself.121 
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Appellate Judge Richard Posner posits that the dichotomy between calling the 
conflict “war” versus “crime” is “semantic” and suggests: “Rather than ask whether 
modern terrorism is more like crime or more like war and therefore which box it should 
be put in, one should ask why there are different legal regimes for crimes and war and let 
the answer guide the design of a sensible regime for fighting terrorism.”122  
To this end, law professors Chesney and Goldsmith address the underlying 
reasons for the different legal regimes for crimes and war in their law review article 
entitled Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models.  In 
their article, they discuss how neither the traditional criminal and military detention 
models can meet the “central legal challenge of modern terrorism,” which they describe 
as “the legitimate and preventive incapacitation of uniformless terrorists who have the 
capacity to inflict mass casualties and enormous economic harms and who thus must be 
stopped before they act.”123  They summarize the problems with the criminal and military 
detention models for detaining terrorists as follows: 
The traditional criminal model, with its demanding substantive and 
procedural requirements, is the most legitimate institution for long-term 
incapacitation. But it has difficulty achieving preventive incapacitation. 
Traditional military detention, by contrast, combines associational 
detention criteria with procedural flexibility to make it relatively easy to 
incapacitate. But because the enemy in this war operates clandestinely, 
and because it has no obvious end, this model runs an unusually high risk 
of erroneous long-term detentions, and thus in its traditional guise lacks 
adequate legitimacy.124 
Therefore, they too, like Ackerman, Posner, and Tushnet recognize that terrorism 
cannot be dealt with by viewing the problem as either crime or war but requires a 
fundamentally new way to understand the problem. 
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The next question to be addressed is whether terrorism – no matter what it is 
called – is really that dangerous as compared to previous threats that America has faced 
since its inception, or rather it is just a perception of danger that has caused the ostensible 
need for preventive detention. 
D. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT LEVEL 
While historically the United States has suspended civil rights and liberties during 
times of war (i.e., Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 during undeclared naval war with 
France, President Lincoln suspending habeas corpus during the Civil War, Palmer raids 
during WWI, Japanese internment camps during WWII), the understanding was that 
these infringements on civil liberties would be temporary.  Supreme Court justices 
Brennan and Rehnquist have observed “a recurring cycle in American history: a 
government crackdown on civil liberties during the crisis that is sustained by the courts, 
followed by a judicial reconsideration once the crisis has passed, and then forgetfulness 
when the next crisis emerges.”125  Although the war on terror appears indefinite, the 
Bush Administration has not addressed any return to “constitutional normalcy.”126  As 
Heymann argues, “we cannot allow such small and hostile groups to impose on us for 
decades the costs we would be prepared to bear for a few years to protect ourselves 
against the vast powers of an advanced foreign state.”127 
While the overall legality/constitutionality of President Bush’s enemy combatant 
policy is presently unclear (see Chapter IV), it seems that as the threat level diminishes 
and America does not suffer another catastrophic terrorist attack, there is a greater chance 
the enemy combatant policy will ultimately be found to be unconstitutional.  Although 
the fate of Hamdi and Padilla have been resolved, the fate of al-Marri is currently 
pending an evidentiary hearing and will likely end up at the Supreme Court.  An 
interesting question is to what extent the current threat level at the time of the decision 
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will affect the analysis in al-Marri.  It seems more prudent to have a policy for preventive 
detention that can incorporate the present threat level as opposed to having its underlying 
legitimacy and legality being decided based on the threat level.  In other words, American 
needs a more resilient preventive detention policy that can withstand a change in the 
threat level posed by different terrorist groups. 
Because terrorism appears to be an indefinite threat, America needs a way of 
evaluating the threat level at any particular time and tailoring its policies accordingly.  As 
Heymann notes, “[h]ow dangerous a situation is depends not only on how bad it is 
currently . . . but also on how likely the situation is to get worse.”128  Ackerman argues 
that “[w]hen terrorists strike at 9/11 scale, nobody has the slightest idea of what will 
happen next” and that the “resulting anxiety is qualitatively different from many of the 
other uncertainties in life.”129  Law professors Adrian Vermeule and Eric Posner argue 
that whether the “government justifiably detains al Qaeda suspects without charging and 
trying them depends to a large extent on the magnitude of the threat . . . .”130  So how can 
America measure the threat? 
One key way may be the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) that are currently 
produced by the National Intelligence Council and the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI).  The NIEs are the DNI’s most authoritative written judgments concerning national 
security issues.  They contain the coordinated judgments of the intelligence community 
regarding the likely course of future events.  In July 2007, the NIE concluded that al 
Qaeda is “likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure 
targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, 
significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the U.S. population.”131 
Significantly, the NIE also noted that al Qaeda “will continue to try to acquire and 
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employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not 
hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems sufficient capability.”132  Yet, as Tushnet 
and Ackerman noted above, perhaps this threat of terrorism is the new “condition” or 
“state of emergency” America faces for the indefinite future.  
Law Professor Mark Brandon makes an intriguing observation.  He maintains that 
from the American Revolution to the present, the “armed forces of the United States have 
participated in eighty-four distinct, significant engagements.”133  He posits that six were 
declared wars, ten were undeclared wars and the rest were significant actions. According 
to Brandon, military actions have occurred during 80 percent of the life of the nation.134 
Thus, on some level, America has almost always been in a state of conflict with its 
enemies.  To what extent, if any, is America’s baseline of threat higher now than it has 
been in the past? 
Many experts agree that terrorism – while a serious threat – does not pose an 
“existential” threat that past conflicts such as the Cold War or Civil War posed to 
national security.  Crenshaw argues that “terrorism does not pose the threat of 
annihilation that the Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities did during the cold war.”135  She 
maintains that what is at stake “is not national survival, material power, or the integrity of 
our armed forces and national defense system but the individual security of American 
civilians at home.”136  Similarly, Rosenau maintains that terrorism does not “pose as 
existential threat to the United States in the way that Moscow did, armed as it was with 
tens of thousands of nuclear weapons.”137  Ackerman notes that “[t]hough our situation is 
grave, it is not as grim as the bad old days of the twentieth century, when Hitler and 
Stalin really did threaten us with physical occupation and political takeover.”  Ackerman 
astutely notes that, although the Cold War presented a graver existential threat than 
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terrorism, no president bypassed the criminal justice system and labeled domestic 
Communists as enemy combatants, throwing them into military prison incommunicado 
for years on end.  While he notes that “anti-Communist hysteria wrongfully destroyed 
countless reputations and careers,” the accused were still provided the “traditional 
protections of criminal due process.”138  Ackerman argues that “[i]f the Cold War 
anxieties did not overwhelm us, why should war talk justify the use of emergency powers 
against small bands of terrorists who cannot rely on the massive assistance of an 
aggressive superpower?”139 
Nonetheless, although terrorism may not be an existential threat in the same way 
as the Cold War, terrorism will be a protracted battle where the United States will need to 
employ all of its instruments of power (i.e., military, economic, diplomatic, law 
enforcement and intelligence) to contain and possibly win.  As explained above, terrorism 
threatens the political sovereignty of our nation – independent of the mass causalities – 
and hence merits a different response than criminal law.  While deterrence and 
containment were the strategies used to win the Cold War against state actors, prevention 
and preemption – which are dependant on accurate intelligence – will be the strategies 
needed to contain terrorism.  Since 9/11, the FBI has been transforming itself from a 
culture of law enforcement based on gathering evidence and prosecution to a “culture of 
prevention.”140  As such, a form of preventive detention may very well be needed for 
purposes of interrogation to obtain needed intelligence.  (This purpose is discussed next 
in Chapter III). When creating a system of preventive detention, however, terrorist 
suspects should not be thought of or viewed as combatants but more like criminals. 
Journalists Wittes and Gitenstein posit, “[t]he proper detention regime for the war on 
terrorism is a hybrid of different legal structures, drawing on elements of the laws of war 
and the criminal law and tailored to the unique threat posed by global catastrophic 
terrorism.”141  The challenge is to create a regime for preventive detention that can 
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balance America’s need for intelligence and incapacitation with due process and rights 
afforded the detainees.  In this way, America can contain terrorism while not 
undermining its democratic principles. 
In sum, by using an old framework primarily concerned with state actors to deal 
with a different and formidable asymmetric threat posed by terrorists risks having the old 
framework found to be unworkable or unlawful when a system of preventive detention to 
deal with terrorist suspects may very well be needed.  While the current threat is al 
Qaeda, ten years from now America may be facing a different terrorist adversary. 
Therefore, America needs a practical and more resilient preventive detention policy that 
is lawful, adaptable, respectable, and sustainable for the indefinite threat posed by 
terrorism.  As Ackerman notes: “The question . . . is whether we can design a structure 
that engages the courts, the president, and the Congress in a joint endeavor that – for all 
its predictable tensions – will generate a more resilient response to the episodic shocks 
that will surely shake us in the future.”142  Chapter VII discusses a possible solution by 
having the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court system monitor a regime of 
preventive detention as applied to U.S. persons not arrested in a zone of combat for 
purposes of interrogation and incapacitation.  Before discussing possible alternatives to 
the enemy combatant policy, however, the underlying rationales or justifications for 
preventive detention as a tool in this war on terror need to be explored.  This analysis will 
be the topic of the next chapter. 
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III. RATIONALES FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE 
WAR ON TERROR 
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. 
 
        -Ancient proverb143 
 
To assess whether preventive detention is needed as a tool in the war on terror, it 
is important to understand the underlying rationale for preventive detention.  While the 
Bush Administration unilaterally designated Padilla, Hamdi, and al-Marri as enemy 
combatants and detained them indefinitely with no criminal charges, the Administration 
did not designate the Lackawanna Six (Buffalo terrorist cell), Richard Reid (shoe-
bomber), John Walker Lindh (U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan who pled guilty), 
Zacarias Moussaoui (20th hijacker in 9/11 attacks) or countless others as enemy 
combatants but instead used the traditional criminal justice system to prosecute and 
ultimately detain these individuals.  As journalist Adam Liptak noted, “[t]he upshot of 
that approach . . . is that no one outside the administration knows just how the 
determination is made whether to handle a terror suspect as an enemy combatant or as a 
common criminal, to hold him indefinitely without charges in a military facility or to 
charge him in court.”144  Hence, one preliminary question is why has the Bush 
Administration departed from common understandings of due process by designating 
some suspected terrorists as enemy combatants while prosecuting other suspected 
terrorists in the criminal justice system.  
Because the Bush Administration’s enemy combatant policy was created 
unilaterally with no input from Congress, there is no legislative history or any single 
document that can succinctly point to this rationale.  Rather, it is necessary to review the 
Administration’s press releases, books and articles written by proponents of the enemy 
combatant policy, speeches from individuals within the Bush Administration, and 
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analyses from law professors, policy-makers, and journalists to gauge an understanding 
of the justification for preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror.  As explained 
below, a review and analysis of such documents points to three plausible reasons for the 
Bush Administration’s enemy combatant policy: interrogation, incapacitation, and 
difficulties with trying terrorists in federal Article III courts.  This chapter discusses these 
rationales and analyzes to what extent, if any, such rationales can be legitimate reasons 
for preventive detention.  
A. INTERROGATION 
A review of the aforementioned literature suggests that interrogation is the 
principal reason for the enemy combatant policy.  As explained in Chapter I, John Yoo, 
former Deputy Assistant Attorney General under the Bush Administration, was one of the 
architects of the enemy combatant policy.  In 2005 he informed The New York Times that 
“[t]he main factors that will determine how [a terrorist suspect] will be charged . . . are, 
one, how strong [his] link to Al Qaeda is and, two, whether [he has] any actionable 
intelligence that will prevent an attack on the United States.”145  According to Yoo, 
“[i]nformation is the primary weapon in the conflict against this new kind of enemy, and 
intelligence gathered from captured operatives is perhaps the most effective means 
against preventing future terrorist attacks upon U.S. territory.”146 
During oral arguments in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Supreme Court Justice Ruth 
Ginsburg asked Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement how the government justified 
treating some terrorist suspects as criminals while others such as Hamdi and Padilla as 
enemy combatants.147  Clement’s response highlights the primacy of interrogation as a 
reason for the disparate treatment: 
Well Justice Ginsburg, I think that reflects a sound exercise of 
prosecutorial and executive discretion. There are some individuals who 
may be captured in a situation where they do not have any particular 
intelligence value [and therefore] can be dealt with in the [judicial 
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system]. But there are plenty of individuals who either have a paramount 
intelligence value [so] that putting them into the [judicial system] 
immediately and providing them with counsel, whose first advice would 
certainly be to not talk to the government is a counterproductive way to 
proceed in these cases.148 
According to the Bush Administration, individuals may be significant intelligence 
assets, and criminal charges with the ensuing rights to counsel and right to exculpatory 
material would greatly halt and disrupt interrogation.  Under the criminal justice system, 
once in custody, a defendant must be warned of his rights to counsel and against self-
incrimination.149  Furthermore, a defendant in a criminal proceeding is constitutionally 
entitled to obtain potentially exculpatory information in the possession of the 
government.150  As Yoo explains, introducing a lawyer immediately after capture of an 
enemy combatant would disrupt interrogation as any competent defense counsel would 
tell his/her client to remain silent.151  According to former White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales (later the former Attorney General), “[t]he stream of intelligence would quickly 
dry up if the enemy combatants were allowed contact with outsiders during the course of 
an ongoing debriefing.”152  He added that such a result would be “an intolerable cost” 
and not required by the Constitution.153  Rosenzweig and Carafano discuss how 
“isolation” is one of the “most successful means of productive interrogation.”154  Judge 
Posner describes how a “detainee who feels isolated and has no access to a lawyer can 
more easily be pressured to provide information sought by the government.”155  In fact, 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the mastermind behind 9/11, initially demanded an 
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attorney upon arrest and stated that he would see his captors in court.156  As explained 
below, KSM was not provided an attorney and has provided substantial intelligence that 
has stopped specific terrorist plots.  Therefore, one purpose for a preventive detention 
regime is to interrogate a terrorist suspect in isolation who may prove to be a valuable 
intelligence asset before criminal charges and the ensuing rights to counsel accrue. 
This concern about Miranda protections interfering with needed interrogation is 
not just theoretical.  As explained by FBI agent Coleen Rowley, Zacarias Moussaoui (the 
20th hijacker) was in custody on September 11, 2001 due to an immigration violation. 
Because he had requested a lawyer, however, the FBI was prevented from questioning 
him when in theory he could have possessed further information about co-conspirators or 
a second wave of attacks.157 
The situation of Padilla is particularly enlightening on this issue of interrogation 
as a rationale for preventive detention.  Yoo describes Padilla as “an intelligence 
prize.”158  Based on information from other captured al Qaeda operatives (discussed 
below), the Administration had intelligence that Padilla, who was arrested at O’Hare 
International Airport in 2002, had just come from Pakistan where he had met with high-
level al Qaeda operatives with plans to detonate a radioactive bomb in a large U.S. city. 
Yet, upon arrest, while he had approximately $10,000 and a cell phone with al Qaeda 
operatives phone numbers on it, he did not have any of the bomb making equipment or 
plans on him, and he did not have the expertise to construct such a weapon himself.  
There were obvious questions that needed to be answered: Where would Padilla, who had 
an extensive violent criminal record as juvenile, get the money, supplies and expertise to 
build such a bomb?  Where would he get the radioactive material?  Were there sleeper al 
Qaeda cells in the United States?159  Although Padilla’s attorney argues that Padilla could 
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have been charged with conspiracy or levying war,160 the Justice Department did not 
think it could detain Padilla very long in the criminal justice system based on the amount 
of evidence it had and that Padilla would unlikely reveal his al Qaeda contacts if he knew 
he was going to be released in matter of months.161  In a June 2004 press release, former 
Deputy Attorney General James Comey stated: 
Had we tried to make a case against Jose Padilla through our criminal 
justice system, something that I as the United States attorney in New York 
could not do at that time without jeopardizing intelligence sources, he 
would very likely have followed his lawyer's advice and said nothing, 
which would have been his constitutional right. He would likely have 
ended up a free man, with our only hope being to try to follow him 24 
hours a day, seven days a week and hope -- pray, really -- that we didn't 
lose him.162 
Initially, as explained in Chapter I, the government detained Padilla pursuant to a 
material witness warrant, which allows the arrest of an individual who has information 
likely to be of interest to a grand jury investigating a crime but whose presence to testify 
cannot be assured.  When it became clear that Padilla could not be detained long-term 
under the material witness statute, the Administration searched for a new strategy. 
President Bush agreed he would designate Padilla an enemy combatant and place 
him into military custody only if several different government agencies independently 
agreed that Padilla’s situation merited such a response.163  After analysis by the FBI, CIA 
and DoD showed that Padilla had critical intelligence information, President Bush 
designated him an enemy combatant.  Hence, while the decision to declare Padilla an 
enemy combatant was certainly a unilateral executive branch decision, it appears the 
decision was made based on an executive branch consensus that Padilla contained vital 
intelligence.  Journalist Wittes observes in his book Law and the Long War that “[i]n 
2002, no responsible government official could have regarded [Padilla] as anything other 
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than a most extreme threat.”164  Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld noted that 
America’s “primary interest in Padilla right now is to figure out what he may know to 
help prevent a future attack rather than trying him in court.”165 
During litigation concerning Padilla, the Administration conceded that its primary 
reason for detaining him as an enemy combatant was to “find out everything he 
knows.”166  An official from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) explained during 
Padilla proceedings that the government’s approach to interrogation is “largely dependent 
upon creating an atmosphere of dependency and trust between the subject and the 
interrogator” and that “even seemingly minor interruptions can have profound 
psychological impacts of the delicate subject-interrogation relationship.”167  He also 
asserted that that “permitting Padilla any access to counsel may substantially harm our 
national security interests” because Padilla, “as with most detainees . . . is unlikely to 
cooperate if he believes that an attorney will intercede in his detention.”168  The DIA 
official further stated that the interrogation process could take a “significant amount of 
time” including “years.”169  In fact, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Moussaoui 
deferred to the government’s assertion that interruptions to the interrogation process 
could have “devastating effects on the ability to gather information” and acknowledged 
that the value of intelligence from al Qaeda operatives in custody could not be 
“overstated.”170  
While one can argue that interrogation is not a viable reason for preventive 
detention or that interrogation is ineffective at producing actionable intelligence, it is 
undeniable that interrogation is the principal reason behind the Bush Administration’s 
enemy combatant policy.  The next question becomes whether, and under what 
                                                 
164 Wittes, Law and the Long War, 180. 
165 “Fed Defend Incarceration of ‘Dirty Bomb’ Suspect,” CNN, June 27, 2002, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/06/27/dirty.bomb.suspect/ (accessed March 30, 2008). 
166 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 464 (citation omitted). 
167 Padilla, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 49. 
168 Ibid., 50. 
169 Ibid., 49. 
170 United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2004).  
 51
circumstances, interrogation can be a legitimate rationale for creating a preventive 
detention regime as a tool in the war on terror.  As will be explained, the answers to these 
questions are complex, often implicate classified information, and frankly unknown 
without additional study and analysis.  
A minor digression is warranted before addressing these questions: there appear 
to be three kinds of interrogation methods: (1) torture, which is prohibited by American 
and international law;171 (2) coercive interrogation, which is legal but has policy 
implications; and (3) non-coercive interrogation, which is the least controversial but 
generally takes a substantial period of time to develop relationships of trust and 
dependency.  As Yoo explains, “[p]hysical or mental coercion that does not constitute 
torture includes threats of poor treatment or promises of better treatment or nonharmful 
physical contact.”172  A discussion of which tactics constitute torture and are, therefore, 
unlawful and which tactics are coercive but remain legal is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  The relevant points for purposes of this paper are: (1) that interrogation is one of 
the main rationales for preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror; (2) that there is 
evidence (discussed below) that all three kinds of methods work to some degree; and (3) 
that more research and study needs to occur in order to determine interrogation’s overall 
effectiveness.  In other words, this paper does not discuss whether certain interrogation 
tactics are lawful or unlawful but instead focuses on the efficacy and costs to 
interrogation in general and ponders whether interrogation in general can be a legitimate 
rationale for preventive detention. 
B. IS INTERROGATION A LEGITIMATE RATIONALE FOR 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION? 
As the concept of preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror is based on 
the underlying rationales for preventive detention, such as interrogation, it is necessary to 
assess whether, and under what circumstances, interrogation of suspected terrorists 
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actually produces actionable intelligence.  In September 2006, President Bush stated: 
“Captured terrorists have unique knowledge about how terrorist networks operate.  They 
have knowledge of where their operatives are deployed, and knowledge about what plots 
are underway.  This intelligence -- this is intelligence that cannot be found any other 
place.  And our security depends on getting this kind of information.”173  Yoo states that 
“intelligence gathered from captured al Qaeda and Taliban fighters allowed our 
intelligence, military, and law enforcement to frustrate plots that could have killed 
thousands of Americans.”174  He explains in his book War by Other Means the capture 
and subsequent interrogations of Abu Zubaydah (al Qaeda’s chief military planner) and 
Ramzi bin al Shibh lead to the capture of KSM who has been described as the “principal 
architect” behind 9/11 attacks.175  Yoo describes how interrogations of these men 
“revealed not only how 9/11 was carried out, but the entire command structure of al 
Qaeda, its processes and organization, and how operations are planned, approved, and 
executed.”176  According to U.S. intelligence officials, Zubayda’s information led to the 
apprehension of other al Qaeda members, including Ramzi Binalshibh, Omar Faruq, 
Rahim al-Nashiri, and Muhammad al-Darbi.177  John Kiriakou, a retired CIA agent, 
noted that after thirty-five seconds of waterboarding, Zubaydah provided “threat 
information” that “disrupted a number of attacks, maybe dozens of attacks.”178  
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In fact, Zubaydah specifically named Padilla and provided information on where 
to locate him in Pakistan.179  Padilla was then followed to America where FBI agents 
arrested him at O’Hare airport. Former Deputy Attorney General Comey describes how 
Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and KSM played an instrumental role in training and 
preparing Padilla for his mission to detonate a radioactive bomb in America.180  Yet, 
after spending three and one-half years as an enemy combatant, Padilla was ultimately 
never charged with attempting to detonate a radioactive bomb, presumably because the 
government did not have adequate evidence that could be brought in an Article III court 
or because it did not wish to reveal sources and methods.181  Some legal analysts suggest 
that prosecutors decided to forgo charges on the dirty bomb plot because it would have 
opened the door for courtroom scrutiny of the government’s use of coercive 
interrogations against al Qaeda operatives, including Padilla.182  Therefore, it is difficult 
to assess whether the interrogations of Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and KSM – which 
are understandably classified – provided accurate and reliable information about Padilla’s 
plans to detonate a radioactive bomb.  Yet, Padilla was convicted of various terrorism-
related charges in August 2007, and his capture occurred because of interrogation of 
captured al Qaeda operatives.  
One obvious question – given that Padilla was locked up as an enemy combatant 
for three and one-half years – is whether the U.S. government actually obtained 
actionable intelligence from Padilla to plausibly justify its treatment of him.  The Bush 
Administration has certainly asserted it has obtained useful intelligence.  In May 2004, 
Comey stated that “[w]e now know much of what Jose Padilla knows.  And what we 
have learned confirms that the president of the United States made the right call.”183 
Officials announced that after two years of interrogation, Padilla had confessed to 
involvement in the dirty bomb plot, although he insisted he never planned to carry it to 
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fruition and had only made the proposal to al Qaeda leaders in 2002 as a way to justify 
fleeing Pakistan to avoid being sent to fight U.S. forces in Afghanistan.184  According to 
officials, Padilla also provided information about an alleged plot to blow up an apartment 
building by leaving gas stoves on and admitted to having contact with senior al Qaeda 
operatives.185  Of course, as explained above, such assertions have never been litigated in 
a court of law, as Padilla was never charged with planning any specific terrorist plot but 
rather with a broad conspiracy charge that he was a willing participant in a global terror 
campaign to wage violent jihad by murdering and maiming people.  Investigative 
journalist Tim Golden notes that “it is not clear that the information that Padilla has 
provided since being held as an enemy combatant has been vital.”186 
There is stronger evidence that interrogations of KSM and other high level al 
Qaeda operatives have produced actionable intelligence that has thwarted specific 
terrorist attacks within the U.S.  In September 2006, President Bush revealed to the 
American public specific terrorist plots that had been thwarted by interrogation of key al 
Qaeda operatives.  According to President Bush, interrogation of KSM led to the capture 
of Hambali, the leader of al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian affiliate known as “J-I” and to a cell 
of seventeen Southeast Asian “J-I” operatives who were planning on attacking within the 
United States, possibly using airplanes.187  In addition, KSM revealed details about al 
Qaeda’s biological weapons program that lead to the capture of two principal assistants 
who were working on al Qaeda’s anthrax program.  Furthermore, according to President 
Bush, terrorists held in CIA custody have also provided information that helped stop a 
planned strike on U.S. Marines at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and helped stop a planned 
attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi using car bombs and motorcycle bombs.188  As 
former CIA head George Tenet noted in his book At the Center of the Storm: My Years at 
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the CIA, “I believe none of these successes would have happened if we had to treat KSM 
like a white-collar criminal--read him his Miranda rights and get him a lawyer who surely 
would have insisted that his client simply shut up.”189 
According to intelligence documents published by Newsweek, the federal 
authorities were able to uncover at least one KSM-run cell that could “have done grave 
damage to the United States.”190  Furthermore, al Qaeda plotters were “scheming to take 
down the Brooklyn Bridge, destroy an airliner, derail a train and blow up a whole series 
of gas stations.”191  Specifically, interrogations of KSM resulted in the arrest of Majid 
Khan, a former Baltimore resident who had been tasked with simultaneously detonating 
explosives in several gas stations’ underground storage tanks.  KSM also revealed that he 
wanted commercial truck driver Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of 
Columbus, Ohio (and a relative of Khan) – to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge by cutting its 
suspension wires.  KSM further identified Adnan el Shukri Jumah, a Saudi born 
permanent U.S. resident alien who received an associate’s degree from a Florida college, 
as an operative with standing permission to attack targets in the United States that have 
been approved by bin Laden.  Most significant is that KSM identified Ali al-Marri as “the 
point of contact for AQ operatives arriving in the U.S. for September 11 follow-on 
operations.”  KSM described al-Marri as “the perfect sleeper agent because he has 
studied in the United States, had no criminal record, and had a family with whom he 
could travel.”192  Al-Marri was arrested in Peoria and labeled as an enemy combatant in 
2003.  He allegedly had trained with KSM and Bin Laden and had researched weapons of 
mass destruction on his laptop.   As explained previously, his case is currently pending an 
evidentiary hearing.  Hence, there appears to be evidence that interrogations of al Qaeda 
operatives have produced critical intelligence that has stopped attacks and led to arrests 
of other al Qaeda operatives. 
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Furthermore, there is evidence from other countries that interrogation has 
produced actionable intelligence that has stopped specific terrorist attacks.  A 1995 plot 
by al Qaeda to bomb eleven American airlines was thwarted by information tortured out 
of a Pakistani suspect by the Philippine police.193  Furthermore, evidence from Israel 
suggests that coercive interrogation is effective and saves lives.  The Landau Commission 
found that “effective activity by the [General Security Service, or GSS] to thwart terrorist 
acts is impossible without the use of the tool of the [coercive] interrogation of suspects, in 
order to extract from them vital information known only to them, and unobtainable by 
other means.”194  In a report submitted to the United Nations, Israel stated that GSS 
investigations thwarted ninety planned terrorist attacks, including “10 suicide bombings; 
7 car-bombings; 15 kidnappings of soldiers and civilians; and some 60 attacks of 
different types . . . .”195  While the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the GSS practices of 
coercive interrogation required clear legislative authorization and violated rights of 
human dignity, it did acknowledge that coercive interrogation works.196  Law Professor 
Sanford Levison explains how “torture enabled the French to gather information about 
future terrorist strikes and to destroy the infrastructure of terror in Algiers.”197  
Another example of successful interrogation was FBI agent George Piro’s in-
depth seven-month interrogation of Saddam Hussein.  While Piro did not use coercive 
interrogation but rather relied on creating a “relationship of dependency, trust, and 
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to create the relationship.198  Based on Piro’s interrogation, Hussein revealed his reasons 
for invading Kuwait and more importantly his rationale for creating the perception that he 
had weapons of mass destruction.199  
Along similar lines, the Department of Defense (DoD) Criminal Investigation 
Task Force (CITF), using exclusively non-coercive interrogation methods, conducted 
over 10,000 interviews of detainees and obtained evidence and confessions that linked 
subjects to the 9/11 attacks, the USS Cole bombing, al Qaeda recruiting, training and 
financing, and other acts.200  According to former Colonel Britt Mallow, who was the 
Commander in charge of the DoD-wide effort to investigate terrorism and war crimes 
cases for prosecution by the Military Commissions, a significant portion of the detainees 
held at Guantanamo Bay between 2002-2005 incriminated themselves and implicated 
others during non-coercive interrogation.201  According to Colonel Mallow, information 
obtained from the detainees was largely corroborated by physical or documentary 
evidence or intelligence reports.202  The significance of these examples is that, even when 
non-coercive interrogation methods are employed, interrogation can produce useful 
information.  Such examples support the efficacy of interrogation as a rationale for 
preventive detention. In sum, although largely anecdotal, there are countless examples of 
interrogation providing actionable intelligence.  
Despite the evidence discussed above about the effectiveness of interrogation, 
many lawyers as well as military, law enforcement, and intelligence professionals argue 
that coercive interrogation produces only unreliable information or that it is not worth the 
ensuing costs to America’s reputation and human dignity.  For instance, although it 
appears as explained above that KSM provided actionable intelligence information, there 
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is nonetheless the question of how much useless, unreliable or inaccurate information 
was also obtained, and whether acting on any of that information could, or actually did, 
endanger U.S. people or interests.  There are reports that KSM confessed to a number of 
things in which he had no direct involvement.203  Shafiq Rasul, the named plaintiff in 
Rasul v. Bush, falsely confessed to attending an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan 
when evidence showed that he was at home in England at the time.204  Consequently, 
some military lawyers believe that “the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields 
unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source 
to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear.”205  A senior Pentagon 
intelligence officer has expressed concerns that intelligence gathered from coercion could 
be inaccurate or false, and that isolation as an interrogation tactic could negatively impact 
the source to recall information.206  Law Professor Brian Foley notes that “[m]ost people 
who are ‘water-boarded,’ beaten, deprived of sleep, and attacked by guard dogs – or who 
are simply threatened with such treatment – will, at some point, decide that it is in their 
interest to acquiesce to their captors, such as by telling them what they know, agreeing 
with the accusations interrogators makes against them, or even concocting stories that 
they believe will please their interrogators.”207  Suskind notes in his book The One 
Percent Doctrine that al Qaeda operative Zubaydah (discussed above as providing 
actionable intelligence) may actually have been a mentally ill low-level logistics person 
who did provide useful information to the Administration.208  According to Suskind, FBI 
agents have even questioned the effectiveness of coercive interrogation.  As one FBI 
agent stated: “The CIA wants everything in five minutes. It’s not possible and it’s not 
productive. What you get in that circumstance is captives and captors playing into each 
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other’s expectations, playing roles – essentially – that gives you a lot of garbage 
information and nothing you can use.”209  Even Yoo – a proponent of the enemy 
combatant policy – acknowledges that “coercive interrogation” should not be used in 
every case and that it does not always work.  Nonetheless, he maintains that it should not 
be ruled out across the board.210 
One way to assess the validity of the Administration’s assertions that 
interrogations of al Qaeda operatives have produced useful intelligence would be the 
Detainee Interrogation Reports mentioned and relied on by the authors of the bi-partisan 
9/11 Commission Report.  According to the commissioners, while they were allowed to 
submit questions to the interrogators of the detainees, they had no control over whether, 
when or how the questions would be asked.211  Significantly, the commissioners noted 
that they used corroborating evidence as much as they could to assess the accuracy of the 
information but that “[a]ssessing the truth of statements by these witnesses – sworn 
enemies of the United States – is challenging.”212  
While it convenient to argue that coercive interrogation does not work – and 
therefore cannot under any circumstances be a rationale for preventive detention – the 
reality, as discussed above, is much more complicated than such an absolutist position 
might suggest.  Law professors Vermuele and Posner argue that asserting that coercive 
interrogation does not work is a convenient delusion: 
Perhaps, all of the officials and actors who use coercive interrogation to 
extract information on preventive grounds are acting immorally or 
imprudently, but to claim that coercive interrogation is entirely ineffective 
is to claim that those actors, all of them, are acting irrationally. . . . The 
claim that coercive interrogation is ineffective is a delusion, although it 
may be a morally pleasing one. It is either a form of wishful thinking or 
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moral commitments and their prudential commitments, or a rhetorical turn 
that opponents of coercive interrogation use to advance their moral 
agenda.213 
Judge Posner argues that “[q]uite apart from the abundant evidence that torture is 
often an effective method of eliciting true information, which is also the common sense 
of the situation, methods of coercive interrogation well short of torture but more coercive 
than is permissible for eliciting statements used in an ordinary criminal proceeding are 
often effective too.”214  Hence, prominent scholars who have studied the issue have 
validated the efficacy of coercive interrogation as a way to obtain valuable information.  
Other scholars argue that the issue of whether coercive interrogation works is 
simply unknown.  As Law Professor Levison describes: 
One problem is that we really have no idea how reliable torture is as a 
method of procuring information. To put it mildly, there are no 
methodologically sophisticated tests of its effectiveness. Indeed, one 
cannot even imagine their occurring in anything but a totalitarian political 
regime, for who would ever give an “informed consent” to being tortured 
as part of the experiment? One is therefore left to anecdote and counter-
anecdote with regard to the efficacy or futility of torture.215 
Nonetheless, there does appear to be some hope of being able to evaluate the 
effectiveness of coercive interrogation with future study.  A December 2006 Intelligence 
Science Board (ISB) 374-page report examined several aspects of interrogation methods. 
As journalist Josh White summarizes, the ISB report concluded that “popular culture” 
and “ad hoc experimentation” have “fueled the use of aggressive and sometimes physical 
interrogation techniques to get those captured . . . to talk, even if there is no evidence to 
support the tactics’ effectiveness.”216  The ISB noted that no significant scientific 
research has been conducted in more than four decades about the effectiveness of many 
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interrogation techniques that are regularly used by the military and intelligence groups.217 
Robert Fein, chairman of the study, observed: “This shortfall in advanced, research-based 
interrogation methods at a time of intense pressure from operational commanders to 
produce actionable intelligence from high-value targets may have contributed 
significantly to the unfortunate cases of abuse that have recently come to light.”218  The 
ISB recommended additional scientific research of interrogation methods (both 
retrospective analyses of data about past interrogations and new studies that relate 
different practices to the value of the information obtained) to determine what is 
effective.219  
The more pressing and relevant question is, assuming interrogation works in 
certain circumstances and with certain individuals, should individuals be locked up 
indefinitely without counsel for the purposes of interrogation to obtain actionable 
intelligence?  Should the executive branch be allowed to unilaterally determine which 
terrorist suspects are ripe for prolonged and incommunicado interrogation?  As Law 
Professor Foley notes, “[t]he Executive . . . is not all-knowing and never has been.”220  In 
fact, a German national named Khaled el-Masri was arrested by Macedonian officials, 
transferred to the CIA for coercive interrogation in Afghanistan, and then released five 
months later in Albania after then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice admitted 
that he had been mistakenly identified as a terrorism suspect.221  As explained in Chapter 
II, given that terrorist suspects are often detained in peaceful civilian areas and not on an 
actual battlefield, mistakes have been made and will continue to be made in this war on 
terror.  
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Furthermore, there are consequences to coercive interrogation.  Al-Marri’s 
attorneys assert that his six and one-half years of detention with no charges (five of them 
as an enemy combatant) have degraded his mental state and left him unable to participate 
in his defense.222  Similarly, mental health experts who have examined Padilla say the 
coercive techniques, which allegedly included sleep and sensory deprivation as well as 
disorienting drugs, shackles, and stress positions, have left him with severe psychological 
damage that may be permanent.223  Although the Administration contends that Padilla is 
faking his psychological condition, there is nonetheless a concern to American’s 
reputation and credibility with respect to its interrogation methods.224  Army Col. Stuart 
Herrington, a military intelligence specialist who conducted interrogations in Vietnam, 
argues that coercive interrogation “endangers our soldiers on the battlefield by 
encouraging reciprocity,” causes “damage to our country’s image” and “undermines our 
credibility.”225  
By contrast, Vermuele and Posner argue that coercive interrogation will only have 
a “marginal” negative effect on the United States’ reputation because the U.S. is “already 
heavily criticized for policies that will not change anytime soon – capital punishment, 
ungenerous social welfare policies, aggressive use of its military, [and] reluctance to 
cooperate in international organizations.”226  They also argue that liberal democracies 
that “collapse into chaos” because they are “bullied by authoritarian regimes or terrorist 
organizations are not attractive role models.”  Yoo concludes that information obtained 
from coercive interrogation has saved thousands of Americans and was worth the costs to 
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America’s reputation.227  As he explains, al Qaeda clearly sought weapons of mass 
destruction and ponders: “What President would put America’s image in the United 
Nations above the protection of thousands of innocent civilian lives.”228  Yoo also notes 
that Israel, Great Britain, and France have employed coercive interrogation in certain 
circumstances without allow the practice to infect “garden-variety” crimes.229  
A related question is whether the use of questionable interrogation methods limits 
one’s options for ultimate legal or diplomatic disposition of an individual subject.  For 
instance, in 2008, the military dropped charges against Mohamed Al Kahtani, an alleged 
September 11 conspirator who did not participate in the 9/11 attacks because he was 
denied entry in the United States.  Because of his brutal interrogation, however, the 
military may not be able to prosecute him.  As journalist Wittes notes, the Administration 
may “have to set him free absent some extrinsic non-criminal detention authority” despite 
his intent to kill large numbers of Americans.230  Hence, coercive interrogation – 
assuming it works – has serious consequences.  
While it appears that interrogation of detainees has produced actionable 
intelligence, it is a more difficult question to assess whether prolonged interrogation as an 
enemy combatant was the only way to obtain such needed intelligence.  There is certainly 
evidence that making deals with terrorists and obtaining their cooperation has also 
produced actionable intelligence.  Former Attorney General Ashcroft informed Congress 
in 2007 that the Justice Department had obtained criminal plea agreements – “many 
under seal” – with more than fifteen individuals who were cooperating with federal 
authorities, leading to “critical intelligence” about al Qaeda safe houses and recruiting 
tactics.231  For instance, Faras – the individual who was tasked by KSM to destroy the 
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Brooklyn Bridge – entered a plea agreement and is now cooperating with authorities.232 
Furthermore, in December 2001, authorities in Britain captured Sajid Badat, a 22-year 
old Muslim born in Gloucester who had returned to Britain after completing al Qaeda 
training in Afghanistan and Pakistan.233  His mission – along with Richard Reid who was 
thwarted by passengers and crew on-board an airplane – was to blow up an aircraft 
traveling from Britain to the United States.  He abandoned the plot and is cooperating 
with British authorities.  Journalist Michael Jacobson notes that “the reasons for a change 
of heart can be strikingly prosaic: family, money, petty grievances.  But they also can 
revolve around shaken ideology or lost faith in a group’s leadership.”234  Hence, there is 
evidence that obtaining intelligence from actual terrorists does not have to be through 
prolonged isolation or labeling them as enemy combatants.  
Nonetheless, there is no reason that America needs only one, exclusive approach 
to gathering intelligence.  While offering incentives and rewards may coax some 
terrorists into cooperating, other terrorists, such as KSM or al-Marri, may need to be 
subjected to prolonged interrogation.  According to former Attorney General Ashcroft, 
one of the reasons al-Marri was labeled an enemy combatant was that he “rejected 
numerous offers to improve his lot by cooperating with the FBI investigators and 
providing information.”235  At a minimum, one can certainly acknowledge that “the value 
of detainees as a source of information remains high in a substantial part of the 
intelligence community.”236  Perhaps, opponents of coercive interrogation would be 
more comfortable with interrogation as a rationale for preventive detention if only non-
coercive methods, such as the methods used on Saddam Hussein were employed.  In 
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other words, while this paper does not address whether any particular interrogation tactic 
is lawful or coercive, the question of whether a system of preventive detention can be 
based on the rationale of interrogation may be dependent on a consensus on the methods 
used to extract information.  
While there appear to be compelling reasons for interrogation as a rationale for 
preventive detention, especially where non-coercive methods are used, that ultimate 
conclusion will depend on threat level as discussed in Chapter II and additional 
discussion and study on the issue.  Therefore, at this juncture, this author does not 
definitively conclude that interrogation is a legitimate rationale for preventive detention 
in all circumstances.  Assuming it is a viable justification – and there certainly is 
evidence that supports such a position – and assuming the threat level merits it, this paper 
proposes creating a preventive detention regime for purposes of interrogation that has 
more due process rights for the detainee then the current enemy combatant policy. 
C. INCAPACITATION 
A second reason for preventive detention and President Bush’s enemy combatant 
policy is incapacitation.  As discussed in Chapter II, the battlefield in this war on terror is 
no longer an actual zone of combat but includes otherwise peaceful civilian areas. 
Incapacitation as a rationale for preventive detention is obviously more compelling if the 
terrorist suspect is detained by military personnel on an actual battlefield during 
hostilities, such as Hamdi, but loses some persuasiveness when the terrorist suspect is 
detained by the FBI in an American city that is not involved in a battle, such as Padilla 
and al-Marri.  An argument can be made, however, that terrorists, if not incapacitated 
when caught in a civilian area, may then leave for a zone of combat in Afghanistan or 
Iraq, or commit terrorist attacks in civilian areas.  Critics respond that the criminal justice 
system can incapacitate terrorist suspects caught in a peaceful civilian area by the filing 
of criminal charges – not by labeling them as enemy combatants when they are not 
captured in a zone of combat.  While it would be impractical to require “soldiers in the 
field to worry about warrants, lawyers, Miranda, forensic evidence, and chains of custody 
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if we want to win the war on terrorism,”237 such an argument cannot honestly apply to 
the situations of Padilla and al-Marri, who were detained in the U.S. by the FBI (not 
soldiers) and not on an actual battlefield.  
During the oral argument in Hamdi, Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued 
that incapacitation of Hamdi was a legitimate rationale for designating him an enemy 
combatant.  Clement posited that the Administration needed to detain Hamdi so he would 
not rejoin the battlefield while the United States had 10,000 American troops in 
Afghanistan.238  According to an affidavit from a Defense Department official (i.e., the 
Mobbs declaration), Hamdi surrendered to the Northern Alliance who turned him over to 
U.S. authorities.  Thus, the Mobbs declaration is based on hearsay from a Northern 
Alliance official who informed the United States that Hamdi was fighting for the Taliban 
in Afghanistan with an assault rifle.239  Significantly, Hamdi was never allowed to 
challenge the facts presented in this affidavit.  According to his father, Hamdi was in 
Afghanistan on a humanitarian mission.  
Justice O’Connor, in her plurality opinion in Hamdi, explicitly upheld 
incapacitation as a justification for preventive detention as long as the individual was 
held only for the duration of hostilities and allowed an opportunity to challenge the 
designation as an enemy combatant: “Because detention to prevent combatant’s return to 
the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 
‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized 
detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.”240  Significantly, after this 
ruling, the Administration did not provide Hamdi a meaningful opportunity to challenge 
his designation as an enemy combatant or the underlying facts asserted in the Mobbs 
declaration.  Rather, in October 2004, the government released Hamdi to Saudi Arabia  
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after it determined that he no longer posed a threat to the United States, thereby 
undermining – to some extent – the Administration’s rationale for detaining this 
dangerous individual.241  
Nonetheless, there is evidence to suggest that al Qaeda detainees who have been 
released have returned to the battlefield.242  In April 2008, a Kuwaiti man released from 
Guantanamo Bay in 2005 blew himself up in a suicide bombing in Iraq killing six 
people.243  The Bush Administration states that as many as twelve people released from 
Guantanamo have returned to the battlefield to fight again against U.S. interests.244  
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the rationale of incapacitation of a 
terrorist suspect caught in an active zone of combat (e.g., Hamdi), it has not addressed 
whether incapacitation of terrorist suspects caught by the FBI in an American city is 
justified (e.g., Padilla and al-Marri).  (This topic will be addressed in detail in Chapter 
IV.)  Certainly, in some cases, the filing of criminal charges is one uncontroversial way to 
incapacitate terrorist suspects caught in a civilian area.  Yet, advocates of preventive 
detention argue that there may not be sufficient admissible evidence to detain a terrorist 
suspect under the traditional criminal justice system.  For instance, a foreign government 
may provide intelligence about an individual but refuse to provide any admissible 
evidence, the evidence may have been obtained by unsavory means and therefore 
inadmissible, or the evidence could compromise sources and methods.  Michael Chertoff, 
former federal appellate judge (now Secretary of Homeland Security), asked a chilling 
question at an ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security meeting in 2004. 
He assumed it was September 10, 2001 and FBI agents just received word from a reliable 
and confidential source that members of an international terrorist organization were 
planning to hijack commercial airliners and bomb New York and Washington, D.C. 
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Chertoff pondered what the FBI could legally do.245  While FBI agents could arrest the 
members to disrupt their plans, it would be hard to hold them on specific charges based 
on the confidential nature of the sources and the hearsay nature of the evidence.  It would 
seem, at a minimum, that these individuals should be arrested and incapacitated at least 
for a short time to disrupt their plans.  Such incapacitation, however, would negate the 
idea of innocent until proven guilty.  Chertoff suggested that America needed changes to 
its current legal system that balance these real security threats with civil liberties.246 
According to Former Deputy Attorney General George Terwilliger, “the use of criminal 
prosecutions to incapacitate terrorists is proving to be clumsy, inadequate and, civil 
libertarians should note, taking law enforcement powers where they have never gone 
before.”247  Thus, it appears that one rationale for preventive detention is interruption of 
plans, even if specific criminal charges cannot be made within forty-eight hours of arrest, 
as is the usual requirement under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.248 
Judge Posner also suggests that the government may have a compelling reason to 
detain a terrorist suspect more than the standard forty-eight hours: “namely, to avoid 
tipping off his accomplices that the government has seized him, while meanwhile 
extracting from him information that it can use to arrest them before their suspicions are 
aroused, or even to ‘turn him’ so that he becomes a double agent, spying on his erstwhile 
accomplices.”249  Incapacitation because there is not enough evidence to charge a 
terrorist suspect, or for the extraction of information about accomplices, however, are not 
foolproof arguments.  There are presently several federal statutes that criminalize 
inchoate crimes such as conspiracy, attempt, and providing material support to terrorists. 
According to former federal prosecutor Kenneth Roth, U.S. courts are fully capable of 
addressing today’s terrorist threat and can use conspiracy law, which only requires two or 
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more people to agree to pursue an illegal plan and take at least one step to advance it, as a 
way to incapacitate most terrorists.  Similarly, he argues that the crime of providing 
material support to terrorists can occur even when a terrorist act is only in preparation 
and has not yet been committed.250  Hence, it is unclear under Chertoff’s example why 
such men could not be arrested and charged with conspiracy, attempt, or providing 
material support to terrorists.  Furthermore, the government could charge terrorism 
defendants with violations of “alternative statutes” such as immigration violations, false 
statements or credit card fraud.251  In fact, credit card fraud is what the government 
charged al-Marri with in 2002 before switching course and designating him an enemy 
combatant in 2003.  
The criminal justice system also has procedures in place to protect confidential 
sources, who can supply probable cause for an arrest or search warrant, which is the 
typical procedure in drug cases.  It also should be noted that probable cause, not proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, is required to arrest someone.  Furthermore, the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984 provides a mechanism to detain a suspect before trial based on a showing of 
dangerousness and risk of flight.  In fact, in 2000, the Second Circuit upheld pretrial 
detention of 30- 33 months of a suspected terrorist with alleged links to al Qaeda based 
on “a substantial threat to national security.”252  Alternatively, the FBI could put such 
terrorist suspects under surveillance to gather more evidence and/or to capture more 
accomplices.  In all fairness, however, surveillance, without knowing the suspect’s intent 
has its limits; it would not have been productive to watch Mohammad Atta board a plane 
with FBI agents waiting to continue surveillance after he disembarked in Los Angeles. 
As with interrogation, incapacitation seems to be a plausible rationale for 
preventive detention.  It certainly has its weaknesses, however, and if employed as a 
rationale to sustain a system of preventive detention, we need a better understanding of 
why the current criminal justice system is so inadequate to incapacitate terrorist suspects 
caught in civilian areas as opposed to an actual zone of conflict.  
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D.  DIFFICULTIES WITH TRYING SUSPECTS IN ARTICLE III COURTS 
A third plausible justification for preventive detention could be difficulties with 
trying terrorist suspects in Article III courts.  While this justification is related to 
incapacitation due to a supposed lack of evidence to arrest, this rationale is more 
concerned with protecting intelligence sources during a trial and with the difficulties of 
applying the rules of evidence in wartime environments.  In other words, the rationale 
articulated in this section is based less on the lack of evidence than on how and where 
that evidence is going to be presented.  As will be explained, this is the weakest of 
plausible reasons for preventive detention because these issues, while illustrating genuine 
challenges to terrorism prosecutions, are really addressing a separate problem of where 
and how terrorist suspects should be tried – not whether they should be held 
incommunicado as a form of preventive detention before trial.  
Tasia Scolinos, a Justice Department spokeswoman, explained in November 2005 
that the designation of someone as an enemy combatant was not arbitrary and depended 
on several factors including “national security interests, the need to gather intelligence 
and the best and quickest way to obtain it, the concern about protecting intelligence 
sources and methods and ongoing information gathering, the ability to use information as 
evidence in a criminal proceeding, the circumstances of the manner in which the 
individual was detained, the applicable criminal charges, and classified-evidence 
issues.”253  Included in these multiple justifications for the enemy combatant policy is 
protecting intelligence sources and using such information in a criminal proceeding.  
Evidence establishing individuals as “terrorists” may not be able to be produced 
in a federal court without disclosing clandestine intelligence assets.  Turner and 
Schulhofer have addressed these questions in an article entitled: The Secrecy Problems in 
Terrorism Trials.254  They explain various scenarios that would make it difficult to try 
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terrorist suspects in federal courts.255  They dub these examples “the well-placed 
informant,” and “the recalcitrant ally.”256  The “well-placed informant” represents 
situations where the evidence comes from on ongoing wiretap or current human 
informant.  By disclosing where the evidence originated, the future intelligence-gathering 
by that human informant or ongoing wiretap is compromised.  
The “recalcitrant ally” represents situations where foreign law enforcement may 
be willing to share evidence for intelligence-gathering but not for prosecution. 
Alternatively, a foreign government may elicit a confession from a suspect (without 
torture) but not be willing to have its interrogator identified or subjected to cross-
examination at a suppression hearing.257  Because there is no subpoena power over 
foreign witnesses, prosecutors might not be able to use valuable and reliable evidence 
from another country.  Intelligence information may also not meet the legal requirements 
of admissibility, especially if the information is in the form of hearsay, consists of stolen 
documents, or is photographs taken by foreign agents.258  Other concerns with trying 
terrorist suspects in federal court include suspects obtaining access to classified or 
sensitive material, leaks of such information to the public, and threats of physical harm to 
participants in the trial such as jurors, judges, and prosecutors.259  
For instance, during the criminal trial of Omar Abdel Rahman, known as the 
“blind sheik,” for participation in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the federal 
prosecutor turned over to the defense a list of two hundred possible un-indicted 
coconspirators in compliance with standard criminal discovery procedures.  This list, 
which was discovered during investigation into the African embassy bombings, was  
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delivered to Bin Laden in Sudan within days of its production in court, allowing Bin 
Laden to see which operatives were compromised and how American intelligence had 
learned its information.260  
Furthermore, opponents of preventive detention – and especially the enemy 
combatant policy – often tout the government’s prosecution of Moussaoui (the 20th 
hijacker) in federal court as evidence that terrorism prosecutions in federal court are 
successful.  To stop the analysis there, however, would be misleading. The government 
experienced many difficulties in prosecuting Moussaoui in federal court using the 
traditional criminal justice system.  Moussaoui wanted access to KSM and other captured 
al Qaeda leaders as potential exculpatory evidence to explain how he was not involved in 
the 9/11 plot but rather was preparing for a second wave.  The federal trial judge agreed 
that access to these individuals was necessary for a fair trial, and when the government 
understandably refused to produce them based on national security concerns, the judge 
sanctioned the government by precluding the death penalty.  The government appealed 
and the appellate court held that written summaries from the al Qaeda operatives would 
serve as substitutes for live testimony.  Ultimately, Moussaoui pled guilty and “relieved 
the government of its quandary between protecting national security secrets and 
prosecution.”261  As Yoo explains, “[t]hose who believe the Moussaoui case shows that 
the criminal justice system can try terrorists have not paid close attention to the 
proceedings.  If Moussaoui had chosen to fight on, as would be standard operating 
procedure with a competent defense counsel this case would still be on today.  Then, in 
your mind, multiply that by hundreds or thousands of other terrorists.”262  
Whatever the ultimate conclusions about where terrorism suspects should be 
tried, the forum and procedures to try terrorist suspects is a separate, albeit related, issue 
to whether we need a system of preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror.  Yet, 
because the Bush Administration mentions these difficulties in prosecuting terrorists as 
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partial justification for the enemy combatant policy, it is listed here as a plausible 
justification.  Furthermore, many of the alternative ideas proposed to the current enemy 
combatant policy (discussed in Chapter VII) include solutions that encompass difficulties 
with trying terrorist suspects in federal court.  Nonetheless, it seems that the challenges 
with trying terrorism suspects in federal court really address a host of different issues not 
directly related to the question of whether the United States needs a system of preventive 
detention as a tool in the war on terror.  
In sum, while a review of the literature illustrates three plausible reasons for 
preventive detention and the enemy combatant policy, the only rationales that seem 
justifiable would be interrogation to obtain actionable intelligence and incapacitation to 
prevent a terrorist suspect from returning to a battlefield.  Both of these justifications are 
problematic to the tenets of a true democracy but may be necessary depending on the 
threat level and priorities of the American public.  With respect to incapacitation, the 
rationale for preventive detention is stronger in the case of someone like Hamdi where 
the detainee is arrested by the military in a zone of combat where chain of custody and 
other evidentiary issues pose challenges.  While it is weaker when the detainee is arrested 
by the FBI in a peaceful civilian area, there could plausibly be a need for preventive 
detention if the criminal justice system is inadequate to incapacitate because of classified 
information, insufficient evidence, or other evidentiary issues.  Of course, interrogation 
and incapacitation may support each other and not be mutually exclusive rationales.  For 
instance, it may be necessary to interrogate to determine if the suspect is likely to be 
dangerous and will return to the battlefield, which supports incapacitation.  Given these 
plausible reasons for preventive detention, the next question discusses whether a system 
of preventive detention based on these rationales could ever be lawful.  
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IV. LAWFULNESS OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to 
impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, the courts must accord 
proper deference to the political branches. However, security subsists, 
too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles, chief among them being 
freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty 
that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. 
 
-Justice Anthony Kennedy in Boumediene v. Bush263 
 
In creating a preventive detention regime in the United States, a preliminary and 
fundamental question that needs to be addressed is under what circumstances, if any, can 
it ever be lawful?  Wittes and Gitenstein from the Brookings Institution note that 
“[d]eveloping rules for detaining suspected enemies engaged in unconventional warfare 
against the United States represents the fundamental challenge facing American legal 
policy in the war on terrorism today.”264  As this chapter explores, there are both 
constitutional and statutory concerns with creating a preventive detention regime 
whereby U.S. persons are detained with no criminal charges and held indefinitely for the 
purposes of interrogation, incapacitation, or difficulties with trying them in Article III 
courts.  While the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether U.S. persons captured in 
peaceful civilian areas can be held indefinitely as enemy combatants, it is likely the 
Supreme Court will ultimately find the enemy combatant policy to be in violation of the 
Constitution and the Non-Detention Act of 1971,265 which requires Congress to pass a 
statute before individuals can be detained.  
Nonetheless, even should the enemy combatant policy be found unlawful, there 
does appear a way to create a lawful regime of preventive detention as a tool in the war 
on terror if: (1) the detainees are allowed to challenge in some way the underlying factual 
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evidence establishing their need to be preventively detained and (2) Congress enacts 
legislation explicitly setting forth the conditions and rules for preventive detention. 
A.  CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
The Constitution does not mention preventive detention.  It is also unclear how 
the various branches of government interact during national exigencies such as war.  For 
instance, while Article II of the Constitution empowers the President to act as 
Commander in Chief, Article I of the Constitution states that “Congress shall have the 
power . . . [to] make rules concerning captures on land and water.”  Article I also gives 
Congress the ability to “declare War”; “raise and support Armies”; and raise funds to 
“provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.”  Harvard 
Law Professor Cass Sunstein observes that the “protection of national security is divided 
between Congress and the president – and that if either has a dominant role, it is 
Congress.”266  As a result of the tension over which branch controls national security, 
over the years the Supreme Court has filled in the contours of preventive detention.  
The Supreme Court has stated that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and 
detention prior to trial or without a trial is the carefully limited exception.”267  Hence, the 
obvious starting point for creating a lawful regime of preventive detention is what 
constitutes these limited exceptions.  As explained below, these exceptions seem to be for 
(1) pre-trial detention before trial; (2) detention of aliens who cannot be returned to their 
country of origin; (3) confinement based on mental illness; (4) quarantines for public 
health; and (5) detention based on the “war powers” of the executive. 
1. Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution 
The Fourth Amendment protects against arbitrary arrest and detention without 
probable cause, and generally requires a judicial determination of probable cause within 
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forty-eight hours of arrest.268  “Probable cause” exists if “the facts and circumstances 
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been 
committed.”269  If the probable cause determination occurs after forty-eight hours, the 
burden is on the government to “demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or 
other extraordinary circumstance.”270  While the procedure used to determine probable 
cause need not be adversarial in nature, it must provide a “fair and reliable determination 
of probable cause as condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this 
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after 
arrest.”271  If probable cause is found an individual is generally entitled to a “speedy and 
public trial” based on specific criminal charges.272  
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution states that no person may be “deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  The Supreme Court has found 
that the right to due process has both “substantive” and “procedural” aspects: 
“substantive due process” prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 
“shocks the conscience” or interferes with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”273  A general principle of substantive due process is that the government may 
not detain a person prior to the judgment of guilt in a criminal trial.274  When government 
action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due process 
scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner, which is referred to as 
“procedural” due process.”275  
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While incarceration usually involves defendants convicted of crimes, the courts 
have traditionally recognized exceptions based on mental illness, quarantines, and 
“dangerousness.”  With respect to the mental illness, the Supreme Court has held that a 
harm-threatening mental illness or “mental abnormality” can outweigh the “individual’s 
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint” and that the government 
may detain mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public.276  With 
respect to quarantines, a state can implement mandatory quarantines under its inherent 
“police powers” to safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.277  The federal 
government has residual authority under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
to prevent the interstate spread of disease.278 
With respect to “dangerousness,” bail can be denied prior to trial under the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984.279  In order for an individual to be denied bail and held in pretrial 
detention, there must be an adversarial hearing, and a finding by a judge based on “clear 
and convincing” evidence that no conditions of release “will reasonably assure . . . the 
safety of any other person and the community.”280  The Supreme Court has found denial 
of bail to be a “permissible regulation” and not a punitive measure.281  Significantly, a 
bail hearing occurs after criminal charges have been filed and after a probable cause 
hearing.  Enemy combatants who are presumed to be dangerous are not being detained in 
pre-trial detention, and, as such, they have not been provided a bail hearing 
demonstrating their “dangerousness.” 
Aliens may also be detained prior to deportation.  In Zadvydas v. Davis, the 
Supreme Court held that the government cannot indefinitely detain an alien who has been 
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ordered deported but who cannot be repatriated to his home country.  The Court held that 
individuals may only be detained for a “period reasonably necessary to bring about that 
alien’s removal from the U.S. [The statute] does not permit indefinite detention.”282  Yet, 
the Supreme Court, while generally lambasting preventive detention, did note that 
“special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened 
deference to the judgments of political branches with respect to matters of national 
security.”283  As of a harbinger for how it would rule three years later in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court even noted in Zadvydas that “terrorism” may constitute 
such a “special argument.”284  In any event, although aliens can be detained prior to 
removal, the Supreme Court has made clear that even non-citizens cannot be indefinitely 
detained. 
It would appear at first blush that any system of preventive detention for the 
purpose of interrogation and/or incapacitation without criminal charges being filed and 
unrelated to mental illness, removal, or quarantine would be unconstitutional and violate 
both substantive and procedural due process.  The Supreme Court, however, has 
recognized exceptions to these core due process rights based on the “war powers” of the 
President under Article II of the Constitution, which states: “the President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy for the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several states, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”285  The 
Supreme Court has noted that “in times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is 
at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be 
dangerous.”286  
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2.  War Powers of the President 
Given the constitutional problems with detaining individuals indefinitely with no 
criminal charges, it makes sense that the Administration would look to the President’s 
“war powers” to create a preventive detention regime.  There is precedent, discussed 
below, that due process rights can be suspended during times of war. In addition, in all 
fairness, the Bush Administration has used its enemy combatant policy sparingly among 
U.S. persons.  To date, it appears that only Padilla, Hamdi, and al-Marri were ever 
declared enemy combatants.  Nonetheless, as discussed in Chapter II, the war paradigm 
approach is illogical and may prove to be unconstitutional if the Supreme Court ever 
decides on the issues raised in al-Marri, which, as of this writing, is the only enemy 
combatant case remaining concerning a U.S. person. 
A look at significant war powers cases throughout America’s history shows two 
recurring themes: (1) in times of emergency and crisis, the courts have traditionally (but 
not always) deferred to the executive branch, especially when Congress had already 
legislated or acquiesced on the matter; and (2) the Supreme Court is more likely to 
intervene after the exigencies of the crisis have passed.  An understanding of how the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government have interacted and 
operated in past wartime emergencies helps place the current enemy combatant cases in a 
context. 
Before discussing specific wartime cases, an understanding of the writ of habeas 
corpus is essential.  Habeas corpus allows a prisoner to challenge the legality of his 
detention in federal court.287  It is a procedural remedy that by itself does not provide any 
substantive grounds for relief.  Rather, a statutory or constitutional law violation must be 
shown in order for a detainee to be released from prison.288  The Supreme Court has held 
that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to 
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to “the erroneous application or interpretation 
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of relevant law.”289  Normally a prisoner brings a habeas petition after trial, conviction, 
and exhaustion of all appeals.  In other words, it serves as a last “stopgap against 
injustice” and is “not a front-line defense.”290  By contrast, with respect to the enemy 
combatant detentions, habeas has become the main source of judicial review because “a 
viable front-end mechanism does not exist.”291  As explained in Chapter II, President 
Bush initially failed to convene Article V or equivalent hearings to determine whether a 
detainee was an unlawful combatant or a civilian.  While pursuant to Hamdi detainees are 
now provided some modicum of judicial review, the issue of habeas corpus will most 
likely continue to dominate the conversation until a better detention regime is created.  
Significantly, on June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held 5-4 in Boumediene v. 
Bush that the foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay have a right to bring habeas petitions 
in federal court.  Yet, this decision just means that the aliens at Guantanamo Bay have a 
right to be heard in federal court as U.S. persons do – it does not prescribe the standards 
or substance for review.  In fact, the Supreme Court explicitly stated: “We do not address 
whether the President has authority to detain these petitioners nor do we hold that the writ 
must issue. These and other questions regarding the legality of the detention are to be 
resolved in the first instance by the District Court.”292  In other words, the right to file a 
habeas petition is a procedural remedy.  As Chief Justice John Roberts stated in his 
dissent, “The majority merely replaces a review system designed by the people’s 
representatives with a set of shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some 
future date.”293  Hence, the substantive rights to be afforded the aliens at Guantanamo 
Bay are yet to be seen.  In fact, as explained below, Padilla, Hamdi and have had the 
procedural remedy of habeas corpus (because they are U.S. persons) but the substantive 
details concerning the legality of their respective detentions still remains unclear.  Al-
Marri certainly has not received much benefit from his right to habeas corpus: he has 
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been detained as an enemy combatant with no charges since 2003, and in July 2008 the 
Fourth Circuit remanded his case for an evidentiary hearing.  The foreign nationals at 
Guantanamo have just entered the legal abyss of uncertainty and minimalist holdings.  
The Suspension Clause of the Constitution allows Congress to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion” if the “public Safety . . . require[s]” 
it.294  As Law Professor Mark Tushnet explains, the Suspension Clause identifies the 
“occasions” that the writ can be suspended (“rebellion or invasion”) and the “criterion” 
for when it can be suspended (“public safety”).295  He ponders whether the attack on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon could constitute “invasions.”296  An argument 
could be made, however, that the founders of the Constitution could not have foreseen the 
threat posed by terrorism, especially in a world with weapons of mass destruction, and 
that a “rebellion” or “invasion” should incorporate such grave threats to the nation. 
Nevertheless, Congress is the branch of the government that has the power to suspend the 
writ, which, significantly, it has not done during the war on terror.297  In fact, in 
Boumediene v. Bush the Supreme Court specifically noted that Congress’s passing of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 to deal with the detention of the aliens at Guantanamo 
Bay was not a formal suspension of the writ.298  
Congress has only suspended the writ four times in the nation’s history: (1) during 
the Civil War when Congress gave President Lincoln permission to suspend the writ after 
he had done so unilaterally (this example is discussed in more detail below); (2) during 
Reconstruction when Congress gave President Grant authority to suspend the writ in 
South Carolina where rebellion was raging; (3) during the Spanish-American war in 1902 
when Congress gave President McKinley authority to suspend the writ to deal with 
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insurrection in the Philippines; and (4) after the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, Congress, at 
the request of the President, allowed the Governor of Hawaii to suspend the writ in the 
Hawaiian islands.299  In each of these instances, a rebellion or invasion was actually 
taking place in an American territory, and Congress responded by suspending the writ.  
An argument could be made that al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11 are similar to Japan’s 
air attacks on the naval base in Pearl Harbor.  Congress allowed the writ to be suspended 
in Hawaii, however; it has not suspended the writ in response to 9/11.  Furthermore, in 
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the Supreme Court ruled that imposition of martial law and the 
closing of civilian courts in Hawaii eight months after the threat of invasion ceased was 
unlawful.300  While the Court recognized that a larger war with Japan was raging, Japan 
was nonetheless on the road to defeat.  Thus, the risk of invasion was no longer sufficient 
to justify martial law when the civilian courts were functioning.301  Such reasoning 
thereby calls into question whether Congress could even suspend the writ seven years 
after 9/11. 
During the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the writ without congressional 
approval based on asserted unilateral constitutional authority and detained approximately 
13,000 civilians.302  He ordered that military courts operate in areas threatened by 
Southern forces even though the civilian courts were fully functioning.303  By eliminating 
the writ, detainees could not challenge the legality of their respective detentions.  In 
1861, sitting as a circuit court judge, Chief Justice Taney ruled that President Lincoln 
lacked authority to suspect the writ without congressional approval.304  President Lincoln 
ignored the circuit court’s holding and famously stated: “Are all the laws, but one, to go 
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unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”305 
President Lincoln, of course, was dealing with the existential fate of the nation. 
In 1863, when it returned to session, Congress enacted legislation suspending the 
writ of habeas corpus, thereby validating to some extent President Lincoln’s previous 
unilateral suspension of the writ and obviating Justice Taney’s concern.  When the matter 
initially reached the Supreme Court in 1864, it refused to rule based on a technical 
jurisdictional argument (which foreshadows how the Supreme Court treated Padilla in 
2004, discussed below).306  A year after the Civil War ended, the Supreme Court held in 
Ex parte Milligan that President Lincoln and Congress lacked the constitutional power to 
suspend the writ and establish martial law when the civilian courts were operating.  
While citizens could be held without charges if the writ was properly suspended, they 
could not be tried by military tribunals.  In fact, the Court noted that “[m]artial law 
cannot arise from a threatened invasion.  The necessity must be actual and present; the 
invasion real, such that effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil 
administration.”307  In other words, a majority of the Court found that neither branch had 
the authority to try civilians in military courts when civilian courts were still operating.  
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not intervene during the Civil War but only 
after it was over, noting its institutional weakness during times of emergency: “During 
the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow that calmness in 
deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial 
question. . . . Now that the public safety is assured, this question, as well as all others, can 
be discussed and decided without passion or the admixture of any element not required to 
form a legal judgment.”308  It is also significant that Congress ultimately did intervene 
and suspend the writ, although President Lincoln claimed that he always had the inherent 
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constitutional authority to act unilaterally.309  In sum, Ex parte Milligan holds that 
civilians may not be tried by military tribunals if the civilian courts are fully functioning. 
The decision, however, did not address whether enemy combatants – as opposed to 
civilians – could be tried by military tribunals.  That decision came during a World War 
II case called Ex parte Quirin. 
In the seminal case Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court noted that the 
Constitution invests “the President, as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war 
which Congress has declared, and to carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the 
conduct of war and for the government and regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws 
defining and punishing offences against the law of nations, including those which pertain 
to the conduct of war.”310  In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens 
could be labeled “unlawful combatants” and tried by a military commission.  As such, the 
Bush Administration has heavily relied on Ex parte Quirin to justify its current enemy 
combatant policy.  
Yet, Quirin did not address in any way whether the President could declare 
people, especially U.S. citizens, enemy combatants and hold them indefinitely with no 
criminal charges.  Quirin involved the question of whether members of the German army, 
who surreptitiously infiltrated to the United States in civilian clothes to conduct sabotage 
on military installations during World War II, could be tried by military commission for 
alleged war crimes as Congress had authorized or had to be tried by the civilian courts, 
which were fully functioning.  While the saboteurs in Quirin were labeled “unlawful 
combatants” (because they wore civilian clothes and did not wear uniforms as required 
by the Geneva Convention), they were (1) allowed counsel (2) not held indefinitely but 
tried before a military tribunal and (3) given specific charges.  Furthermore, the 
defendants in Quirin (including a U.S. citizen) admitted they were enemy combatants; 
their argument was they should be tried before the civilian Article III courts which were 
fully functioning and not a military tribunal.  By contrast, Hamdi, Padilla and al-Marri all 
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dispute they are enemy combatants.  In other words, while the Bush Administration touts 
Quirin as justification for its present enemy combatant policy, an understanding of the 
underlying facts demonstrates that Quirin is largely inapposite and not analogous to the 
current enemy combatant cases.  
Furthermore, Congress had generally authorized the military commissions used to 
try the German saboteurs.  The Supreme Court in Quirin refused to address whether the 
President, acting unilaterally, could bypass the civilian courts to try U.S. citizens by 
military commission: “It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent 
the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military 
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation.  For here Congress has 
authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions.”311  As law 
professors Issacharoff and Pildes observe, “the Court upheld President Roosevelt’s 
actions precisely because he was exercising authority that Congress had expressly 
delegated to him.”312 
The most notorious example of preventive detention based on the war powers of 
the President was the internment of Americans of Japanese ethnicity during World War 
II.  In Hirabayashi v. United States313 and Korematsu v. United States,314 the Supreme 
Court upheld national-original specific regulations based on broad deference to the war-
making powers of the President and Congress.  In Hirabayashi, the Court upheld curfew 
orders that had been authorized by Congress relating to Japanese Americans on the West 
Coast and in Korematsu the Court upheld the initial evacuation orders requiring the 
Japanese to leave the West Coast. Yet, in Ex parte Endo – a case decided the same day as 
Korematsu – the Supreme Court unanimously held that indefinite detention of a loyal 
citizen such as Endo was unlawful.315  Korematsu and Endo, however, were decided two  
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years after the initial evacuation orders, and the practical question was whether 
continued detention was permissible.  The President – perhaps getting notified that the 
Court was going to find the detentions unlawful – ordered the relocation camps closed 
one day before Endo was decided.316  
Several key points concerning detention and unilateral executive action can be 
gleaned from the Japanese internment cases.  First, Congress had specifically authorized 
the curfew orders in Hirabayashi and the initial evacuation orders in Korematsu – hence, 
as in Ex parte Quirin, the question of whether the President had unilateral war powers to 
implement such measures was left unresolved.  By contrast, Congress had not authorized 
the detention camps in Endo.  In other words, during World War II, the Supreme Court 
felt more comfortable sustaining war time measures infringing on civil liberties when 
Congress had approved of the measures.  Second, similar to how the Supreme Court 
delayed acting in Ex parte Milligan until the civil war ended, the Supreme Court did not 
interfere and strike down the President’s war powers until the immediate threat had 
dissipated.  Endo was decided two years after the internment camps had been operating 
and decided a day after the President closed the internment camps (although he probably 
closed them in anticipation of the Supreme Court decision).  Hence, there seems to be a 
pattern of the Supreme Court deferring during the emergency crisis to the executive and 
legislative branches and then ruling after calmness and normalcy have been restored. 
Third, no one seems to remember Endo but only Hirabayashi and Korematsu.317 
The general consensus of the Japanese internment cases is that the President, Congress 
and the Supreme Court overreacted to threats to national security by imposing national-
origin specific regulations on an entire group of people without any specific reasonable 
suspicion.  Because the Supreme Court did not decide Endo until after it was essentially 
moot (i.e., the detainees were released), its significance was greatly lessened and to some 
extent undermined as the majority of the American public does not realize that the 
Supreme Court actually found the indefinite internment of loyal Japanese Americans to 
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be unlawful.  As discussed below, al-Marri has been detained as enemy combatant since 
2003, so his detention is approaching six years.  If the new Administration decides to 
release him – or transfer him to the criminal justice system as it did Padilla – any 
subsequent decision in al-Marri may similarly not be remembered. Will al-Marri be the 
next Endo? 
The next significant war power case concerned President Truman’s seizure of the 
steel mills because of an anticipated strike to ensure continued production during the 
Korean War.  President Truman claimed he had inherent constitutional authority as 
Commander in Chief to avert a “national catastrophe which would inevitably result from 
the stoppage of steel production.”318  Significantly, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, the Supreme Court struck down President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills 
finding that it went beyond his role as Commander in Chief because the seizures took 
place outside the “theater of war.”319  Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that, because 
there was not a formal declaration of war by Congress, there was a lack of congressional 
authorization for the asserted wartime powers.  Moreover, the Court noted that Congress 
had, in fact, expressly rejected allowing the executive to seize industrial plants as a 
solution to strikes when it enacted the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.320  In a famous 
concurring opinion on the balance between executive and legislative powers in times of 
emergencies, Justice Robert Jackson wrote: 
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or 
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can 
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional 
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive 
Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so 
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at 
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.321 
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With respect to the current enemy combatant policy, two significant questions can 
be gleaned from Youngstown.  First, to what extent is the executive’s capture of Padilla 
and al-Marri in peaceful civilian areas similar to President Truman’s attempt to seize the 
steel mills?  Arguably, both are away from the “theater of war.”  Second, to what extent 
has Congress acquiesced or allowed the detention of enemy combatants?  There has been 
no formal declaration of war.  As explained below, while President Bush asserts that 
Congress provided statutory authority with the Joint Resolution passed immediately after 
9/11, this argument to support indefinite detention of U.S. persons captured in civilian 
areas appears tenuous at best. 
3. Enemy Combatant Cases: Hamdi, Padilla, and al-Marri 
a. Hamdi 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme Court (consisting of 
Justice O’Connor who authored the decision and former Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Kennedy and Justice Breyer) held that the executive could label a U.S. citizen captured in 
a zone of combat as an enemy combatant and hold that individual indefinitely for the 
duration of the war in Afghanistan as long as that individual “receive[d] notice of the 
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s 
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”322  Significantly, because of the 
“exigencies of the circumstances,” the plurality noted that during the adversarial 
proceedings there could be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government.  Once 
the government put forth “credible evidence” that the detainee met the enemy combatant 
criteria, the burden would shift to the detainee to submit “more persuasive evidence” that 
he fell outside the criteria.323  Furthermore, the plurality noted that hearsay evidence 
“may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence.”324 
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According to a sworn declaration based on hearsay from the Northern 
Alliance, Hamdi had surrendered with an enemy unit in a theater of combat in 
Afghanistan while armed with an AK-47.  Hamdi, however, claimed he was in 
Afghanistan for a humanitarian mission.  By the time his case reached the Supreme 
Court, he had been held for more than two years without charges or access to counsel. 
After the plurality of the Supreme Court held that he could be labeled an enemy 
combatant as long as he was first provided an opportunity to rebut the underlying 
evidence, the Administration released him to his family in Saudi Arabia without any kind 
of adversarial hearing, stating that he no longer posed a threat to the United States. As a 
condition of his release, he gave up U.S. citizenship.325  
While the plurality upheld the executive’s ability to detain U.S. citizens 
captured on a battlefield as enemy combatants as long as they are provided an 
opportunity to challenge the designation in some neutral forum, Justice Scalia (joined by 
Justice Stevens) wrote a lengthy dissent arguing that there was no constitutional authority 
for the Administration’s enemy combatant policy: “If Hamdi is being imprisoned in 
violation of the Constitution (because without due process of law), then his habeas 
petition should be granted; the executive may then hand him over to the criminal 
authorities, whose detention for the purpose of prosecution will be lawful, or else must 
release him.”326  Justice Scalia argued that the Administration had two choices for 
detaining citizens like Hamdi: (1) get Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or 
(2) try suspected terrorists on specific criminal charges in civilian courts.  
As explained above, the writ of habeas corpus allows individuals to 
challenge the legality of their detention at a hearing, and Congress has the authority to 
“suspend” the writ “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion.”327  Hence, according to Justice 
Scalia, if the Administration considered the 9/11 attacks an “invasion” and asserted that it 
is currently responding to that “invasion,” Congress could suspend the writ, which it had 
                                                 
325 Isikoff and Hosenball, “Out of the Brig: ‘Enemy Combatant’ Yaser Hamdi Will Soon be Released 
from a Military Prison without Facing Any Charges.” 
326 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 576. 
327 Art. 1, sec. 9, cl. 2. 
 91
not done.  Justice Scalia stated: “Absent suspension . . . the Executive’s assertion of  
military exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention without charge.”328 
If the writ is not suspended, then Justice Scalia asserted that terrorism suspects must be 
charged with specific crimes or set free. 
Justice Clarence Thomas also dissented but under a strikingly different 
rationale.  He argued that not only did the executive have authority to detain indefinitely 
U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, he maintained that the courts did not have the 
information or expertise to interfere with the executive’s decision-making process. 
Hence, according to Justice Thomas, there was no need to provide Hamdi with any 
opportunity to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant before a neutral 
decision-maker because the President can make “virtually conclusive factual findings” on 
who is an “enemy combatant.”329  In fact, Justice Thomas noted in italics (so the point 
was not missed) that the President could detain Hamdi indefinitely “even if he is 
mistaken.”330  Justice Thomas also noted that detention could be justified for 
interrogation or preventing the detainee from returning to the battlefield.331 
While Hamdi did limit unilateral executive detention by forcing the 
government to provide some meaningful review to its detainees, it failed to address (1) 
how long a U.S. citizen can be detained as an enemy combatant before the judicial review 
begins; (2) how long a U.S. citizen can be held incommunicado and without access to 
counsel; and (3) how long a U.S. citizen can be held overall as an enemy combatant with 
no criminal charges.  Justice O’Connor had contemplated “generations” and, while 
troubled, acknowledged the “substantial prospect of perpetual detention.”332  
In sum, Hamdi was a very narrow decision which did not even garner a 
majority, leaving many pivotal questions unanswered.  As law professors Posner and 
Vermeule observe, “[a]s of the present, it is simply not clear what the consequences of 
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Hamdi are, or even whether it is a consequential decision at all.”333  Law Professor 
Ackerman cynically notes: “Although the popular press has haled Hamdi for reining in 
presidential power, I take a much dimmer view: a few more victories like this, and civil 
liberties will become an endangered species in the United States of America.”334 
Nonetheless, based on Hamdi, it is clear that, at a minimum, any proposed alternative 
preventive detention regime must allow the detainees a meaningful opportunity to 
challenge the underlying factual evidence necessitating their preventive detention.  
b. Padilla 
Significantly, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a U.S. 
citizen arrested in the United States (and not on a battlefield as was Hamdi) can be 
detained indefinitely with no charges based on the war powers of the President.  This 
factual scenario was presented by Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen arrested in May 2002 at 
Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport after an overseas trip to Pakistan where he 
allegedly had been training with al Qaeda operatives.  Upon arrest, Padilla was carrying 
$10,526, a cell phone, and e-mail addresses for al Qaeda operatives.335  As explained in 
Chapter III, the Administration argued that Padilla was planning to detonate a radioactive 
bomb in American and designated him an enemy combatant in June 2002 after initially 
detaining him on a material witness warrant.336  On December 18, 2003, the Second 
Circuit held that the President lacked the authority to indefinitely detain a U.S. citizen 
arrested in the United States as an enemy combatant and gave the Administration 30 days 
to release him or transfer him to the criminal justice system.337  The Bush Administration 
then requested an expedited writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.  
For a five person majority, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist held 
that there was no federal district court jurisdiction to hear Padilla’s case because his 
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habeas petition was filed in the wrong jurisdiction (Southern District of New York, where 
he was initially held as a material witness) and would need to be re-filed in the federal 
district where he was currently being detained by the military as an enemy combatant 
(District of South Carolina): 
We confront two questions: First, did Padilla properly file his habeas 
petition in the Southern District of New York; and second, did the 
President possess authority to detain Padilla militarily. We answer the 
threshold question in the negative and thus do not reach the second 
question presented.338 
In Justice Stevens’ dissent (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and 
Breyer), he argued that “slavish application” to a “bright line rule” was unfortunate 
because Padilla’s attorney had not been provided fair notice of his transfer to South 
Carolina.339  He wrote: 
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even 
more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their 
successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by 
the rule of law. Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of 
investigating or preventing subversive activities is in the hallmark of the 
Star Chamber.340 
In sum, despite Justice Stevens’ passionate dissent, the Supreme Court failed to address 
the merits concerning Padilla’s incommunicado confinement as an enemy combatant.  
Padilla’s attorneys re-filed his habeas petition in the District of South 
Carolina and the process of judicial review began anew.  While the district court found 
Padilla’s detention unauthorized because he was not arrested in a foreign zone of 
combat,341 the Fourth circuit reversed, holding that the rationale to incapacitate Padilla so 
he would not return to the battlefield was indistinguishable from the facts in Hamdi.342 
Interestingly, during this second round of litigation, the Administration emphasized that 
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Padilla had taken up arms with the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan (before his 
detention in Chicago) and needed to be incapacitated so he did not return to the 
battlefield, ostensibly trying to make the facts more similar to Hamdi, which had been 
decided on the same day the Supreme Court remanded Padilla.  Specifically, the 
Administration asserted in its brief to the Fourth Circuit: “Padilla’s combat activities in 
Afghanistan are not materially distinguishable from Hamdi’s and so Padilla fits squarely 
within the enemy combatant definition that the Supreme Court utilized in Hamdi.” 343 
Padilla appealed to the Supreme Court. 
Just a few days before the Supreme Court deadline for Bush 
administration briefs on the question of the President’s powers to continue holding 
Padilla in military prison without charge, the Administration transferred him to the 
criminal justice system in November 2005, presumably to avoid a show-down over the 
enemy combatant policy and to allow the Fourth Circuit’s favorable ruling to stand.  
After three and one-half years as an enemy combatant, and extensive proceedings before 
the U.S. district courts, the courts of appeal, and Supreme Court, on August 16, 2007, a 
federal jury convicted Padilla on criminal conspiracy and terrorism-related charges.344 
Padilla was never charged with planning to detonate a radioactive bomb, which was the 
initial justification for the enemy combatant designation.345  
c. Al-Marri 
On June 11, 2007, a divided Fourth Circuit (2-1) held in al-Marri v. 
Wright that Ali al-Marri, a legal resident from Qatar, arrested in Peoria, Illinois in 
December 2001 and designated as an enemy combatant in June 2003, could not be locked 
up indefinitely with no charges.346  Federal investigators had found credit card numbers 
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on al-Marri’s computer and initially charged him with credit card fraud. 347  Upon further 
investigation, the government alleged that al-Marri was a “sleeper agent” for al Qaeda 
who entered the United States with his family on September 10, 2001, trained at an al 
Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, met with Bin Laden, KSM, and other terrorist leaders, and 
had used his laptop computer to research weapons of mass destruction.348  Of particular 
interest to the government were al-Marri’s alleged contacts with Mustafa Ahmed al-
Hawsawi – an alleged paymaster and travel coordinator for al Qaeda who is currently 
being detained at Guantanamo Bay.349  In rejecting the Administration’s designation of 
al-Marri an enemy combatant, the Fourth Circuit stated: “Put simply, the Constitution 
does not allow the President to order the military to seize civilians residing within the 
United States and then detain them indefinitely without criminal process, and this is so 
even if he calls them 'enemy combatants.’”350  The Fourth Circuit noted that an 
individual could be detained as an enemy combatant only if he takes up arms with the 
military arm of a foreign government – not for being an alleged member of an 
international terrorist group.351  The Fourth Circuit distinguished Hamdi and Padilla by 
noting that they both had been working at the direction of Taliban forces rather than just 
al Qaeda (even though Padilla was ultimately detained in Chicago and not 
Afghanistan).352  Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that al-Marri must be transferred 
to the civilian court system and tried on criminal charges, deported, held as a material 
witness, or be set free.353  As a result of this adverse decision, the Administration asked 
the full Fourth Circuit to review the case.  On August 22, 2007, a majority of the Fourth 
Circuit judges agreed to grant en banc review of the decision.  
On July 15, 2008, the full Fourth Circuit ruled in a split 5-4 decision that 
while the President could detain a legal resident (and presumably U.S. citizens) captured 
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in a peaceful civilian area as an enemy combatant, al-Marri needed to be provided more 
due process.  The Fourth Circuit addressed two questions:  First, assuming the allegations 
against al-Marri were true, did Congress authorize the President to detain al-Marri as an 
enemy combatant, and second, assuming Congress had empowered the President to 
detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant, was al-Marri provided sufficient due process (per 
Hamdi) to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant.354  Significantly, four 
judges agreed with the government on both questions and found that the President did 
have authority to designate legal residents caught in a civilian area as enemy combatants 
and that the Administration had submitted sufficient evidence through a declaration to 
justify such treatment.  A different four judges agreed with al-Marri on both points and 
found that the President did not have the power to detain legal residents caught in 
America as enemy combatants and that al-Marri had not been provided sufficient due 
process.  Judge William Traxler Jr. essentially broke the tie by holding that, while the 
President did have the authority to detain legal residents as enemy combatants, the 
government’s declaration based on hearsay was not necessarily sufficient evidence to 
justify such treatment.355  The four judges who would have preferred to rule that the 
President did not have authority to detain al-Marri as an enemy combatant reluctantly 
joined Judge Traxler in his opinion to give “practical effect” and order a remand on the 
“terms closest” they would impose.356 As of this writing, al-Marri is pending an 
evidentiary hearing, and it is unclear whether either party will request an interlocutory 
appeal to the Supreme Court and if so, whether the Court would even grant certiorari.  
(The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari while the case was waiting the Fourth 
Circuit’s en banc ruling.) 
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Therefore, as of now, the Supreme Court has not ruled on the pivotal 
constitutional question of whether U.S. citizens, such as Padilla, or legal residents, such 
as al-Marri, can be detained indefinitely as an enemy combatant with no criminal 
charges.  The Supreme Court has ruled that the President can designate citizens caught in 
an active zone of combat as enemy combatants for the duration of the particular conflict 
as long as the individual can challenge that designation in a neutral forum.  Nonetheless, 
even with minimal judicial review as contemplated in Hamdi, it remains unclear how 
long a person can be detained preventively without criminal charges and how long a 
person can be detained incommunicado before initial judicial review.  As journalist 
Wittes astutely notes, “[i]t overstates the matter to say that the enemy combatant cases 
were full of sound and fury and signifying nothing, but they certainly signified a great 
deal less than their sound and fury portended.”357  In sum, there is legal uncertainty 
surrounding these key issues, which ironically provides some flexibility in analyzing and 
proposing alternative regimes of preventive detention to the enemy combatant policy. 
B. STATUTORY CONCERNS WITH PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
In 1950, Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act (EDA) which authorized 
the President to declare an “Internal Security Emergency” during which the President 
could authorize the detention of any person deemed reasonably likely to engage in acts of 
espionage or sabotage.358  Significantly, the EDA was never used, and it was repealed 
before any court had the opportunity to rule on its constitutionality.359 
In 1971, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), dubbed the Non-Detention Act, 
which repealed the EDA, and provided that: “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise 
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”  The legislative 
history suggests Congress intended to prevent the recurrence of internments or detention 
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camps such as those that occurred during World War II.360  In signing the 1971 
legislation, President Nixon explained that the Administration was “wholeheartedly” in 
support of the repeal of the Emergency Detention Act, and that he wanted “to underscore 
this Nation’s abiding respect for the liberty of the individual. Our democracy is built 
upon the constitutional guarantee that every citizen will be afforded due process of law. 
There is no place in American life for the kind of anxiety – however unwarranted – which 
the Emergency Detention Act has evidently engendered.”361 
Not surprisingly, Padilla, Hamdi, and al-Marri have all argued that, based on 18 
U.S.C. § 4001(a), Congress forbade the detention of U.S. persons without explicit 
statutory authority.  The Administration has countered that Congress’s “Joint Resolution” 
or “Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF) after 9/11 provided statutory 
authority to detain U.S. persons (as well as aliens) in the war on terror.362  The AUMF 
provides the executive with authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those . . . organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 . . . in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such . . . organizations 
or persons.”363  
In Hamdi, a plurality of the Supreme Court affirmed the President’s powers to 
detain enemy combatants as part of the “necessary and appropriate force” (i.e., the 
AUMF) authorized by Congress after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The 
plurality found the President’s detention of U.S. citizens was not foreclosed by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4001(a), which, as explained above, provides that no U.S. citizen may be detained 
except pursuant to an act of Congress.  Specifically, Justice O’Connor noted: “[I]t is of 
no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention.  Because 
detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of 
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waging war, in permitting use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly 
and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.”364 
Significantly, the plurality emphasized that the scope of the AUMF was limited to 
individuals who “fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, 
an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for 
those attacks” and that “detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are 
considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is 
so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and 
appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.”365  Thus, Hamdi seems 
to be limited by the salient fact that he was arrested on a battlefield in Afghanistan during 
an actual conflict.  
Because the plurality in Hamdi found statutory authority (i.e., AUMF) for 
labeling individuals as enemy combatants, the Court did not address the Bush 
Administration’s alternative argument that it had plenary constitutional authority to 
preventively detain individuals as enemy combatants.  Justice O’Connor noted: “We do 
not reach the question whether Article II provides such authority, however, because we 
agree with the Government’s alternative position, that Congress has in fact authorized 
Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.”366  In other words, it is an unsettled question 
whether – independent of any statutory authority such as the AUMF – the President has 
inherent constitutional authority under Article II of the Constitution to detain individuals 
as enemy combatants without congressional approval.  
Some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court plurality in Hamdi 
precluded interrogation to gain intelligence as a rationale for indefinite detention and that 
only incapacitation for the duration of the specific hostilities in a zone of combat was 
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justifiable.367  Although the Hamdi plurality did hold that Hamdi could be held as an 
enemy combatant for the duration of the particular conflict in Afghanistan and not for 
purposes of interrogation, a close reading of Hamdi does not automatically preclude 
Congress from creating a regime that would allow preventive detention for purposes of 
interrogation.  Justice O’Connor stated that “indefinite detention for the purpose of 
interrogation is not authorized” under the AUMF.368  In other words, Justice O’Connor is 
stating that the AUMF – a statute passed by Congress – does not authorize indefinite 
detention for purposes of interrogation.  She is not stating that Congress does not have the 
authority to create such a regime, or that if it did, such a regime would be automatically 
unconstitutional.  
In fact, Justice Scalia in his Hamdi dissent acknowledged that interrogation of 
terrorist suspects may be a legitimate need but implored Congress – not the Executive – 
to address the issue: “I frankly do not know whether these tools are sufficient to meet the 
Government’s security needs, including the need to obtain intelligence through 
interrogation. It is far beyond my competence, or the Court’s competence, to determine 
that. But it is not beyond Congress’s.”369  Therefore, Justice Scalia at least contemplates 
a need for preventive detention based on interrogation and notes that Congress could 
create such a regime.  Finally, Justice Thomas in his Hamdi dissent also found 
intelligence gathering to be a valid interest of the government in the war on terror.370  
While the plurality in Hamdi found the AUMF to authorize the detention of U.S. 
citizens caught in an active zone of combat as enemy combatants, in al-Marri, the Fourth 
Circuit initially found that the AUMF did not provide the Administration with the 
statutory authority to classify civilians captured in the United States as enemy 
combatants: “[W]e note that the AUMF itself contains nothing that transforms a civilian 
into a combatant subject to indefinite military detention.  Indeed, the AUMF contains 
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only a broad grant of war powers and lacks any specific language authorizing 
detention.”371  Yet, after an en banc ruling by the Fourth Circuit in July 2008, five judges 
held that the AUMF did provide the necessary authority for the President to detain legal 
residents caught in peaceful civilian areas as enemy combatants.372   
Nonetheless, the legislative history of the AUMF suggests that Congress 
explicitly did not intend for the President to be able to indefinitely detain civilians 
captured in the United States.  During debate in the U.S. Senate, Department of Justice 
officials lobbied to have the words “in the United States” added after the phrase “use all 
necessary and appropriate force,” which would have granted the President war powers to 
do anything he wanted within the U.S.373  Because this phrase was not included in the 
final AUMF, it can be inferred that Congress did not intend for the President to use his 
war powers within the confines of the United States.  Therefore, it appears to be a legal 
stretch to argue that the AUMF provides the necessary statutory authority to detain U.S. 
persons captured in a peaceful civilian area within the United States as opposed to 
someone like Hamdi who was captured and detained on an actual battlefield in 
Afghanistan.  
Had the government not transferred Padilla to the criminal justice system in 
November 2005, it is not at all clear whether the Supreme Court would have upheld the 
government’s right to detain Padilla – a U.S. citizen detained in the United States (as 
opposed to Hamdi captured in a war-zone in Afghanistan) – as an enemy combatant 
pursuant to the AUMF.  In fact, in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, where the majority dismissed his 
habeas petition on jurisdictional grounds, the four dissenters, namely Justices Stevens, 
Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg, would have found indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen 
captured in America for incommunicado detention prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) 
and not supported by the AUMF.374  Furthermore, Justice Scalia, who joined the majority 
in remanding Padilla’s habeas petition on jurisdictional grounds, argued in his Hamdi 
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dissent that the AUMF did not authorize detention of U.S. citizens as enemy 
combatants.375  In other words, there are five current Justices who would likely not find 
that the AUMF provides the requisite statutory support to support President Bush’s 
enemy combatant policy.  
Nonetheless, as of this writing, the Supreme Court has not addressed the 
constitutional and statutory issues with respect to the Administration’s enemy combatant 
policy concerning civilians arrested in the United States.  It is not clear that the Supreme 
Court would hold that the AUMF provides the necessary statutory authority to support 
the Administration’s broad approach to its enemy combatant policy for U.S. persons 
arrested in the United States and not on a battlefield.  
Interestingly, the USA Patriot Act – legislation more specific than the AUMF – 
does not support indefinite detentions of U.S. persons.376  Rather, the statute mandates 
that aliens be charged with criminal or immigration violations within seven days of arrest 
if the alien endangers the national security, or successive six-month periods if the alien 
cannot be removed and remains a threat to the national security of the U.S. or the safety 
of the community or any person.377  It seems incongruous that Congress would allow 
aliens to be detained for finite periods of time based on showings of danger to national 
security while allowing U.S. persons to be detained indefinitely.  In fact, Congress 
rejected a provision in a draft bill of the Patriot Act that would have allowed the Attorney 
General to detain without charge any alien he “has reason to believe may commit, further, 
or facilitate acts [of terrorism].”378  Furthermore, given the specific wording of the USA  
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Patriot Act, and the general wording of the AUMF, it seems unlikely that the Supreme 
Court would find the AUMF as explicit statutory support to detain U.S. citizens arrested 
in the United States and not on a battlefield. 
C. CONCLUSION 
While it appears that President Bush has only designated three U.S. persons as 
enemy combatants – which is certainly fewer than the 120,000 Japanese Americans who 
were detained – Congress has not explicitly authorized their detentions and the Supreme 
Court has been remarkably silent and deferential to the executive branch.  It will be 
interesting to see how the Supreme Court ultimately rules in al-Marri – the only active 
enemy combatant case involving a U.S. person, which, as of this writing, is pending an 
evidentiary hearing if not an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court.  If there is not 
another terrorist attack rivaling 9/11 at the time of the Supreme Court’s ruling in al-
Marri, it is likely the Supreme Court will find unconstitutional the President’s claim of 
inherent war powers to detain U.S. persons arrested in civilian areas as enemy 
combatants when the civilian courts are functioning and when there has been no 
congressional suspension of the writ.  
In sum, it is unlikely that the Administration’s enemy combatant policy will prove 
constitutional and “pursuant to an Act of Congress” if the Supreme Court decides on the 
issues presented in Padilla and al-Marri.  Nonetheless, despite the legal obstacles, there 
seems to be legal authority to create a narrow regime for preventive detention based on 
national security interests as long as some due process rights are afforded the suspects 
and as long as it is pursuant to an “Act of Congress.”  In fact, the war power cases 
demonstrate that the most significant factor in increasing the chance of any preventive 
detention regime being found lawful is congressional involvement.  As Ex parte Milligan, 
Ex parte Quirin, Ex parte Endo, and Youngstown show, the Supreme Court is more likely 
to find preventive detention constitutional under the President’s war powers if Congress 
legislates on the matter.  Furthermore, explicit congressional legislation (unlike the vague 
AUMF) would obviate any statutory concerns posed by the Non-Detention Act.  
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Before proposing an alternative preventive detention regime that complies with 
the aforementioned legal principles, it is helpful to look at how Israel and Britain have 
dealt with preventive detention with respect to their terrorist threats.  Both Israel and 
Britain have provided considerable more due process rights to their detainees than the 
current enemy combatant policy even though they probably face a greater ongoing 
terrorist threat than does the United States. 
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V. INSIGHT FROM ISRAEL AND BRITAIN’S PREVENTIVE 
DETENTION REGIMES 
No civilized nation confronting serious danger has ever relied exclusively 
on criminal convictions for past offenses. Every country has introduced, 
by one means or another, a system of preventive or administrative 
detention for persons who are thought to be dangerous but who might not 





Israel and Britain have been dealing with terrorist threats for decades, and both 
countries have created various regimes of preventive detention of terrorist suspects to 
deal with the recurring reality of terrorism.  While no one terrorist attack in either country 
resulted in 3,000 deaths, as did the 9/11 attack, both countries view terrorism as threats to 
national security and both countries grapple with the balance between security and liberty 
in their counterterrorism policies.  Hence, in understanding the broader context of 
America’s enemy combatant policy, and analyzing whether preventive detention is 
needed in the war against terror, it is useful to look at other democracies that have dealt 
with asymmetric terrorist threats and observe how they have handled incapacitation and 
interrogation of terrorist suspects.  As New York University Law Professor Schulhofer 
notes: “Fighting terrorism poses challenges that are essentially new (or newly 
recognized) for America.  For that reason, it is worth considering the experience of 
Western democracies that confronted grave terrorist threats over extended periods before 
September 11, 2001.”380  To this end, he posits that Britain and Israel “offer two of the 
few available sources of recent experience in attempting to reconcile the demands of 
national survival and the rule of law in the context of an unremitting terrorist threat.”381 
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As this chapter illustrates, there are significant differences among the preventive 
detention regimes of Israel and Britain and America’s enemy combatant policy, namely: 
(1) the manner in which the preventive detention policies were created in the first place, 
and (2) the ensuing substantive rights of the detainees.  While America’s enemy 
combatant policy was created unilaterally by executive fiat based on claimed inherent 
constitutional authority, Israel and Britain’s preventive detention policies – which have 
changed throughout the decades – have virtually always been enacted by a legislative 
body and were not just executive usurpations of power.  Moreover, both Israel and 
Britain have almost always had an explicit role for judicial review before subjecting the 
suspect to prolonged preventive incapacitation whereas President Bush has asserted that 
the executive branch can alone resolve factual disputes and determine whether an 
individual is an enemy combatant based on intelligence reports without any opportunity 
for the detainee to respond.  Finally, and most significantly, the breadth and scope of 
Israel and the Britain’s current preventive detention policies are strikingly more modest 
than America’s.  Although Britain is currently trying to increase pre-charge detention to 
forty-two days (and in July 2005 tried to increase pre-charge detention to ninety days), its 
current limit is twenty-eight days of preventive detention.  While Israel has 
administratively detained some Palestinians for years, the detainees were allowed judicial 
review, generally within eight days, and are subject to renewals every six months. 
Conversely, President Bush has asserted his right to unilaterally label individuals as 
enemy combatants and detain them indefinitely and incommunicado for a war that may 
never end. Professor Thomas Powers notes: “The policies of Britain and Israel each 
moved in the same direction: toward greater legal clarity and toward more extensive due 
process protections.  The United States should take advantage of those countries’ 
experiences to find ways to build due process into preventive detention.”382 
Although America’s system of government and demographics are different than 
Israel and Britain’s (and these differences will be addressed below), there are nonetheless 
useful comparisons that can be drawn between all three countries because they all are 
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democracies dealing with terrorism and they all struggle with balancing civil liberties 
with national security.  Yet, America’s policy of preventive detention is not just different 
by a matter of degree – it is grossly different by a matter of kind.  An important question 
that needs to be addressed is to what extent, if any, is the threat America faces from 
terrorism graver than the threat faced by Israel, which is surrounded by hostile nations 
and has been in a state of emergency since its founding in 1948, or the threat faced by 
Britain, which has a larger home-grown Islamic terrorism threat than America.  If the 
threat that America faces is similar or not as severe, then the rationale for its more 
draconian preventive detention policies loses even more of its persuasiveness.  
B. ISRAEL’S PREVENTIVE DETENTION POLICIES 
In Israel, preventive detention is called “administrative detention” and is distinct 
from criminal detention. Administrative detention is defined as detention without charges 
or trial and is authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree.383  It can 
be used solely for prevention.384  According to Haifa University Law Professor Emanual 
Gross, administrative detention is based on the danger to state or public security posed by 
a particular person whose release would likely threaten the security of the state and the 
ordinary course of life.385  The goals of administrative detention are not arrest, trial, 
conviction, and punishment but rather prevention.  Although difficulty in convicting a 
person in ordinary criminal proceedings is not a reason for employing administrative 
detention, if evidence is classified and cannot be disclosed, administrative detention 
becomes an option.386  
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Significantly, Israel has separate administrative detention policies for Israel 
proper versus the Palestinian Territories, much like America’s enemy combatant policy 
as applied to U.S. persons (Hamdi, al-Marri, and Padilla) who were/are detained in 
America versus aliens captured overseas and held at Guantanamo Bay or Bagram airbase 
in Afghanistan.  While Israel’s detention laws provide for judicial review and 
considerably more due process for its detainees than America’s enemy combatant policy, 
Israel’s administrative detention policies nonetheless invoke criticism from civil rights 
groups within Israel. 
1. Israel Proper 
In 1948, when Israel achieved its independence, Israel adopted the British 
Mandate’s Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which empowered the High 
Commissioner and Military Commander to detain any person it deemed necessary for 
maintaining public order or securing public safety or state security. In 1979, Israel 
reformed its detention laws and enacted a new statute: the Emergency Powers 
(Detentions) Law of 1979 (EPDL of 1979), which provided more rights to detainees than 
the prior regulations, such as requiring that a detainee be brought before the president of 
the district court within forty-eight hours after arrest for judicial review of the detention, 
allowing appeals to the Supreme Court, and mandating periodic reviews by the president 
of the district court every three months.387  While the EPDL of 1979 only applies once a 
state of emergency has been proclaimed by the Israeli Knesset, Israel has been in such a 
state of emergency since its inception in 1948.  
Under the EPDL of 1979, Israeli citizens and non-citizens within Israel can be 
detained if the defense minister has “reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state 
security or public security” requires it, although “state security” and “public security” 
have never been expressly defined.388  The district court in reviewing the detention order 
must vacate the order if it does not find “objective reasons of state security or public 
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security” that require the detention or if the detention “was made in bad faith or from 
irrelevant considerations.”389  A detainee may appeal the district court’s decision directly 
to the Israeli Supreme Court, which requires that the danger to the State must be “so 
grave as to leave no choice but to hold the suspect in administrative detention” or that the 
detainee “would almost certainly pose a danger to public or State security.”390  Unlike 
America where an enemy combatant can be held indefinitely, the detention order in Israel 
is limited to six months, although it can be indefinitely renewed.391  Hence, this six-
month distinction may be more form than substance.  Matti Friedman of the Jerusalem 
Post notes that “in theory, someone could be held ad infinitum” under Israel’s 
administrative detention policies and in practice some Palestinians have been held for 
years in administrative detention.392  
During the detention proceedings, the judge sees all the evidence, even if it is 
classified, and the judge decides what evidence may be disclosed to the detainee and 
his/her counsel.393  Therefore, some detainees are held without knowledge of the specific 
allegations against them and without a meaningful opportunity to rebut the charges.394  
Such a practice has caused B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights group, to decry that “Israel 
has therefore made a charade out of the entire system of procedural safeguards in both 
domestic and international law regarding the right to liberty and due process.”395  It 
further argues that Israel has used administrative detention to detain Palestinians for their 
political opinions and non-violent political activity.396 
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Similar to some of the rationales for America’s enemy combatant policy 
discussed in Chapter III, one rationale for Israel’s administrative detention is to protect 
sources and methods and allow otherwise inadmissible evidence such as hearsay into 
evidence.397  Prolonged incapacitation for purposes of interrogation, however, does not 
seem to be a primary rationale in Israel, which stands in stark contrast to America’s 
principal rationale for its enemy combatant policy.  Unlike America (at least so far), 
Israel has also detained terrorists under administrative detention who have completed 
their criminal sentences if there is a fear they might engage in subsequent terrorists 
activities against Israel.398  Such a rationale B’Tselem argues means that Israel has totally 
blurred the “distinction between preventive and punitive detention.”399  
2.  Palestinian Territories 
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, administrative detentions are generally enforced 
pursuant to various military orders.  The military orders allow a senior military 
commander to detain an individual for up to six months, although it can be indefinitely 
renewed as in Israel proper, if the commander has “reasonable grounds to presume that 
the security of the area or public security require the detention.”400  As in Israel proper, 
the terms “security of the area” and “public security” are not defined and their respective 
interpretations have been left to the military commanders.401  The detainees are allowed 
to appeal the military orders to the Israeli Supreme Court, which sits in these cases as a 
High Court of Justice. As the High Court of Justice, the Court may hear “matters in 
which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice.”402  
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Unlike America’s detainees at Guantanamo Bay who receive no access to a 
lawyer for their initial status determination or review hearings403 (which only occur once 
a year), a detainee in the Palestinian Territories is entitled to a lawyer, and an appearance 
before a judge is generally required within eight days of arrest (by comparison to forty-
eight hours in Israel proper).404  Throughout the decades, however, different military 
orders have changed the number of days a detainee can be held without seeing an 
attorney and the number of days before judicial review.  For instance, in 1970, Military 
Order 378 allowed military authorities to impede access to counsel for thirty days for 
individuals suspected of violating security laws.405  Specifically, Order 378 allowed the 
head of the investigation to bar access to a lawyer for fifteen days, and a reviewing 
administrator could extend the bar for an additional fifteen days if convinced that the 
measure was “necessary for the security of the area or for the benefit of the 
investigation.”406  In 2002, a military order gave the commanding officer the authority to 
prevent a detainee from meeting with a lawyer for up to thirty-four days if the officer 
believed that such a meeting with the lawyer would impede the effectiveness of the 
interrogation.407  The Israeli Supreme Court upheld this provision finding that, on 
balance, the risk of damage to the investigation or national security outweighed the 
immediate right to an attorney.408  The detention, however, was not incommunicado; 
after forty-eight hours, the detainees had the right to be visited by the International Red 
Cross (IRC) and their families were informed of their whereabouts.409  By contrast, in 
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America, the Bush Administration barred al-Marri from seeing his attorneys or the IRC 
until after he had been in incommunicado detention for sixteen months.410 
Israel uses administrative detention more aggressively against Palestinians than 
against Israeli citizens. According to Amnesty International, between 2000 and 2005, 
thousands of Palestinians were held in administrative detention, some of them for more 
than three years, while during that same time period only four Israelis were placed in 
administrative detention for periods ranging from six weeks to six months.411  Israel’s 
use of administrative detention has also increased since the second intifada.  Before the 
start of the first intifada in 1987, Israel had about 200 administrative detainees.412 
According to B’Tselem, by 2007, Israel held a monthly average of 830 Palestinians in 
administration detention, which was one hundred higher than in 2006.413  As of February 
2008, Israel is holding 780 Palestinians in administration detention414 (at its height, 
Guantanamo Bay held about 750 prisoners).415  By comparison, over the years, only nine 
Israeli citizens residing in settlements in the West Bank have been administratively 
detained for periods up to six months.416  Similarly, in America, most of its enemy 
combatants are held overseas and there appear to have been only three enemy combatants 
that were U.S. persons. 
Although Israel’s administrative detention regimes in both the territories and 
Israel proper provide more due process and substantive rights to its detainees than 
America’s enemy combatant policy, many civil libertarians in Israel deride administrative 
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detention as inhumane and undemocratic.  Hebrew University Law Professor David 
Kretzmer argues that the main problem with administrative detention is the “temptation 
to use it even when it’s not necessary.”417  He argues that it is overused in the territories 
instead of employing the criminal justice system and that Israel fails to recognize the 
“distinction between legitimate political activity and unlawful conduct that endangers 
security.”418 
3. Role of Israel’s Judiciary  
Unlike America where the Supreme Court has been largely (but not entirely) 
deferential to the executive branch on matters of preventive detention (see Chapter IV), 
the Israeli Supreme Court since the 1900s has been extremely activist and attentive to due 
process and human rights issues raised by administrative detention.  In fact, the Knesset 
(Israel’s legislature) has often criticized the activist nature of the Israeli Supreme Court 
arguing that it oversteps its bounds and second guesses the will of the people as 
expressed by their elected representatives.  
Israel has been in a state of war since its founding in 1948 – with frequent 
uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Moreover, terrorist organizations such as 
Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad have directly targeted Israeli civilians, largely with suicidal attacks in Israeli cities. 
Terrorism against Israel increased dramatically after the second intifida, beginning in 
September 2000 and continuing to this day.  According to Israel’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 960 Israeli citizens have been killed by terrorists between 2000 and 2006 and 
6,596 have been wounded. 419 In 2002 alone, there were 60 separate suicide attacks 
against Israeli targets420 – more than during the previous eight years combined.421  Yet, 
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as Professor Schulhofer notes, although the Palestinian intifada has grown in intensity 
since 1999, “Israeli courts have become increasingly interventionist” and not increasingly 
deferential to military authorities.422  Harvard Professor Philip Heymann expresses a 
similar sentiment: “The contrast with Israel is revealing.  Even in the midst of the 
intifada, the Israeli Supreme Court has asserted some level of judicial review over 
government actions that affect Palestinians, both within Israel and also within the West 
Bank and Gaza.”423 
For instance, in 2002, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) undertook a military 
operation known as Defensive Shield (or Defensive Wall) in response to an extremely 
bloody month of terrorist attacks in Israel which culminated in a suicide bomber killing 
dozens of Israelis during a Passover dinner at a hotel.  As a result, IDF arrested thousands 
of Palestinians and, pursuant to a new military order,424 detained them for eighteen days 
(and then twelve days) without judicial review based on an IDF officer’s determination 
that the “circumstances of [the person’s] detention raise the suspicion that he endangers 
or may be a danger to the security of the area, the IDF, or the public.”425  In Marab v. 
IDF Commander in the West Bank, the Israeli Supreme Court invalidated the military 
order that allowed investigative detention of Palestinians in the West Bank for twelve 
days without a judicial hearing for purposes of interrogation.426  Rejecting the 
government’s claim that effective interrogation and security merited the delay, the Court 
held that prompt judicial review of detention is an inherent part of the legality of the 
detention measure because the detainee is still presumed innocent.427  The Court found 
that detaining Palestinians twelve days without judicial review was “in conflict with the 
fundamentals of both international and Israeli law,” which view “judicial review of 
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detention proceedings essential for the protection of individual liberty.”428  Significantly 
– and in stark contrast to America – the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that even “an 
‘unlawful combatant’ . . . is to be brought promptly before a judge.”429  The Israeli 
Supreme Court, however, deferred its ruling for six months to allow the IDF to create a 
new regime of detention and arrest.430  Israel went back to allowing eight days before 
judicial review. 
Interestingly, while the Israeli Supreme Court in Marab did not allow twelve days 
before judicial review, it did allow the IDF to postpone access to counsel for up to thirty-
four days, meaning that some detainees would attend their judicial review hearing 
without the benefit of counsel.  The Court based this determination on “significant 
security considerations.”431  Importantly, the Court explicitly noted that “advancing the 
investigation [i.e., facilitating interrogation] is not a sufficient reason to prevent the 
meeting . . . . [T]here must be an element of necessity.”432  This, of course, stands in stark 
contrast to America where the main rationale for years of incommunicado detention is to 
facilitate interrogation without interference posed by attorneys. 
While the Israeli Supreme Court does not hesitate to involve itself in the minutia 
of administrative detention (i.e., discussing the exact number of days before judicial 
review and access to counsel), the U.S. Supreme Court by contrast has largely avoided 
the substantive details concerning preventive detention and focused more on narrow 
jurisdictional issues.  For instance, in Rasul v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
foreign nationals (similar to Israel’s detainees in the Palestinian Territories) held at 
Guantanamo Bay had a right to challenge their detentions in federal court with a writ of 
habeas corpus.433  Yet, the Court failed to provide any details on what proceedings, if 
any, would be appropriate.  Therefore, there was no discussion of the time limits for 
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incommunicado detention or judicial review and no discussion of what standards merited 
preventive detention in the first place. After Rasul, at the Bush Administration’s urging, 
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005,434 which stripped the 
foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay of their limited victory in Rasul and held that the 
federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals challenging their detention.  
In June 2006, however, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court interpreted 
the DTA restrictively, holding that it only applied prospectively from the date of 
enactment and did not remove jurisdiction from the federal courts in habeas proceedings 
pending on that date.435  Congress responded by passing the Military Commissions Act 
(MCA) of 2006 which stated, inter alia, that the DTA applied to all pending cases – not 
just those that occurred prospectively.436  On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held 5-4 
in Boumediene v. Bush that the foreign nationals at Guantanamo have a right to challenge 
their detentions in U.S. civilian courts and that the MCA is unconstitutional to the extent 
that it precludes the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain habeas petitions brought by 
them.437  As explained in Chapter IV, however, these cases do not concern the 
substantive rights detainees have on the merits and what claims will be cognizable before 
federal courts.  In fact, ironically, after six years of litigation, the aliens at Guantanamo 
have the same rights – or lack thereof – that Padilla, Hamdi, and al-Marri have: they all 
can bring habeas petitions before federal courts.  As commentator George Will notes of 
Boumediene, “None [of the detainees] will be released by the court’s decision, which 
does not even guarantee a right to a hearing. Rather, it guarantees only a right to request a 
hearing.”438  In other words, while the Israeli Supreme Court has intervened and  
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addressed substantive details of preventive detention (i.e., arguing that twelve days is too 
long before judicial review), the U.S. Supreme Court – six years later – is still standing 
on the sidelines.  
The same pattern has occurred with the enemy combatant cases involving U.S. 
persons detained in America.  As explained in Chapter IV, in Hamdi, the U.S. Supreme 
Court merely held that after two years of incommunicado detention as an enemy 
combatant, Hamdi must be allowed a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
designation of an enemy combatant in a neutral forum (something Israel’s 1979 law had 
already provided after a mere forty-eight hours for detainees arrested within Israel). 
Disappointingly, as in Rasul, Hamdi did not specify how long an enemy combatant could 
be held incommunicado or how long he could be held before being brought for judicial 
review.  As Professor Schulhofer laments, the Supreme Court “expressed no impatience 
and showed no evident discomfort with the two-year-plus periods that detentions had 
been allowed to remain unreviewed.”439  Similarly, in Padilla, the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected Padilla’s appeal on jurisdictional grounds – finding 5-4 that Padilla filed his 
habeas petition in the wrong jurisdiction – and did not reach any of the substantive issues 
concerning his indefinite and incommunicado detention.  As Professor Schulhofer 
observes, “[a]fter more than two years of detention, virtually all of it incommunicado, 
and after persistent, unsuccessful efforts to secure the rights to counsel and to a hearing 
on the allegations against him, Padilla obtained no relief whatsoever. He was told to start 
again in another court.”440  In sum, the Supreme Court in Israel is exceedingly more 
proactive in scrutinizing the details of administrative detention to guarantee basic human 
rights while the U.S. Supreme Court is much more reticent and deferential to the 
executive branch. 
Some of these differences between the Israeli and U.S. Supreme Courts can be 
attributed to their divergent views on standing and justiciability.  While in America the 
Supreme Court tends to be deferential to the executive branch during times of war, in 
Israel, which has been in a perpetual state of war, the Israeli Supreme Court believes that 
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it can review virtually all activities conducted by the executive branch whether in Israel 
proper or the Palestinian Territories.  In fact, there is almost no standing requirement for 
the Israeli Supreme Court – almost any person directly affected by state action can 
petition the Court that the action was unlawful, although the Court will not substitute its 
own discretion for the executive’s decisions on operational issues or counter-terrorism 
measures.441  In fact, even organizations interested in the fate of a detainee can appeal to 
the Israeli Supreme Court.442  As Israeli Supreme Court Registrar Yigal Mersel notes: 
“The approach of the [Israeli] Court is to balance human rights and national security on a 
case-by-case basis; this approach manifests itself in an almost total willingness to hear 
any case challenging any counter-terrorism activity, without reservations of standing or 
justiciability.”443  According to Chief Justice Barak, “everything is justiciable.”444  In 
other words, if a petitioner argues that the military is acting unlawfully, the petition will 
not normally be rejected on the grounds that the petitioner is not an Israeli citizen or 
inhabitant.445  
Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court has strict standing and jurisdictional 
requirements as demonstrated by the years of litigation just concerning whether the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay could bring habeas petitions challenging their detentions in 
federal court.  A fundamental difference between the Israeli and U.S. Supreme Courts is 
that the U.S. Supreme Court is restricted to ruling on specific cases that have been 
previously adjudicated and hence cannot opine on broader policy issues as can the Israeli 
Supreme Court. Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s greater standing and jurisdictional 
restrictions, it could be argued that Congress needs to take the initiative to protect the 
procedural and substantive rights of detainees more than does the Supreme Court.  Stated 
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differently, while the Israeli Supreme Court is activist (much to the chagrin of the 
Knesset) and often protects substantive human rights, the U.S.’s differing system of 
government leads to the conclusion that Congress needs to play this role.  
4. Israel’s 2002 Unlawful Combatants Act 
In 2000, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the EPDL of 1979 did not allow 
Israel to detain individuals who are not themselves terrorist threats for “bargaining 
chips.”446  The Court held that the particular terrorist had to pose a risk and could not be 
held simply as a negotiating tool despite the fact that his detention might be crucial to 
state security and the release of Israeli soldiers.  Rather, the Court found that an 
individual’s detention had to ensue from the dangers posed by his release.447  
As a result of this decision, the Knesset enacted the 2002 Incarceration of 
Unlawful Combatants Law, which allows Israel to detain “members of a force 
perpetrating hostile acts against Israel” even without a showing of immediate threat or 
individual involvement in terrorist acts.448  Although this law provides for access of 
counsel within seven days of detention, judicial review within fourteen days of detention, 
and a right of appeal to the Supreme Court within thirty days,449 this law would 
theoretically allow Israel to detain terrorist members based on mere association.  The 
detainee can be held until the Minister of Defense determines that the group with which 
the detainee is associated has ceased hostilities against Israel or until a court determines 
that the detainee’s release would not threaten state security.450  Significantly, if the 
Minister of Defense determines in writing that a force engages in hostile acts, this finding 
is presumed correct unless the detainee can prove otherwise.451  After the initial detention 
hearing, the detention must be reviewed by the district court every six months (in contrast 
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to every three months under the 1979 law).452  It appears that Israel has used this law 
only a few times, against high-profile terrorists from abroad.  Most recently, Israel used it 
to detain Hezbollah fighters during the summer of 2006.453 
By comparison, in 2005, Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced the Detention of 
Enemy Combatant Act (DECA) (HR 1076) to the House of Representatives but it never 
became law.454  The purpose of DECA was to “authorize the President to detain an 
enemy combatant who is a United States person or resident who is a member of al Qaeda 
or knowingly cooperated with members of al Qaeda, to guarantee timely access to 
judicial review to challenge the basis for a detention, to permit the detainee access to 
counsel, and for other purposes.”455  Significantly, the DECA explicitly stated that 
“Congress has a responsibility for maintaining vigorous oversight of detention of United 
States citizens and lawful residents to assure that such detentions are consistent with due 
process.”456  Furthermore, in order to detain an “enemy combatant” under DECA, the 
President would need to certify that (1) “the United States Armed Forces are engaged in a 
state of armed conflict with al Qaeda and an investigation with a view toward 
prosecution, a prosecution, or a post-trial proceeding in the case of such person or 
resident is ongoing or (2) detention is warranted in order to prevent such person or 
resident from aiding persons attempting to commit terrorist acts against the United 
States.”457  Importantly, like Israel, the certifications would be effective for 180 days but 
able to be renewed with successive certifications.458  Judicial review would occur at the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia where detainees could challenge 
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– with the assistance of counsel – the basis of the detention.459  Yet, DECA did not 
proscribe any particular time frame that a detainee could be held incommunicado or 
otherwise brought for judicial review, instead relying on vague generalities about future 
rules that shall “guarantee timely access to judicial review to challenge the basis for a 
detention, and permit the detainee access to counsel.”460  Significantly, had DECA been 
enacted, it would have been similar to Israel’s law that passed in 2002, although Israel’s 
Act did specifically provide strict time frames for judicial review and access to counsel.  
Yet, because DECA was not passed into law – and no alternative legislation has 
been enacted – the executive branch still argues it retains the right to unilaterally label a 
U.S. person caught in a civilian area as an enemy combatant and hold that person 
indefinitely, although pursuant to Hamdi that individual must be allowed to challenge 
that designation in a neutral forum.  On the other hand, Israel’s 2002 Incarceration of 
Unlawful Combatants Law effectively allows Israel to “take hostages” to secure the 
release of Israeli prisoners.  Thus, an argument could be made that such a rationale is 
more draconian than the U.S. enemy combatant policy where at least the enemy 
combatants are themselves (alleged) unsavory characters.  Neither policy is refreshing. 
5. Summary of Analysis: Israel versus United States 
While’s Israel administrative detention that is used primarily against Palestinians 
has several problems, namely, that secret evidence can be used to detain individuals for 
indefinite renewals of six months, it is fundamentally better than America’s form of 
preventive detention employed in its enemy combatant policy.  Although Israel has not 
suffered a catastrophic terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11, between 2000 and 2006, Israel 
suffered 152 attacks in a country with a population of close to seven million.461  Unlike 
America, however, it has always allowed judicial review of its administrative detention of 
individuals and allowed access to counsel.  Although the number of days has changed 
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throughout the decades, the maximum number of days a detainee can be held without 
access to counsel in Israel is thirty-four days and the maximum number of days before 
judicial review is eight days compared to America’s indefinite and largely 
incommunicado detention.  While pursuant to Hamdi, America’s enemy combatants must 
now be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the designation presumably with 
counsel, the details of that review and how long the person can be initially held without 
judicial review and access to counsel are still unresolved.  As Heymann observes, 
“[t]hough our danger is far less than the danger that Israel faces, our willingness to 
abandon the most fundamental judicial protections of personal security has been far 
greater.”462 
Significantly, the rationales for preventive detention are also different between the 
two countries.  While both countries attest they need preventive detention when evidence 
is classified or inadmissible – or when they do not want to compromise methods and 
sources – America further asserts that it needs preventive detention to gain actionable 
intelligence from the detainees, and that access to counsel will thwart that purpose.  By 
contrast, Israel’s Supreme Court refused to allow incommunicado detention for a mere 
thirty-four days based on such a rationale.  Israel, however, uses administrative detention 
to continue to detain individuals that are dangerous to Israel’s security after the 
completion of their criminal sentences.  America has not yet articulated this rationale but 
it may be too soon to tell since all of America’s convicted terrorists are still serving their 
sentences such as Padilla, Richard Reid, and John Walker Lindh. 
Finally, Israel has never claimed that its executive branch or military could 
unilaterally create a system of administrative detention without input from the legislative 
or judicial branches.  In fact, even at the height of suicidal terrorist attacks in 2002, the 
IDF only authorized detention of eighteen days (then dropped it to twelve days) without 
judicial review (which was struck down by the Israeli Supreme Court).  It is telling that 
Israel’s military only tried to obtain preventive detention for weeks compared to 
President Bush’s claim of indefinite detention without judicial review.  
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Although Israel’s administrative detention policies highlight some substantial 
flaws in America’s system of preventive detention, it is also useful to look at how Britain 
has dealt with its various terrorism threats throughout the decades.  As will be shown, 
while Israel and America view the conflict with terrorism more as a “war” using terms 
such as “unlawful” or “enemy” combatants, Britain treats terrorists more as criminals, 
and its preventive detention regime reflects a need for additional time to investigate 
potential terrorist acts as crimes. 
C. BRITAIN’S PREVENTIVE DETENTION POLICIES 
In Britain, preventive detention is presently called “pre-charge detention” and is 
used to increase the time for investigation of a potential crime before charging the 
suspect.  Unlike the Israeli model, pre-charge detention in Britain cannot be used to 
detain an individual after completion of a criminal sentence because he/she is a threat to 
security, and unlike the practice in the United States, pre-charge detention does not 
appear to be used solely for interrogation to gain useful intelligence, although this can be 
part of the rationale.  Britain’s form of preventive detention is really in support of its 
criminal justice system.  There is no argument that terrorists are unlawful or enemy 
combatants and no discussion of how to create a regime outside of criminal law.  As a 
British government committee noted in April 2002: “Terrorists are criminals, and 
therefore ordinary criminal justice and security provisions should, so far as possible, 
continue to be the preferred way of countering terrorism.”463  
1. Britain’s Emergency Executive Powers 
While Britain’s current preventive detention regime is framed as pre-charge 
detention under its criminal justice system, this was not always the case.  During both 
World Wars, Britain used virtually unchecked executive power to detain individuals 
suspected of being spies or otherwise hostile to the nation.  Regulation 14B, enacted in 
1915, allowed the Home Secretary (responsible for internal affairs in Britain and Wales) 
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to order the internment of any person “for securing the public safety or the defense of the 
realm.”464  Detainees could not use habeas corpus to challenge the detentions in court; 
rather, a government committee could recommend, but not order, release.  The House of 
Lords ruled that it was “necessary in a time of great public danger to entrust great powers 
to [the executive]” and assumed that “such powers will be reasonably exercised.”465 
Similar powers were enacted during World War II with Regulation 18B, under which 
2,000 individuals were detained without trial.466  Many were British citizens, including 
leaders of right-wing fascist originations.  Although Winston Churchill initially supported 
Regulation 18B during World War II, he ultimately condemned it, and it was abolished 
after the war.  He stated: “The power of the Executive to cast a man into prison without 
formulating any charge known to the law, and particularly to deny him the judgment of 
his peers, is in the highest degree odious and is the foundation of all totalitarian 
government whether Nazi or Communist.”467  
Emergency executive power to detain generally ended after World War II.  
Britain then promulgated a series of emergency regulations that were constantly renewed 
to deal with the threat posed by Irish Republicans and later al Qaeda.468  Instead of 
unfettered executive detention, the focus changed to pre-charge detention periods (the 
current maximum is twenty-eight days) with judicial review at varying intervals.  While 
America also detained individuals during World War II (e.g., Japanese internment 
camps), Britain’s Regulations 14B and 18B during the World Wars seem similar to 
President’s Bush current claim of executive war powers to unilaterally detain terrorist 
suspects as enemy combatants.  In other words, although Britain faced a serious terrorist 
threat with its conflict in Northern Ireland (between 1966 and 1999 a total of 3,636 
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individuals lost their lives in violence related to the Northern Ireland conflict),469 it did 
not resort to executive detentions as it had during the World Wars but instead issued a 
series of regulations that, while controversial, at least allowed for judicial review of pre-
charge detention.  Similar to Israel, as the terrorist threat increased, it could be argued 
that the Britain responded overall with more due process for terrorist suspects.  
2. Britain’s Emergency Regulations Pre 9/11 
While a detailed recounting of Britain’s conflict with Northern Ireland and its 
ensuing legal instruments to fight terrorism before 9/11 is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, with respect to pre-charge detention, there are some useful regulations to discuss. 
The 1939 Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act (PVA) empowered the 
Home Secretary to arrest and detain individuals without warrant for an initial period of 
forty-eight hours and, with the authorization from the Secretary of State, for an additional 
period of five days, making the total number seven days for pre-charge detention.470  The 
PVA was supposed to be temporary and only last two years; however, it was not until 
1952 that it was allowed to expire and not until 1973 that it was formally repealed.471 
Yet, in 1974, after IRA bombings of two pubs in Birmingham left 21 people dead and 
160 injured, the PVA was reintroduced again in 1974 as the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974 (PTA).472  Section 12 (1b) of the PTA allowed the 
British police to arrest and detain anyone they reasonably suspected “to be or have been 
involved in acts of terrorism” for seven days without charge with the approval of the 
Secretary of State.  For the first forty-eight hours, the suspects could be held without 
access to attorneys.473  Under general criminal law, by comparison, pre-charge detention 
could not and presently cannot exceed ninety-six hours (four days) and the suspect is 
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entitled to see an attorney within the first thirty-six hours.474  It is interesting to note that, 
when faced with a serious terrorist threat, Britain increased incommunicado detention a 
mere twelve hours (from thirty-six hours to forty-eight hours) while incommunicado 
detention has been over two years for America’s enemy combatants with no prescribed 
statutory limit at all. 
The PTA was rewritten in 1976, 1984 and again in 1989 but continued to stay as 
emergency “temporary” powers that had to be renewed each year until the 2000 
Terrorism Act, discussed below.  The seven days of pre-change detention stayed the same 
throughout the PTA’s existence. From 1974 until 1996, 27,000 people were arrested 
under the PTA alone.  Although fewer than fifteen percent were subsequently charged 
with a crime, according to terrorism expert and Professor Linda Donahue, the information 
gained during questioning most likely decreased the level of violence.475  
In 1972, as the conflict and violence in Northern Ireland escalated, the British 
government appointed Lord Diplock to head an inquiry into needed emergency powers to 
deal with the growing terrorist threat in Northern Ireland.  The resulting 1973 Northern 
Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) empowered the government to intern terrorist 
suspects for seventy-two hours without charges based on mere subjective suspicion 
(reasonableness was not even required).  In 1987, these special arrest powers for 
Northern Ireland were suspended and instead the PTA provision requiring “reasonable 
grounds” before detainment was employed.476  While the EPA (like the PTA) was 
supposed to be temporary, it lasted twenty-six years until the 2000 Terrorism Act 
(discussed below).477  Although Britain had a tendency to enact restrictive legislation 
under the guise of being “emergency” legislation, the laws were continued because they 
proved effective.478  Donahue points out, however, that the effectiveness of security had 
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a corresponding negative effect on civil liberties, including increased friction within 
Northern Ireland and unwelcome international attention on British domestic affairs.479  
After the peace process with Northern Ireland in 1999, Britain began to focus 
more on international terrorism, including al Qaeda.480  In 2000, Britain passed 
permanent counterterrorism legislation (no more discussions of “temporary” measures) 
with the 2000 Terrorism Act (TA).  While originally the TA only allowed seven days for 
pre-charge detention, it was amended in 2003 to increase the total possible period of 
detention without charge to fourteen days for any individual reasonably suspected of 
being a terrorist.481  Between the date of the amendment and September 4, 2005, 357 
people were arrested of whom thirty-six were held in excess of seven days. 482  In other 
words, although the police had the ability to hold suspects for fourteen days in pre-charge 
detention, it exercised that power infrequently.  
3. Britain’s Regulations Post 9/11 
Like Israel and America, Britain proposed different preventive detention or pre-
charge detention policies for its citizens compared to aliens residing within its borders. 
While Britain has never held an individual outside its borders as the United States has at 
Guantanamo Bay or Israel has in the Palestinian Territories, Britain’s preventive 
detention policy towards its foreign nationals after 9/11 was more draconian than the 
procedures applied to its own citizens, causing much uproar and the policy’s eventual 
demise. 
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a. Foreign Nationals in Britain 
After 9/11, Britain adopted additional legal measures with the 2001 Anti-
terrorism, Crime, and Security Act (ATCSA) which provided stronger powers to allow 
the police to investigate and prevent terrorist activity and other serious crime.  Sixty-
seven British citizens died in the 9/11 attacks, and eleven of the nineteen suspected 9/11 
hijackers had British links.483  The attack highlighted that terrorist organizations were 
using Britain to plan attacks.484  
While the ATCSA did not increase pre-charge detention for British 
citizens from the 2000 TA’s seven days – that happened later in 2003 and again after the 
July 2005 bombings – it did allow for the removal or indefinite detention of foreign 
nationals suspected of terrorist activity (albeit this part of ATCSA was limited to fifteen 
months, unless renewed by Parliament).485  Upon certification by the Home Secretary 
that the individual was an international terrorist whose presence in Britain created a risk 
to national security, that individual could be deported.  If deportation could not occur 
because of Britain’s international obligation to prevent torture or other inhumane 
treatment, or because of national security concerns, then ATCSA provided the individual 
could be indefinitely detained – without trial – in Britain, unless the suspect agreed to go 
to another country and the country agreed to accept him.486  
Yet, ATCSA did provide some measure of review: a person detained or 
deported could appeal – with the assistance of counsel – the certification to the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), which had the power to cancel the 
certification if it concluded there were not grounds for the Home Secretary’s 
certification.487  Significantly, the appeal included two stages: an “open” one where the 
Home Secretary disclosed information and a “closed” one where classified information 
                                                 






was made available to a security-cleared special advocate.488  Once receiving classified 
information, the special advocate was precluded from further communication with the 
suspect or his attorney.  Unlike in Israel where a judge could prohibit both the suspect 
and his attorney from seeing classified information during the judicial proceeding for 
administrative detention, British law allows for a special advocate to access the 
information against the suspect and provide some measure of review. 
Nonetheless, ATCSA’s provisions regarding indefinite detention of 
foreign nationals did not survive scrutiny.  The government ultimately repealed the 
provisions of ATCSA dealing with indefinite detention based on a House of Lords 
Judicial Committee December 2004 ruling that such powers were incompatible with 
articles of the European Commission on Human Rights relating to the right to liberty and 
the right to freedom from discrimination.  The Committee found the indefinite detention 
powers to be discriminatory as they only applied to foreign nationals, not to British 
citizens, and that they were not proportionate to the threat Britain faced from 
terrorism.489  
During the relatively short-life of ATCSA, Britain held seventeen foreign 
nationals, some more than two years.490  Of the seventeen, two men voluntarily left 
Britain and one individual was released under ATCSA and detained on other grounds.491 
In October 2003, the SIAC rejected appeals of ten of the remaining fourteen detainees.492 
In other words, while the indefinite detention of foreign nationals under ATCSA was 
short-lived, it does not appear that the SIAC rejected many of the detentions on 
substantive grounds.  Yet, even the indefinite detention provision of ATCSA – which was 
controversial and only lasted approximately three years – provided at the outset for some 
level of judicial review of the indefinite detention of foreign nationals.  
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By contrast, the United States did not provide any review of the foreign 
nationals held at Guantanamo Bay until after the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi and 
Rasul that enemy combatants must be allowed to challenge the designation in a neutral 
forum.  As a result, the Bush Administration created Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs) where a three-panel board of military officers from the Department of Defense 
(not the judiciary) decides the detainees’ status based on the current threat assessment 
and intelligence value of each detainee.  The detainees are not allowed attorneys; they 
cannot see evidence used that is considered classified; and there is a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of the government.  
For aliens detained within the United States, the USA Patriot Act allowed 
detention by the Attorney General without charge for seven days, after which the person 
needed to either be charged or removal proceedings commenced.493  If a detainee could 
not be otherwise deported and the “release of the alien was found to threaten the national 
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person” the Attorney 
General could hold the individual for renewable periods of six months.494  According to 
the Inspector General of the Department of Justice, 762 aliens were arrested in 
connection with investigating 9/11 and the majority of these individuals were charged 
with immigration violations (such as overstaying visas).495  Ironically, foreign nationals 
under the USA Patriot Act have more due process rights than U.S. persons detained as 
enemy combatants.  After all, the Administration detained Padilla as an enemy combatant 
for three and one-half years before bringing criminal charges, which seems to be in 
contrast to Britain and Israel where non-citizens are (or were in the case of Britain) 
treated in a harsher manner. 
b. British Citizens 
After terrorist bombs murdered fifty-two people in London on July 7, 
2005, the Home Office (similar in some respects to the U.S. Department of Homeland 
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Security) tried to increase pre-charge detention for British citizens from the fourteen days 
provided in the TA of 2000, as amended in 2003, to ninety days.  Then-Prime Minister 
Tony Blair addressed Parliament by stating: “I have to try to do my best to protect people 
in this country and to make sure their safety and their civil liberty to life come first. Let 
us have a debate about the strength or otherwise of those proposals but for myself I find it 
a convincing case.”496  Although Parliament refused to extend pre-charge detention to 
ninety days in what was Mr. Blair’s first parliamentary defeat, it is significant to note that 
Mr. Blair presented his recommendation to Parliament and encouraged debate about the 
issue.  This, of course, contrasts to President Bush’s unilateral decisions – without any 
debate or input from Congress – on the identity of enemy combatants and how long they 
can be held without access to counsel. 
On July 3, 2006, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee497 
published a report entitled Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth Report of Session 2005-
06, which evaluated whether there was a legitimate justification to extend pre-charge 
detention to ninety days.  The report articulated reasons to extend pre-charge detention 
beyond fourteen days: the international nature of terrorism; difficulties in establishing the 
identify of terrorist suspects; the need to find interpreters; the need to decrypt computer 
files; the length of time needed for scene examination and analysis; the length of time 
needed to obtain and analyze data from mobile phones; the need to allow for religious 
observance by detainees; and delays arising from solicitors’ consultations with multiple 
clients.498  Significantly, unlike in America, interrogation to gain intelligence was not one 
of the rationales listed as a justification for extending preventive detention, although 
certainly the detainees are allowed to be questioned during the pre-charge detention 
period.  Yet, the report notes that “[i]n general it cannot be expected that interviews of 
suspects during extended detention will lead to significant additional information that can 
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be used in court.”499  According to the police, “the detention process is not about 
interviewing alone as many people do not answer questions in any event” and that “in the 
majority of suspect interviews, terrorist suspects are advised, and exercise, their right to 
remain silent.”500  By comparison, in America, enemy combatants are not allowed to 
meet with attorneys expressly because it would interfere with interrogation and 
questioning of terrorist suspects.  The report concluded that ninety days of pre-charge 
detention may be useful in some cases but that it was not essential.501 
While ninety days of pre-charge detention did not pass, as a compromise, 
in the Terrorism Act of 2006, twenty-eight days for pre-charge detention became the new 
limit.502  According to the TA of 2006, those arrested can be detained for forty-eight 
hours, after which the police or Crown Prosecution Service may apply to a judicial 
authority for an extension of the detention warrant.503  In other words, judicial review 
begins after forty-eight hours.  Detention can only be authorized if it is necessary to (1) 
obtain relevant evidence by questioning the suspect; (2) preserve evidence or (3) to make 
a decision about the deportation or charging of the suspect.504  Applications to extend the 
detention period may be made for seven days at successive intervals up to a maximum of 
twenty-eight days.505  For the first fourteen days, the application for detention is made to 
a designated magistrate judge.  Between days fourteen and twenty-eight, the application 
must be made to a High Court judge.506  At each proceeding, the detainee can be 
represented by special counsel who has been cleared to handle classified information.507 
This judicial review at week-long intervals stands in stark contrast to the Bush 
Administration’s claim of inherent constitutional authority to detain enemy combatants 
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indefinitely and without access to counsel.  Finally, in Britain, the Home Secretary 
appoints an independent reviewer to examine the operation of the detention laws and to 
review each individual case of detention.508  Significantly, there is no such equivalent 
review function in the United States for its enemy combatants. 
According to the Home Office, the judicial review proceedings have been 
rigorous, with applications for detentions being strenuously contested by the defense 
attorneys and lasting several hours.  Not all detention orders have been granted and some 
have been granted for less time than requested.509  Since July 26, 2006, when pre-charge 
detention was increased to twenty-eight days, and October 2007, there were 204 arrests 
under the TA.  Only eleven suspects were detained for more than fourteen days (eight of 
them where charged and three were released without charge).510  In other words, 
although Britain can detain suspects up to twenty-eight days, it appears to be using its 
authority sparingly. 
During the summer of 2007, the Home Office tried to increase the twenty-
eight day limit to fifty-six days of pre-charge detention.  A government report issued by 
the Home Office in July 2007 argued that the police were investigating around 2,000 
individuals of terrorist related offenses and that the complexity of the investigations was 
escalating due to an increase in use of false identifies and international links which 
necessitated the cooperation of foreign governments.511  The report concluded: 
The Government is clear that it will only be necessary to go beyond 
twenty-eight days in exceptional circumstances – were there are multiple 
plots, or links with multiple countries, or exceptional levels of complexity. 
To ensure that any new limit is indeed used only in exceptional cases, we 
believe that any increase in the limit should be balanced by strengthening 
the accompanying judicial oversight and Parliamentary accountability.512 
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Although the Home Office proposed four options to implement the extension to fifty-six 
days of pre-charge detention – with each option offering different varieties of judicial 
review and oversight – Parliament refused to extend pre-charge detention beyond twenty-
eight days.  Alternatively, the Home Office proposed civil emergency legislation that 
would allow for an additional thirty days’ detention (for a total of fifty-eight days) if 
Parliament declared an emergency.513  This option was also defeated by Parliament.  
By comparison, in America, Congress has utterly failed to involve itself in 
the details of preventive detention for U.S. persons, although it has passed the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 and Military Commissions of Act of 2006 to deal with the foreign 
nationals at Guantanamo Bay.  As explored earlier, while Congress did debate the DECA 
in 2005, which would have provided a statute to deal with preventive detention of U.S. 
persons as enemy combatants, it failed to pass and it does not appear that any alternatives 
are being proposed.  In other words, while Britain and Israel’s respective legislatures 
have played an active role in their respective preventive detention regimes (whether 
called pre-charge detention or administration detention), Congress has been remarkably 
silent and deferential to the executive branch. 
Currently, the British government is trying to increase the twenty-eight 
day pre-charge limit to forty-two days.  In April 2008, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith 
introduced a new anti-terrorism package that would allow for pre-charge detention of up 
to forty-two days and post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects.514  According to 
Smith, forty-two days would only be used in exceptional cases such as those that require 
the cooperation of a foreign government.515  In June 2008, the House of Commons 
passed the measure by an extremely narrow margin, vote was 315 to 306, but it is not 
likely to pass the House of Lords when it comes up for debate in the Fall.516 
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Although forty-two days of pre-charge detention is not nearly as severe as 
years of incommunicado and indefinite detention as advocated by the Bush 
Administration, the forty-two day proposal has sparked harsh criticism from civil liberties 
group within Britain.  For instance, civil rights group Liberty has called the proposal 
unjust, arguing that “[t]he UK already has the longest period of pre-charge detention in 
the Western world, and there is no evidence that a further extension will make us any 
safer.”517  Human Rights Watch has argued that the government could enact “rolling 
periods of 42-day pre-charge detention” by proposing new charges against terrorist 
suspects.518  According to Ben Ward, Associate Europe and Central Asia Director at 
Human Rights Watch, increasing the pre-charge detention period more than twenty-eight 
days “denies the basic right to liberty” and is counterproductive as it is “a recipe for 
alienating communities vital to defeating terrorism.”  He explains that the proposals to 
increase pre-charge detention evoke the experience of internment in Northern Ireland: 
“Internment was deeply counterproductive in the fight against terrorism in Northern 
Ireland, and these proposals carry similar risks.”519  Amnesty International also argues 
the extending pre-charge detention risks “alienat[ing] affected communities, leading 
people to mistrust the authorities and make them less likely to want to cooperate with the 
police.”520 
Critics contend that other measures should be used before increasing pre-
charge detention, such as allowing suspects to be interviewed after they have been 
charged (and allowing refusals to answer to be held against them) and using telephone 
intercept material as evidence.521  Liberty Director Shami Chakrabarti maintains that she  
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would support measures allowing for a suspect to be charged with a lesser offence, such 
as possessing explosive material or attending a terror camp, while investigations 
continued for more serious or related offences such as conspiracy to murder.522  
Curiously, some critics of Britain’s attempts to increase pre-charge 
detention beyond twenty-eight days argue that America compares favorably to Britain.  
In November 2007, Liberty published an article entitled Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention 
Comparative Law Study, in which it compares Britain’s pre-charge detention to other 
countries, including America but not Israel.  In this report, author Jago Russell argues 
that America only detains criminals for forty-eight hours under its criminal justice system 
while Britain’s twenty-eight days is excessive: 
Despite being a major terrorist target the United States, for example, 
allows only two days’ of pre-charge detention. . . . How can our 
Government sustain the argument that the UK police need over a month 
when so many other countries manage with pre-charge detention periods 
of less than a week?523  
In this war on terror, however, America has often bypassed its criminal justice system, 
arguing that terrorist suspects are enemy combatants that can be held incommunicado 
pursuant to the laws of war and released at the end of hostilities that may never end. 
While Russell acknowledges that America has detained individuals due to the executive’s 
“war powers” privilege, he argues such powers are not equivalent to pre-charge detention 
in Britain as they are not part of the criminal justice system.524  Nevertheless, while 
Britain’s twenty-eight days of pre-charge detention may be excessive, when it comes to 
preventive detention as a concept, it is hardly prudent to compare Britain’s twenty-eight 
days of pre-charge detention, which was passed by Parliament and has weekly judicial 
review incorporated within its provisions, to America’s enemy combatant policy where 
the executive branch has unilaterally decided to detain individuals for years of  
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incommunicado detention.  Russell notes: “If UK law is significantly more repressive 
than the law in other countries, some will use the disparity to question Britain’s moral 
authority.”525  Such a statement only applies a fortiori to the United States. 
4. Summary of Analysis: Britain versus United States 
Since 2000, Britain’s preventive detention regime has moved from seven days of 
pre-charge detention to twenty-eight days of pre-charge detention with access to counsel 
after forty-eight hours and judicial review every seven days.  While there has been debate 
about extending pre-charge detention to ninety, fifty-six or currently now forty-two days, 
there never has been an argument that pre-charge detention should be indefinite and 
without access to counsel.  In fact, on June 2, 2008, in arguing that Britain should extend 
pre-charge detention from twenty-eight to forty-two days, Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
specifically stated in The Times that “our first principle is that there should always be a 
maximum limit on pre-charge detention.  It is fundamental to our civil liberties that no 
one should be held arbitrarily for an unspecified period.”526  In other words, unlike 
President Bush who has argued for indefinite detention of enemy combatants with no 
judicial review, the executive branch in Britain has never asserted such authority in the 
war on terror.  Furthermore, Parliament has not abdicated its responsibilities to its 
citizens: it has and continues to openly debate the issue. There is no executive usurpation 
of power as there was during the World Wars. 
By contrast, in the United States, Hamdi, Padilla and al-Marri – all U.S. persons – 
were locked up for years with no access to counsel.  Al-Marri appears to be the only U.S. 
person currently detained as an enemy combatant, although he now has met with 
attorneys and, as of this writing, his case is pending an evidentiary hearing.  Padilla was 
convicted of terrorism-related charges in August 2007 after serving over three years as an 
enemy combatant and is serving a seventeen year sentence, and Hamdi was released to 
Saudi Arabia in 2004 after the Supreme Court held that he must be provided a 
meaningful opportunity to rebut the designation as an enemy combatant. Yet, the 
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precedent of unilateral executive war powers to detain American citizens as enemy 
combatants and hold them indefinitely is on the books.  While the Supreme Court has 
ruled that enemy combatants must be allowed a modicum of judicial review to challenge 
the factual assertion that they are enemy combatants, there is no prescribed timeframe on 
when it must occur and no timeframe on how long an enemy combatant can be denied 
counsel for purposes of enhancing interrogation potential.  Even the proposed DECA did 
not contain such particulars.  These details are apparently not significant enough to 
motivate Congress to legislate or move the Supreme Court to provide more than minimal 
holdings in its decisions.  
While approximately 3,000 people died on September 11, Britain like Israel has 
faced decades of terrorist threats.  For the worst twenty years of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, 2,750 individuals were killed, 2,000 of them civilians, and more than 31,900 
seriously injured, all in a territory of 1.5 million.527  Furthermore, between 1976 and 
November 1998, 94 incidents of international terrorism took place in Britain, including 
the bomb planted on Pan Am Flight 103 that exploded over Lockerbie in 1988 killing 270 
people.528  Moreover, al Qaeda killed 52 and injured 700 people in July 2005 by bombing 
public transportation in London, and in 2006, eight men tried to smuggle explosives in 
liquids onto airliners leaving Heathrow airport for the United States.  Furthermore, it is 
well known that Britain has a substantial home-grown Islamic terrorist threat posed by its 
class system and radicalization of poor Muslims.  As of June 2008, according to Prime 
Minister Brown, there are at least 2,000 terrorist suspects, 200 networks or cells, and 30 
active plots in Britain.529  It is simply not a credible argument that America’s harsher 
preventive detention policy is based on a larger threat posed by al Qaeda.  As does Israel, 
Britain provides more due process and rights to its detainees than America, and the other 
branches of government do not appear to be so feeble.  As Professor Schulhofer aptly 
notes: “In one important respect the British and Israeli experiences are unambiguous. 
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They leave us with no illusion that the powers currently claimed by the U.S. government 
are in any sense normal, even for a situation of national crisis.”530 
Malaysia and Singapore have preventive detention regimes in which they can 
hold suspects for two-year periods without charge or meaningful court appearances based 
on mere suspicion that they might endanger national security. 531 Considering the United 
States held Padilla as an enemy combatant for three and one-half years before charging 
him with a crime, and al-Marri has been held without charges since 2003, it seems like 
the United States is in the company of authoritarian regimes more than democracies such 
as Israel and Britain.  As explained in Chapter II, it does not appear that the threat posed 
by terrorism merits such a sacrifice of our democratic principles. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The United States was completely unprepared on 9/11 and the resulting enemy 
combatant policy seems to be an ad hoc response to insecurity.  In comparing other 
countries’ approaches to preventive detention, the question should not be how does the 
United States create a perfect regime – because that cannot happen – the question is how 
does the United States create a regime that can at least provide some meaningful judicial 
review, some access to counsel, some congressional oversight, and some balance to 
unilateral executive discretion.  While Britain and Israel’s approaches to preventive 
detention are not perfect – and frequently lambasted by their own human rights groups – 
they do demonstrate that democracies facing serious and long-term terrorist threats can 
provide more overall due process and substantive rights to detainees than America’s 
years of incommunicado and indefinite executive detention.  Israel and Britain had the 
advantage (if it can be called that) of decades of dealing with terrorism before 9/11.  It 
only makes sense that the United States should look to their experiences to see if any of 
their principles can be applied to the United States’ unique kind of government.  
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Historically both Britain and Israel’s preventive detention policies started more 
draconian with less judicial review and more executive discretion.  Over the years as each 
country became more accustomed to its “emergency,” they provided more due process 
rights and judicial review to detainees even though the threat posed by terrorism did not 
diminish.  Perhaps this is the United States’ fate, and it too will eventually provide more 
due process rights to its enemy combatants by involving Congress and the judiciary in 
creating and monitoring a preventive detention regime.  The purpose of this paper is to 
analyze options so the United States can move in that direction.  Accordingly, Chapter 
VII proposes a regime for preventive detention enacted by Congress whereby the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court monitors a system of preventive detention that takes into 
account the lessons learned and observations gleaned from both Israel and Britain. 
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VI. METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING ALTERNATIVE 
REGIMES FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION AS A TOOL IN THE 
WAR ON TERROR 
This is the destiny of a democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, 
and not all practices employed by its enemies are open before it.  Although 
a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its back, it 
nonetheless has the upper hand.  Preserving the Rule of Law and 
recognition of an individual’s liberty constitutes an important component 
in its understanding of security.  At the end of the day, they strengthen its 
spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome difficulties. 
 
-Israeli Supreme Court532 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter VII, many lawyers, professors, and policy-makers 
have advocated alternative regimes to the Bush Administration’s enemy combatant policy 
for detaining suspected terrorists. The ideas proposed are: (1) enacting no preventive 
detention regime (i.e., “purist” approach); (2) creating entirely new court systems to deal 
not only with detaining suspected terrorists for purposes of interrogation and/or 
incapacitation but also with ultimately trying them for various war crimes or violations of 
criminal statutes; (3) making modifications to the current criminal justice system; (4) 
creating some sort of civil commitment scheme; (5) or creating an “emergency 
constitution” with provisions for preventive detention after another terrorist attack. 
Congress also attempted to pass the Detention of Enemy Combatant Act in 2005 but it 
stalled in committee and has never been resurrected.  This paper proposes using the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts to monitor a narrowly-prescribed regime for 
preventive detention.  
In order to evaluate these alternative approaches against each other as well as 
against the status quo enemy combatant policy, it is helpful to identify a framework for 
assessing criteria that are important underpinnings of a democratic society.  For purposes 
of this paper, each approach to preventive detention will be analyzed using four 
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parameters, namely whether and to what extent the approach is likely to (1) be legal; (2) 
protect security; (3) enhance liberty; and (4) be efficient from an organizational/ 
institutional standpoint.  
As will be shown in the next chapter, there is generally an inverse relationship 
between security and liberty.  In other words, approaches that favor or err on liberty tend 
to offer less protection to national security, although – as will be demonstrated – this is 
not universally the case.  This “tradeoff” between liberty and security is what law 
professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule dub the “security/liberty” frontier, which 
uses welfare economics to try to determine the “Pareto-optimal” solution.533  Although a 
formal analysis using Pareto-optimization is beyond the scope of the paper, it is useful to 
think of security and liberty as “goods” that a society – at any given point – tries to 
maximize.  As they describe: 
The tradeoff thesis can be stated in simple terms. Both security and liberty 
are valuable goods that contribute to individual well-being or welfare. 
Neither good can simply by maximized without regard to the other. The 
problem from the social point of view is to optimize: to choose the joint 
level of liberty and security that maximizes the aggregate welfare of the 
population.534 
Hence, while this methodology will analyze “security” and “liberty” separately with 
respect to each of the options for preventive detention proposed, it will also look at their 
interplay.  If liberty protections can be increased without any decrease in security, then 
the option is producing a suboptimal result.  As will be shown, this is arguably the case 
with the current enemy combatant policy.  
A. LEGALITY 
Whether the approach is likely to be legal will be addressed first because if an 
approach is not likely to be legal, then it is an impractical solution to address preventive 
detention as a tool in the war on terror.  Legality will be analyzed both from a  
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constitutional and statutory standpoint.  While a policy may currently be unlawful 
because it violates a statute, Congress could change the law to allow a certain policy, 
thereby making it legal.  
B. SECURITY 
As explained in detail in Chapter III, the main justifications for preventive 
detention as a tool in the war on terror – as least as articulated by the Bush 
Administration – are interrogation to gain actionable intelligence and general 
incapacitation to prevent the terrorist suspect from returning the battlefield.  While these 
rationales are controversial, there is nonetheless evidence that intelligence obtained from 
the interrogation of enemy combatants has stopped specific terrorist plots, lead to the 
captures of additional terrorists, and allowed the U.S. to better understand the structure 
and capabilities of al Qaeda.  Similarly, there is evidence that released enemy combatants 
have returned to the battlefield to inflict more damage.  While critics of preventive 
detention argue that cooperating terrorists also provide useful information and that 
criminal charges can incapacitate dangerous individuals who intend to do future harm, as 
explored in Chapter III, these arguments are not foolproof and have several weaknesses, 
especially if there is not enough admissible evidence to convict a terrorist suspect beyond 
a reasonable doubt in a court of law.  If the threat posed by terrorism merits preventive 
detention, then these two reasons, interrogation and incapacitation, appear to be the 
motivating rationales.  In other words, they represent the “security” part of the 
methodology.  
C. LIBERTY 
The concept of “liberty” is somewhat amorphous.  Two key ingredients – in the 
context of preventive detention – are due process and a meaningful ability for the terrorist 
suspect to challenge his need to be preventively detained.  The more such protections 
resemble the current criminal justice system, which errs on the side of allowing a guilty 
person to go free over incapacitating an innocent, the more the preventive detention 
regime would be protecting liberty, probably at the expense of security.  In order to help 
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gauge liberty to make meaningful comparisons between the different approaches to 
preventive detention, the following democratic principles will be employed: (1) 
transparency and accountability; (2) balance of power or checks and balances; and (3) 
narrow-tailoring of the government’s policy to meet its objectives or not being overbroad. 
These three principles have been identified by Law Professor Stephen Schulhofer as 
“fundamental to the preservation of freedom” and “bedrock principles” of our 
democracy.535 
With respect to transparency and accountability, the question is whether the 
preventive detention regime is cloaked in secrecy or whether there is some accountability 
or transparency allowed, perhaps to Congress, if not the American people.  While it is 
understandable that parts of a preventive detention regime may need to be secret from the 
American public, especially if classified information is being used, the more a regime of 
preventive detention is overall accountable to Congress or the judiciary, the more it 
would uphold liberty principles.  Again, as will be analyzed in the next chapter, there 
may very well be a tension between more openness and more security.  
Separation of powers is another key ingredient of liberty and arguably one of the 
most ingenious foundations of the U.S.’s system of government.536  James Madison, one 
of the Founding Fathers, wrote in the Federalist Papers that “tyranny” results when there 
is an “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands 
. . . .”537  In Louis Fisher’s words: “The Framers rejected political models that 
concentrated power in a single branch, especially over matters of war.  To minimize 
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abuse and injustice by government officials, they relied on a system of checks and 
balances, separation of powers, review by an independent judiciary, and the operation of 
republican principles.”538  
Nonetheless, there are several renowned legal theorists who argue that power 
should be accumulated in the executive during times of emergencies.  Most notably, 
Posner and Vermeule argue that courts and, to a lesser extent Congress, should be 
deferential to the executive branch during emergencies because the executive branch 
contains the requisite knowledge, is able to react quickly, and can, therefore, select the 
best policy.539  While they acknowledge that the executive may chose a suboptimal 
policy, they do not believe that the courts are likely to improve the matter so they should 
remain deferential: 
On this comparative institutional view, there is no general reason to think 
that judges can do better than government at balancing security and liberty 
during emergencies.  Constitutional rules do no good, and some harm, if 
they block government’s attempts to adjust the balance as threats wax and 
wane.  When judges or academic commentators say that government has 
wrongly assessed the net benefits or costs of some security policy or other, 
they are amateurs playing at security policy, and there is no reason to 
expect that courts can improve upon government’s emergency policies in 
any systematic way.540 
By contrast, Law Professor Cass Sunstein succinctly explains the problem 
inherent in solely relying on the executive branch to make fundamental decisions: 
Dynamics within the executive branch present a serious problem, because 
that branch is designed to be neither diverse nor deliberative.  It is run by 
a single person, who is constitutionally entitled to populate his branch with 
like-minded people.  But modern social science has demonstrated that, 
after deliberation, like-minded people usually end up thinking a more 
extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk. This 
process is known as “group polarization.”  Suppose that people within an  
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executive agency believe that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction.  That 
belief is likely to be heightened after members have started to talk among 
themselves.541 
While there are differing opinions on the role of separation of powers during an 
emergency, this author accepts as true that an adherence to balance of powers principles 
enhances liberty.  Journalist Jeff Rosen notes: “We may indeed need a system of 
preventive detention, but we also need the legislative and judicial oversight that exists in 
other Western democracies.”542  Hence, each proposal for preventive detention will be 
measured in part on how well it incorporates separation of power principles into its 
regime.  The greater the role for the judicial branch and Congress, the higher the proposal 
will score on this aspect of the liberty continuum. 
Finally, the last component of liberty is the question of whether the approach is 
narrowly-tailored to meet its objectives.  This parameter scrutinizes whether there is a 
good “fit” between the policy of preventive detention and objective of security.  Because 
of the controversial nature of preventive detention, policies that are narrowly-tailored to 
deal exclusively with interrogation and incapacitation of terrorist suspects – without 
impacting ordinary criminal law – will score higher on liberty than policies that could 
gradually be broadened to encompass preventive detention of dangerous but non-terrorist 
threats.  
In sum, liberty looks to measure how well any proposal for preventive detention 
incorporates (1) transparency/ accountability, (2) balance of power principles, and (3) 
being narrowly-tailored to meet its objectives.  
D. ORGANIZATIONAL FEASIBILITY 
The last parameter focuses on feasibility from an organizational/institutional 
standpoint and assesses whether an institution already exists that could be modified to 
create a preventive detention regime or whether new institutions would need to be 
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created.  While this factor does not look at financial costs per se, it more generally 
considers whether the hiring of new staff and judges would be needed and/or new 
facilities built, or whether using an institution that already exists would prove to be a 
more efficient use of resources. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Finally, this paper does not advocate any one approach for preventive detention 
that is applicable in all contexts.  Rather, this paper attempts to categorize and evaluate 
the ideas advocated for preventive detention by comparing whether they are likely to be 
lawful, how they balance security and liberty, and whether they are likely to be 
organizationally efficient.  The concept of preventive detention, especially for purposes 
of interrogation, is on many levels antithetical to democratic principles.  Yet, as Posner 
and Vermeule attest, “evils, even grave ones” may be “necessary” in this war on terror 
and the absolutist must “come to grips with the inevitability of tragic choices.”543  In the 
end, Congress and the American people will need to decide whether preventive detention 
is needed as a tool in this conflict.  If so, then this paper suggests an approach using the 
FISA courts that will try to balance the due process for detainees and enhance democratic 
principles to the greatest extent it can while also prioritizing national security. 
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VII. BEYOND THE ENEMY COMBATANT POLICY: 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national 
conduct.  Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its 
dictates . . . to be more safe [nations] at length become willing to run the 
risk of being less free. 
 
-Alexander Hamilton from the Federalist Papers544 
 
Individuals from across the political spectrum have criticized the Administration’s 
enemy combatant policy and suggested alternative ways to create preventive detention 
regimes to deal with the terrorist threat.  As succinctly summarized by journalists Wittes 
and Gitenstein of the Brookings Institution, “[t]he Bush Administration’s insistence on 
deriving this scheme purely from the laws of war, without involving the other branches of 
government, has resulted in a confused, widely criticized, poorly justified, and sometimes 
unfair system for which Congress has so far needed to take no responsibility.”545  While 
some proposals for preventive detention are mere implorations for Congress to become 
involved,546 other ideas provide more substantive details.  In this chapter, President 
Bush’s enemy combatant policy (i.e., the status quo) as well as the substantive 
alternatives to President Bush’s enemy combatant policy are described, categorized, and 
analyzed under the methodology described in Chapter VI, including an idea proposed by 
this author to have the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) monitor a system 
of preventive detention. 
The alternative ideas can be classified into six general categories: (1) the purist 
approach, where there is no system of preventive detention and U.S. persons are tried in 
Article III courts with criminal charges or set free; (2) the creation of an entirely new 
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national security court to deal with detention and trials of suspected terrorists; (3) a 
middle ground of using the current criminal justice system with modifications to existing 
statutes (4) Bruce Ackerman’s “emergency constitution” with provisions for preventive 
detention after another terrorist attack; (5) Congress’s failed attempt to pass the Detention 
of Enemy Combatant Act (DECA) in 2005 (this was briefly explored in Chapter V); and 
(6) this author’s approach of using the FISC to monitor a system of preventive detention 
for the limited purposes of incapacitation and interrogation but not for trials.  While this 
author’s recommendation of using the FISC technically falls under category 3 of 
modifying existing statutes (FISA would be modified to include the changes to the FISC), 
because it would constitute a substantial change to a statute, and create a fundamentally 
new regime for preventive detention, it is discussed separately.  
A. THE ENEMY COMBATANT APPROACH 
1. Description 
President Bush’s enemy combatant policy as applied to U.S. persons has been 
discussed in previous chapters and is not repeated in detail here.  In sum, President Bush 
asserts that he has authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces under Article II 
of the Constitution and the AUMF passed by Congress after 9/11 to unilaterally detain 
terrorist suspects indefinitely without charge and incommunicado for purposes of 
incapacitation and interrogation.  It appears that, despite numerous threats, he has applied 
this policy to only three U.S. persons, Hamdi, Padilla, and al-Marri, although al-Marri is 
the only current U.S. person being detained as an enemy combatant.  Padilla was 
transferred to the criminal justice system in 2005 after spending three and one-half years 
as an enemy combatant.  He was convicted of terrorism-related charges in 2007 and 
sentenced to seventeen years in prison.  Hamdi was released to Saudi Arabia in 2004 after 
the Supreme Court held that he had to be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge his 
designation as an enemy combatant in a neutral forum.  
Although one could argue that the situation facing the foreign nationals detained 
at Guantanamo is a more pressing issue, and certainly many of the underlying principles 
 151
and solutions discussed herein are applicable to them, the fact that the President has 
decided he has the unilateral authority to detain U.S. persons captured in peaceful civilian 
areas as enemy combatants is especially troubling.  As Professor Heymann argues, 
President Bush has failed to consider “the impact of precedent and practice on the 




As discussed in detail in Chapter IV, it is doubtful the enemy combatant 
policy is lawful.  It most likely violates the Non-Detention Act of 1971, which requires 
Congress to pass a statute before individuals can be detained.  While the plurality in 
Hamdi found that the AUMF passed by Congress after 9/11 provided the necessary 
statutory support to detain a U.S. citizen captured on an actual battlefield during the 
specific hostilities in Afghanistan, it is likely that the Supreme Court will not find the 
AUMF provides the necessary statutory authority to support the Administration’s broad 
approach to its enemy combatant policy for U.S. persons arrested in the United States and 
not on a battlefield.  In fact, in Rumsfeld v Padilla, Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and 
Ginsburg in their dissent would have found indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen captured 
in America for incommunicado detention prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) and not 
supported by the AUMF.548  Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued in his Hamdi dissent that 
the AUMF did not authorize detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants.549  In other 
words, as explained in Chapter IV, there are currently five Justices who would likely not 
find that the AUMF provides the requisite statutory support to support President Bush’s 
enemy combatant policy. 
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Although the Supreme Court in Hamdi did not address whether the 
President had unilateral authority under Article II of the Constitution to detain U.S. 
persons as enemy combatants (because it found that Congress had provided that authority 
with the AUMF), a review of war power cases suggests that the President probably does 
not have such unilateral authority without congressional consent.  Because the legality of 
the enemy combatant policy is thoroughly discussed in Chapter IV, it is enough to say 
here that President Bush’s broad application of his enemy combatant policy is legally 
flawed and not likely to survive Supreme Court scrutiny.  
b. Security 
If the executive branch can unilaterally detain any U.S. citizen in any 
American city as an enemy combatant, then security is arguably enhanced.  After all, 
does anyone really doubt that Padilla or al-Marri are terrorists or dangerous individuals? 
Because there has not been another terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11, and 
because the Bush Administration insists that interrogation of enemy combatants has 
thwarted specific terrorist plots and lead to captures of countless other terrorists, one 
could argue that the enemy combatant policy has made the nation more secure.  
Alternatively, one could argue that the enemy combatant policy – directly 
because it eschews liberty in favor of security – has tarnished America’s reputation and 
created the impetus for more terrorists, although such an assertion would be difficult if 
not impossible to quantify.  One could also argue that if the executive branch were 
detaining thousands of U.S. persons as enemy combatants, and many were truly innocent 
of terrorist activity, then the government would be wasting resources instead of focusing 
its energy on capturing genuine terrorists, thereby decreasing security.  
Yet, upon scrutiny, as deplorable as the detention of 120,000 Japanese 
Americans was during World War II, did it really make the nation less safe?  The United 
States currently incapacitates a higher percent of its population than any other nation in 
the world so we certainly have the infrastructure.550  While there are undoubtedly 
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negative consequences to incarcerating innocent people, if one looks at security in 
isolation, one would have to conclude that the implications of the enemy combatant 
policy, whereby the executive can unilaterally detain terrorist suspects indefinitely for 
purposes of interrogation and incapacitation, enhances security.  The more relevant and 
complicated question concerns the costs to liberty and whether incorporating more due 
process into the enemy combatant policy would really decrease security by any 
appreciable amount.  In other words, the enemy combatant policy may be an inefficient 
and suboptimal policy choice because it needlessly prioritizes security at the expense of 
liberty.  
c. Liberty  
With respect to liberty, President Bush’s enemy combatant entails no 
transparency, no accountability, and no balance of power.  While, as explained in Chapter 
III, the Administration claims that it only designates a U.S. person as an enemy 
combatant if there is a consensus between executive branch agencies that it is warranted, 
the executive branch is staffed by like-minded people who often suffer from group-
polarization.  Having the FBI, CIA, DoD, and DoJ all decide that a person should be 
designated as an enemy combatant is not comforting when the judicial branch is 
completely bypassed.  Louis Fisher observes: “No review panel within the executive 
branch, much less within the military, could possibly possess the sought-for qualities of 
neutrality, detachment, independence, and impartiality if it has to pass judgment on a 
President’s decision that a U.S. citizen is an ‘enemy combatant.’”551 
Furthermore, the enemy combatant policy is not narrowly-tailored to meet 
its objectives.  Although it has only been applied a handful of times to U.S. persons, 
President Bush has asserted his ability to apply it anytime he feels it is necessary to 
protect this nation from terrorism.  As Padilla’s lawyer Jonathan Freiman notes, “[t]he 
argument that the entire United States has become a battlefield by virtue of those heinous 
attacks on 9/11 is just an argument to make the Constitution completely optional, an  
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argument to extend presidential power to the level of monarchy – to every inch of life in 
this country.”552  In other words, as explained in Chapter II, the power that President 
Bush has asserted in this war on terror is overbroad. 
While protecting this nation from terrorist attacks is a laudable, rational, 
and necessary goal, it seems that we should never be so concerned with security that we 
have absolutely no regard for liberty or incarcerating an innocent person.  It seems some 
sort of balance is always preferable.  The enemy combatant policy has no balance – it is 
an extreme policy that completely favors security over liberty.  And, as explained in 
Chapter II, it is not clear that terrorism poses such a threat to this nation that merits such a 
draconian response.  Law Professor Monica Hakima attests: “The armed-conflict model 
is consistent with the preventative goals of non-battlefield detention, but its liberty costs 
are prohibitive: innocents easily could be detained, for extended periods if not for life, 
based only on a reasonable suspicion of threat and without any judicial guarantees.”553 
As Wittes and Gitenstein similarly observe, “[t]oo much factual uncertainty attends the 
status of individual detainees to permit their long-term detention based on procedures 
created solely by the executive branch and lacking in basic fairness to the accused, who 
may face a lifetime of incarceration.”554  
Significantly, if one could provide more due process rights (i.e., more 
liberty), without decreasing security, then there is not a tradeoff between liberty and 
security, and the policy is inefficient.  Would providing due process to Hamdi, Padilla or 
al-Marri really have resulted in less security?  While pursuant to Hamdi there must be 
minimal judicial review – although this review can occur within the executive branch in 
the form of a “military tribunal” – the question is whether providing review within the 
judicial branch would really have resulted in less security to this nation.  Unfortunately, 
there is no definitive or mathematical way to answer this question.  The overriding point  
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is that the enemy combatant policy does not appear to be the prudent choice for the 
United States in this war on terror because the risks to liberty (i.e., detaining an innocent 
person) are too high.  It does not seem narrowly-tailored to meet its objectives. 
d. Institutional Efficiency 
The enemy combatant policy does, however, have low 
institutional/organizational costs.  Once President Bush designates a U.S. person as an 
enemy combatant, he is then transferred to military custody.  There is no need for a 
separate court system as discussed below.  (This paper focuses on U.S. persons; there are 
obviously institutional costs to housing aliens at Guantanamo Bay or elsewhere.) 
e. Conclusion 
In sum, the enemy combatant policy is most likely unlawful, overbroad, 
cloaked in secrecy, and does not adhere to balance of power principles.  Assuming it is  
found to be lawful, it is a poor policy choice in that it either (1) prioritizes security at the 
expense of liberty and is a bad tradeoff, or (2) it actually produces an inefficient result in 
that more liberty could be added without decreasing security.  Either way, one should 
scrutinize alternative approaches to preventive detention to see where they lie on this 
balance between security and liberty and see if a better solution can be proposed to the 
next Administration.  
It is recommended that the enemy combatant policy as applied to U.S. 
persons be ceased immediately.  Al-Marri should be transferred to the criminal justice 
system, deported, or subjected to an alternative regime of preventive detention enacted by 
Congress.  While President Bush’s enemy combatant policy is probably unlawful and has 
numerous policy flaws as delineated above, an alternative regime of preventive detention 
can most likely be created that complies with constitutional and statutory law and 
upholds more democratic principles.  
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B. THE PURIST APPROACH 
1. Description 
As discussed in Chapter IV, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote a 
lengthy dissent in Hamdi arguing that there was no constitutional authority for the 
Administration’s enemy combatant policy.”555  Justice Scalia argued that the 
Administration had two choices for detaining citizens like Hamdi and presumably Padilla 
and al-Marri: (1) urge Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or (2) try suspected 
terrorists on specific criminal charges in civilian courts.  According to Justice Scalia, if 
the Administration considered the 9/11 attacks an “invasion” and asserted that it is 
currently responding to that “invasion,” Congress could suspend the writ, which it has not 
done.  Justice Scalia stated: “Absent suspension . . . the Executive’s assertion of military 
exigency has not been thought sufficient to permit detention without charge.”556  If the 
writ is not suspended, then Justice Scalia found that terrorism suspects must be charged 
with specific crimes or set free.  In essence, the purist approach is no system of 
preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror. 
Former federal prosecutor Kenneth Roth, who is now the Executive Director of 
Human Rights Watch, adopts this purist approach.  According to Roth, there is no need 
for preventive detention as a tool in the war on terror.  He argues that the “U.S. criminal 
justice system has successfully dealt with a broad range of serious security threats, from 
espionage at the height of the Cold War to ruthless drug-trafficking enterprises.”557  As 
explained in Chapter III, Roth argues that statutes banning conspiracy and providing 
material support to terrorists can incapacitate terrorists at early stages.  With respect to 
the need for interrogation, he maintains that the right to counsel would not prevent a 
“parallel but separate questioning aimed at investigating other suspects or preventing 
terrorism.”558  He further asserts that statutes such as the Classified Information 
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Protection Act (CIPA) have successfully resulted in “a reasonable compromise between 
fairness and security.”  In fact, he states that “CIPA rules have not forced the government 
to abandon even one of the dozens of international terrorism cases it has prosecuted since 
9/11.”  While he acknowledges that the criminal justice system is not perfect and the 
government may have to release some suspects, he nonetheless concludes that is an 
“infinitely better option than preventive detention.”559 
Similarly, Kelly Anne Moore, former chief of the Violent Crimes and Terrorism 
Section in the Brooklyn U.S. Attorney’s Office, argues there is no need for preventive 
detention because “[t]he existing federal system has a proven track record of dealing with 
complex prosecutions.”560  In a 2005 terrorism prosecution of two Yemeni citizens who 
conspired to send money from Brooklyn to members of al Qaeda and Hamas, Moore 
explains that, while some of the government’s evidence was excluded, and certain 
classified material had to be de-classified before trial, the two terrorists were ultimately 
convicted.  She also recounts how she had to win a motion to protect information related 
to the methods and operations of German law enforcement before critical German agents 
were permitted to testify in an American court.  She concludes that “[t]he use of 
classified information to obtain convictions in terrorism cases does not need to be the 
extreme hurdle it is often made out to be.”561 
Finally, human rights attorneys Zabel and Benjamin argue in their white paper In 
Pursuit of Justice, Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in Federal Court that the criminal justice 
system has mechanisms in place for detaining terrorist suspects such as pre-trial detention 
and the material witness statute – hence, a scheme of administrative or preventive 
detention is not warranted for the rare anomalies of Padilla or al-Marri: 
[W]e do not believe that the need for a brand-new scheme of 
administrative detention has been established.  In the overwhelming 
majority of terrorism cases that have arisen to date, the government has 
been able to lawfully detain individuals based on criminal or immigration 
charges or based on non-controversial applications of the law of war.  In 
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other words, cases such as Padilla and al-Marri are rare exceptions, 
they are not the rule, and we believe that it is a mistake to draw 
generalized conclusions about the efficacy of the criminal justice system 
from these isolated and in some ways anomalous cases.  Further, a brand-
new administrative detention scheme would reflect a significant shift in 
our country’s traditional approach to this very important subject, could be 
susceptible to abuse, and would raise serious constitutional issues.562 
2. Analysis 
a. Lawfulness 
The purist approach would certainly be lawful.  Because it is a system 
permitting no preventive detention, and criminal law would be used to incapacitate and 
interrogate terrorists, it would not violate the Constitution or any statutes.  An interesting 
question is whether it would even be lawful for Congress to officially suspend the writ as 
Justice Scalia suggests in Hamdi in order to create a preventive detention regime to deal 
with terrorist threats.  As explained in Chapter IV, several war power cases such as Ex 
parte Milligan and Duncan v. Kahanamoku suggest that if the civilian courts are 
functioning and there is not a current “invasion” or “rebellion,” neither the President nor 
Congress could suspend the writ and have the military try and detain terrorist suspects as 
enemy combatants.  Law Professor Ackerman notes: “[A]ny restriction on habeas corpus 
in response to terrorism requires Congress to explore the twilight zone of its 
constitutional authority: it is a stretch to say that one or two attacks – even very serious 
ones – amount to an ‘invasion’ or ‘rebellion,’ especially if they aren’t followed up by an 
ongoing series of major assaults.”563  
Currently, this is largely an academic point because Congress has not even 
attempted to suspend the writ in response to 9/11.  As explained in Chapter IV, in 
Boumediene, the Administration did not argue that Congress’s passing of the MCA of 
2006 to deal with the detention of the aliens at Guantanamo Bay was a formal suspension 
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of the writ.  Rather, Congress was trying to create a substitute/alternative procedure for 
the writ with the MCA, which was found to be unconstitutional.  In sum, to the extent the 
purist approach represents no system of preventive detention – which is what former 
federal prosecutors Roth and Moore argue – it certainly would be lawful approach. 
b. Security 
While the enemy combatant policy prioritizes security at the expense of 
liberty, the purist approach does the exact opposite, prioritizing liberty at the extreme 
while needlessly leaving this nation vulnerable to terrorism.  Then-federal judge Michael 
Mukasey, who is now the Attorney General, convincingly explains: “On one end of the 
spectrum, the rules that apply to routine criminals who pursue finite goals are skewed, 
and properly so, to assure that only the highest level of proof will result in a conviction. 
But those rules do not protect a society that must gather information about, and at least 
incapacitate, people who have cosmic goals that they are intent on achieving by 
cataclysmic means.”564 
Although several former federal prosecutors and human rights lawyers 
argue that the criminal justice system has procedures in place to deal with classified 
material and several statutes criminalize preparatory terrorist acts, there nonetheless 
remains a pervading feeling of insecurity and inadequacy in fighting this war on terror 
with only the criminal law.  RAND authors James Renwick and Gregory Treverton note 
in their article The Challenges of Trying Terrorists as Criminals that “[t]he extremely 
open U.S. criminal justice system cannot afford adequate protection to the classified 
information necessary both to prosecute and to defend in terrorist trials.  Charges are 
often dropped or cases dismissed entirely to protect sensitive information, and even when 
cases are seen through to completion, information useful to terrorists about 
counterterrorism methods and procedures cannot help but make its way into the public 
record.”565  
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As explained in Chapter III, during the trial of Omar Abdel Rahman, 
known as the “blind sheik” for participation in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 
the federal prosecutor turned over to the defense a list of two hundred possible un-
indicted coconspirators in compliance with standard criminal discovery procedures.  This 
list made it to Bin Laden within a couple days of its production in court, allowing Bin 
Laden to see which operatives had been compromised.566  A similar situation occurred 
during the trial of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing.  During his trial, there was testimony about the delivery of a cell phone that 
tipped off accomplices still at large that one of their communications had been 
compromised. According to then-federal judge Mukasey, this link had been providing 
“enormously valuable intelligence” and “was immediately shut down and further 
information lost.”567  
Even former federal prosecutor Roth – an advocate of no preventive 
detention – acknowledges that criminal law is not perfect and the government may have 
to release some suspects in order to protect national security.  In a world with weapons of 
mass destruction, and terrorists bent on murdering thousands of civilians, the cost of 
releasing some suspects because we cannot fashion preventive detention – which other 
democracies have done – seems too costly and completely unnecessary.  As journalist 
Stuart Taylor notes, “the danger that a preventive detention regime for suspected 
terrorists would take us too far down the slippery slope toward police statism is simply 
not as bad as the danger of letting would-be mass murderers roam the country.”568 
The Administration asserts – and it is certainly not hard to imagine – 
situations where the CIA or FBI has inadmissible evidence about a terrorist suspect or 
simply not enough evidence to obtain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Additionally, because defendants are entitled to the evidence against them as well as any 
exculpatory evidence to mount their defense, there is the very real danger of having to  
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identify sources and methods to the suspect, which could compromise ongoing 
intelligence, as explained above.  While the criminal justice system has ways of dealing 
with and mitigating these obstacles, they are not foolproof.  
The United States criminal justice system is premised on the notion that 
one is innocent until proven guilty and it would prefer to let 100 guilty people go free 
than incarcerate one innocent person.  That philosophy seems too damaging – if not naïve 
– in the world we now face.  As Professor Tung Yin notes, “[b]ecause criminal law is 
concerned with punishment, it sets a high bar for detention.  It is too high a bar to reach 
many al Qaeda members, even the high level architects of the 9-11 attacks who are in 
U.S. custody in undisclosed locations.”569  Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe states: 
“The old adage that it is better to free 100 guilty men than to imprison one innocent 
describes a calculus that our Constitution – which is no suicide pact – does not impose on 
government when the 100 who are freed belong to terrorist cells that slaughter innocent 
civilians, and may well have access to chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.”570  
In addition, as explained in depth in Chapter III, there is evidence that 
interrogation of enemy combatants has produced actionable intelligence that has thwarted 
specific terrorist plots, led to the captures of other terrorists, and revealed the 
organizational and financial structures of al Qaeda.  While obtaining a terrorist suspect’s 
cooperation though the criminal justice system, such as a plea bargain, works in some 
cases (i.e., John Walker Lindh), there is no reason to believe that it works effectively in 
all cases.  After all, al-Marri refused to cooperate, as was his right under the criminal 
justice system, and presumably has provided intelligence while detained as an enemy 
combatant, although such an assertion is hard to assess given that he is still being 
detained as an enemy combatant and the Administration has not revealed what, if any, 
information he revealed.  While certainly, as Roth notes above, intelligence officials not 
involved in the prosecution could question a terrorist suspect, there is evidence, as  
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explained in Chapter III, that isolation is needed to enhance interrogation potential.  In 
sum, the purist approach does not appreciate the complexities in needing to obtain 
actionable intelligence.  
The purist approach is also not a politically realistic approach.  As Taylor 
notes, “[t]he demands by many human-rights advocates that all terrorism suspects be 
released unless proven guilty of crimes should be (or, at least, inevitably will be) rejected 
by the president, Congress and the courts.  Some form of administrative detention – not 
to punish but to incapacitate terrorism suspects for whom criminal prosecution is not 
feasible – will be with us for the foreseeable future.”571  In other words, while “doing 
nothing” and relying on the criminal justice system would be lawful and enhance liberty, 
it is simply not a realistic or credible option right now.  In fact, a rule of no preventive 
detention under any circumstances may force executive officials to break the law in order 
to protect the nation.  As Ackerman portends, “lawlessness, once publicly embraced, may 
escalate uncontrollably.”572  It seems better to acknowledge preventive detention as a 
necessary evil and try to incorporate some liberty protections into a regime.  Furthermore, 
if it is not a realistic approach, there is a concern that the criminal law will gradually 
change to allow preventive detention, thereby contaminating ordinary criminal procedure. 
Law Professor Hakima notes: 
The criminal model is substantially more protective of individual rights, 
but if used exclusively in the fight against terrorism, it too carries with it 
potentially significant costs.  States that have no choice but to charge, 
prosecute, and convict terrorism suspects will inevitably adjust the 
criminal law to enhance its preventative capacity.  They therefore risk 
eroding the safeguard of the criminal justice systems and contaminating 
the law as it applies in more ordinary cases.573 
In sum, the purist approach does an inadequate job of protecting this 
nation from terrorist threats.  
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c. Liberty 
Nonetheless, using the criminal justice system instead of fashioning a 
system of preventive detention would certainly score high marks on the liberty part of the 
continuum, which looks at transparency/accountability, balance of power, and being 
narrowly-tailored.  The purist approach is certainly accountable/transparent.  Pre-trial 
detention would be pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, which requires an adversarial 
hearing based on clear and convincing evidence, and is generally open to the public. 
Trials are also generally open to the public thereby ensuring transparency.  Separation of 
power principles are also adhered to as the trials are administered by Article III judges. 
There is no executive usurpation of power.  The purist approach is also narrowly-tailored. 
In fact, as explained above, it is arguably too narrowly-tailored and under-inclusive as it 
does not provide the necessary security that the United States may need to fight and 
contain terrorism.  
d. Institutional Efficiency 
At first blush, it would seem the purist approach would not incur any 
organizational or institutional costs because no new institutions or frameworks would 
need to be created.  Rather, the criminal justice system as it currently exists would be 
used to incapacitate and interrogate terrorist suspects.  Depending on how many terrorist 
suspects are being prosecuted, however, it could possibly strain the criminal justice 
system.  According to then-federal judge Mukasey, criminal prosecutions of terrorists 
during the 1990s “yielded about three dozen convictions, and even those have strained 
the financial and security resources of the federal courts near to the limit.”574 
Nonetheless, there have been only a handful of U.S. persons detained as enemy 
combatants (and only one currently) – obviously this issue is more relevant for the 
approximately 270 foreign nationals being detained overseas at Guantanamo Bay who, as 
of June 2008, have a right to be heard in federal court.  The main alternative to trying 
enemy combatants or terrorists in federal court, however, is to create a separate court 
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system (discussed below).  Clearly, fashioning a new court system with new rules and 
new staff would encompass comparatively more organizational and institutional costs 
than exclusively using the criminal justice system to detain terrorists.  
e. Conclusion 
The purist approach is lawful, easy to administer, and would not require 
any institutional or organizational changes.  It needlessly sacrifices security in this war on 
terror, however, when other alternatives (discussed below) can find a more nuanced 
balance between security and liberty.  It should only be recommended if the terrorist 
threat is extremely low to non-existent. 
C. ALTERNATIVE COURT SYSTEM  
1. Description 
Several individuals have proposed creating a parallel court system to deal with 
national security and terrorism related issues.  Thomas Powers, Professor at the 
University of Minnesota, states: “Designing a preventive detention policy means, in 
effect, creating a separate legal system that applies only to a small class of persons, a 
system running parallel to criminal law on the one hand, and to the laws governing POWs 
and war criminals on the other.”575  Andrew McCarthy, a former chief Assistant U.S. 
Attorney who prosecuted several terrorists, suggests a specialized national security court 
which “would develop an expertise in issues peculiar to this realm: classified 
information, the Geneva Conventions, the laws and customs of war, etc., and would have 
jurisdiction over matters related to the detentions and any resulting trials of alleged 
unlawful combatants.”576  McCarthy explains that these specialized courts would be 
before an Article III court and not a “unilateral executive-branch production” but would 
resemble more a military tribunal.  Furthermore, he suggests that the Justice Department 
could form a specialized unit “to be the liaison with the Defense Department as well as 
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the government’s representative before the national-security court.”577  The specialized 
unit “could then report to the Court the fact that an alleged unlawful combatant had been 
captured and was being detained, and certify both that hostilities were ongoing and that it 
was in the national-security interest of the United States that the combatant be held.” 
McCarthy posits that “for the first three years, that certification would be 
unreviewable.”578  After three years, “the court could require the government to make a 
more informative representation, under seal, of the basis for continuing to hold a 
particular combatant.”579  McCarthy also suggests that the burden of proof be lowered to 
preponderance of the evidence instead of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for 
criminal convictions.580 
Professors Jack Goldsmith of Harvard and Neal Katyal of Georgetown propose 
the creation of some sort of national security court for terrorism suspects, which would 
include interrogation.  While they both acknowledge they are on opposite sides of the 
detention policy debate, they argue that “[a] sensible first step is for Congress to establish 
a comprehensive system of preventive detention that is overseen by a national security 
court composed of federal judges with life tenure.”581  They argue a national security 
court would have a number of advantages over the enemy combatant policy, namely a 
“Congressionally approved definition of the enemy”; a reduction on “the burden on 
ordinary civilian courts”; and “specialized” judges and defense attorneys with security 
clearances.582  As Katyal states, “[c]reating a National Security Court, with repeat-player 
lawyers and judges, will change the entire dynamic, and help avoid the excessive rhetoric 
that has characterized both sides in the war on terror.  It would also send a signal to the 
world that we have a serious process in place, one that we would feel comfortable 
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applying to our own citizens.”583  While criminal prosecutions would continue where 
feasible in ordinary federal court, Katyal and Goldsmith posit that a national security 
court, “explicitly sanctioned by Congress, would have greater legitimacy than our current 
patchwork system, both in the United States and abroad.”584  Katyal notes: “Would I love 
every case to be tried in criminal court?  Of course.  The reality is, when you’re dealing 
with foreign investigations, particularly concerning events that occurred a long time ago, 
there are going to be a small handful of cases that you can’t try in criminal court.”585  
Harvey Rishikof of the National Defense Institute also advocates the use of a 
specialized “Federal Terrorism Court.”586  According to Rishikof, “[t]he current 
adjudicative framework for the post-9/11 terrorism detentions and prosecutions has 
undermined American credibility at a crucial juncture; weakened national confidence in 
our political institutions; and called into question our commitment to the letter and spirit 
of our laws.”  Thus, he recommends a “specialized court for terrorism cases [that] would 
allow our system to handle not only the unique legal complexities of terrorism, but the 
physical risks as well.  Such a court could be situated in a designated courthouse with 
security measures that are more stringent than those found in most federal courts, with 
state of- the art facilities and procedures for holding and transporting suspects; storing 
evidence; protecting judges, jurors and witnesses; and transmitting or receiving televised 
testimony.”587  He proposes a “Federal Terrorism Court Commission” to recommend a 
“model legislative proposal” within the next six months.588  
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A separate court system to deal with national security and terrorist threats 
would most undoubtedly be lawful if (1) created by Congress and (2) it allowed a 
meaningful opportunity for the detainees to rebut the underlying evidence establishing 
their need to be preventively detained.  As explained in Chapter IV, the plurality in 
Hamdi held that U.S. citizens captured in a zone of combat can be designated as an 
enemy combatant and held indefinitely until the particular conflict is over as long as the 
detainees can challenge the underlying evidence in a neutral forum.  While Hamdi 
concerned a U.S. citizen detained on an actual battlefield – as opposed to an otherwise 
peaceful civilian area – there is no reason to believe that creating a separate court system 
run by federal judges would pose any legal obstacles when terrorist suspects are arrested 
in a non-battlefield environment.  In fact, in Hamdi the plurality noted that the factfinder 
could be run by the executive branch in the form of an “authorized and properly 
constituted military tribunal.”589  Hence, creating a system run by the judiciary would 
only provide more legitimacy than called for in Hamdi.  
The more complicated question concerns the underlying rights allowed the 
detainees in the national security court.  Of all the plans articulated above, the only one 
that may pose a problem is McCarthy’s plan, which calls for a three-year unreviewable 
designation of an individual as an unlawful combatant.  Although Hamdi did not specify 
when judicial review must occur, it is doubtful that the plurality would uphold three years 
of incommunicado and unreviewable detention.  Wittes and Gitenstein from the 
Brookings Institution urge the next Administration to create a new preventive detention 
regime that encompasses an impartial decision-maker; basic procedural protections for 
detainees; assistance of counsel; written, public opinions explaining the basis for each 
status determination; review of such determinations by federal civilian courts; and 
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ongoing judicial review for detainees subjected to detention.590  If a national security 
court upheld such principles, and it seems like most, if not all, of proposals advocated 
would, then they would likely be found to be lawful. 
b. Security 
With respect to the security-liberty continuum, the creation of a national 
security court balances security and liberty much better than does the purist or enemy 
combatant approaches, which dominate the extremes of the spectrum.  While a national 
security court as envisioned above is more focused on the question of where to try 
terrorist suspects – as opposed to the rationales of general incapacitation and 
interrogation – it can be assumed that either Congress or the judges running a national 
security court would develop rules determining under what circumstances interrogation 
and incapacitation are allowed before an actual trial.  The national security court receives 
relatively high marks regarding security.  Because the burden of proof would be lower (as 
McCarthy suggests) and hearsay evidence would presumably be allowed (after all, the 
plurality in Hamdi said hearsay could be used), it would be easier than the normal 
criminal justice system to detain an individual, which is the overriding point.  While this 
means an innocent person could be detained, as explained above, perhaps that is the risk 
we face to protect this nation from a terrorist threat in a world with weapons of mass 
destruction. 
There is one potential drawback to security, however.  As RAND authors 
Renwick and Treverton note, an argument could be made that prosecuting terrorists in a 
specialized court could afford them an elevated status and increase their credibility and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and perhaps even generate public sympathy for 
them.591  If this happened, there could be an increase in terrorism, thereby undermining 
security.  This concern, while plausible, seems unlikely.  Providing terrorist suspects due 
process in a specialized court run by federal judges is certainly an improvement over the 
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status quo enemy combatant policy.  As al-Marri’s brother has stated: “If the guy is 
guilty, prove he is guilty and we will accept that.  If he is not guilty, then why hold him 
all these years? . . .  At least he should get justice.”592  A specialized court system, 
especially one that adhered to the principles espoused by Wittes and Gitensten, would 
provide justice.  
c. Liberty 
The national security court would provide more liberty protection than the 
enemy combatant approach.  There would be accountability, especially if the national 
security court were required to report to Congress on its operations and if there were 
written, public opinions explaining the basis for each status determination.  There would 
probably be less transparency than the purist approach but more than the enemy 
combatant approach.  While a specialized court system that handles classified 
information could not be open to the public, and cleared defense counsel would need to 
assist the detainees, it is not clear how much less transparency there actually would be 
than in the purist approach, which can and does close proceedings to the public based on 
national security concerns.  When deciding where the national security court fits on the 
liberty part of the liberty/security continuum, it is less transparent than the purist 
approach because presumably most if not all of its proceedings are closed to the public. 
Of course, as explained above, this lowering of liberty (i.e., less transparency) results in a 
consummate increase in security.  
With respect to the balance of power, the national security court, which is 
run by federal judges and created by Congress, would uphold separation of power 
principles.  There is a benefit to liberty when federal judges – and not just the executive 
branch – monitor the preventive detention regime.  Law professors Mario Barnes and F. 
Greg Bowman emphasize the unique role that judges play in America’s system of 
government: “Judges, or at least federal judges, are seen by law and economics scholars 
as rational actors in the pursuit of public welfare because the judicial system removes  
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most, if not all, possibility for a judge to gain personally from his or her substantive 
rulings.  As a result, only efficiency-driven principles remain as animating judges’ 
decisions.”593  
The main drawback with the creation of the national security court is that 
it could result in being overbroad.  While Goldsmith and Katyal argue that prosecutions 
in ordinary criminal court would continue where feasible, who would make the decision 
of where to try the terrorist suspect?  Would lone wolf or solely domestic terrorists like 
Timothy McVeigh be tried in the national security court?  McCarthy suggests that the 
executive branch would have to certify there were ongoing hostilities before labeling 
someone an “unlawful combatant” and subjecting them to the national security court.  
But if the national security court determines the individual is not an unlawful combatant 
but a mere criminal is the trial then transferred to the ordinary criminal court where it 
starts from scratch?  If the government brings a terrorism prosecution in ordinary 
criminal court, can the defendant request for his case to be transferred to the national 
security court?  If the national security court is effective at prosecuting and detaining 
terrorists, would there not be an argument that it should encompass complicated 
espionage or drug cases where classified material also predominates?  There are certainly 
answers to these questions, and the answers do not suggest that a national security court 
is unworkable.  These issues, however, do introduce one fundamental ingredient better to 
be avoided: new jurisdictional issues and turf wars.  If the six years of litigation 
concerning the foreign nationals at Guantanamo has showed us anything, it is that 
jurisdictional issues mixed with minimalist holdings is not recipe for success.  In creating 
a system of preventive detention, introducing new jurisdictional issues is best to be 
avoided so the substance, i.e., is this person a terrorist who needs to be incapacitated or 
interrogated, can predominate.  
It also is unclear whether a national security court really needs to create 
infrastructure to protect its participants.  While terrorists no doubt want to murder 
                                                 
593 Mario Barnes and F. Greg Bowman, “Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Charting a Method to 
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civilians, they are pretty indiscriminate.  It seems that drug dealers, organized crime, and 
gang members are more motivated to kill specific jurors, prosecutors and judges than 
terrorists.  Would such a realization make it more likely to get such cases transferred to 
the ultra-secure national security court, again increasing its overbroadness and potential 
for mission creep? 
Thus, with respect to the liberty part of the equation, the national security 
court gets a mixed review.  As explained in Chapter III, creating a new forum for trials is 
a separate, albeit related, question of whether there needs to be preventive detention for 
purposes of incapacitation and interrogation.  It could be argued that the proposal of a 
national security court for trials is an overboard solution to the question of preventive 
detention.  Nonetheless, a national security court could be made accountable and it does 
adhere to balance of power principles.  On the other hand, it is not transparent and 
arguably is not narrowly-tailored to meet its objectives.  It has a potential problem with 
mission creep and should this solution be chosen, some clear boundaries and guideposts 
are going to need to be developed.  Overall, it balances security with liberty better than 
the purist approach and the enemy combatant policy.  Because it is not transparent, 
lowers the burden of proof, and eliminates/reduces evidentiary issues that pose a problem 
with the ordinary criminal justice system, it tilts more towards security than liberty.  
d. Institutional Efficiency 
The creation of a separate court system would pose huge organizational 
/institutional costs.  While there are currently specialized federal courts for bankruptcy, 
tax, patent, and international trade, creating a new court system to deal with terrorists 
would entail significant costs in the form of (1) deciding which judges would hear the 
cases; (2) creating the secure facilities that Rishikof and presumably others believe is 
essential; (3) hiring new staff; (4) creating a new body of law for such cases (i.e., would 
judges borrow from ordinary criminal law or would new precedents have to be 
established); (5) and, as discussed above, deciding which terrorists should be tried in 
ordinary criminal courts and which terrorists merit the specialized court system.  As 
Zabel and Benjamin argue in their white paper: 
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We note, however, that one significant downside of a new national 
security court would be the need to create from scratch the procedures, 
precedents, and body of law that would govern such a court.  The 
disarray that has plagued the military commissions at Guantánamo—with 
abundant litigation as well as internal dissension within the military 
command structure but not a single completed trial some six years after 
the presidential order authorizing military commissions—does not bode 
well for those who envision creating a brand new system from scratch.  By 
contrast, a significant advantage of the criminal justice system is the fact 
that the federal courts have amassed many years of experience and a 
reservoir of judicial wisdom as well as a broadly experienced bar—both 
prosecutors and defense attorneys—to guide the course of particular 
cases.594 
Hence, as a matter of comparison, creating a new court system incurs 
much more organizational and institutional costs than the purist approach, which relies 
exclusively on the criminal justice system, or the enemy combatant approach, which 
transfers detainees to military custody. 
e. Conclusion 
A national security court would be lawful and provide a more nuanced 
balance between liberty and security than either the enemy combatant or purist 
approaches.  Its strengths are its adherence to balance of power principles (i.e., being run 
by federal judges) and its ability to handle classified and other evidentiary issues that the 
normal criminal justice system may not be able to consistently provide.  As Wittes 
observes, “[i]t would put detentions in the hands of judges with all the prestige of the 
federal court system yet with particular expertise applying rules designed to protect 
classified information and manage legitimate security concerns.”595  Its negatives are that 
it poses substantial organizational and institutional costs, especially if a new body of law 
has to be developed and jurisdictional questions arise, and there is a concern with it 
potentially becoming overbroad and infecting ordinary criminal law.  A national security 
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court also seems to be an overbroad solution to the question of preventive detention.  It 
should only be recommended if the terrorist threat is extremely high and there are a large 
number of terrorists needing to be tried, thereby justifying the substantial organizational 
and institutional costs.  
D. MODIFYING EXISTING STATUTES/LAW 
1. Description 
Philip Heymann of Harvard Law School and Juliette Kayyem at the Kennedy 
School of Government have proposed a solution to preventive detention using the current 
criminal justice system with no provisions for an alternative court system.596  In their 
detailed proposal, they distinguish between individuals caught in an active zone of 
combat and U.S. persons arrested in the United States.  With respect to the former, they 
suggest that the U.S. Constitution, the decisions interpreting it, and the relevant Geneva 
Conventions be fully honored.597 
With respect to the latter – civilians seized within the U.S. – they suggest that 
such individuals only be detained pursuant to criminal charges and probable cause that 
the individual has committed or is planning to commit an act previously criminalized by 
statutes.598  Unlike the purist approach discussed above, however, they would allow for 
pre-trial detention for an initial ninety days up to two years on an ex parte showing that a 
trial would be “impossible without a severe loss of national security secrets” or that the 
release of the detainee would “significantly endanger the lives of others.”599  They would 
also allow an initial interrogation of up to seven days with no access to counsel if there is 
a “showing that the individual arrested has information which may prevent a terrorist  
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attack.”600  Significantly, any “statement obtained by custodial interrogation in the 
absence of a lawyer” would not be admissible in any criminal prosecution of the 
detainee.601 
Serrin Turner and Stephen Schulhofer at NYU also argue that suspected terrorists 
should be tried in Article III courts using current statutes, such as the Classified 
Information Protection Act (CIPA), the 1984 Bail Reform Act, and the Speedy Trial Act, 
perhaps with modifications by Congress.602  
By way of background, CIPA was created in 1980 to facilitate the prosecution of 
Cold War spies.603  It provides the government with alternatives to complete disclosure 
of classified information, such as in camera reviews of classified material, protective 
orders, allowing cleared counsel but not the defendant to view the classified material, or 
substitutions for classified material such as redacted versions of classified information or 
unclassified summaries of material.604  At all times, the government retains full control 
not to disclose classified information if it believes that national security interests 
outweigh prosecutorial gains.605  
The Bail Reform Act allows defendants to be held in pre-trial detention if the 
court finds there is no reasonable way to assure that the defendant will not pose a danger 
to the public if released.  While the defendant is entitled to an adversarial hearing, he 
does not have the same confrontation rights as he does at a trial, and the government can 
use hearsay from a confidential source without the informant appearing in court.606  
The Speedy Trial Act usually requires a trial within a certain prescribed time limit 
after indictment.  The Act permits delay of trial, however, when failing to grant a 
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postponement could result in a “miscarriage of justice” or when the case is “so unusual or 
so complex, due to . . . . the nature of the prosecution . . . that it is unreasonable to expect 
adequate preparation for pre-trial proceedings or for the trial itself” within the usual time 
limits.607  
Turner and Schulhofer posit that a combination of CIPA, the Bail Reform Act, 
and the Speedy Trial Act could be fashioned to detain terrorist suspects before trial and 
allow for successful prosecutions in Article III courts.  As they explain, the need to 
protect sensitive information is not unique to terrorism cases, as espionage, organized 
crime, and drug cases can raise similar issues.608  If existing statutes are not able to deal 
with terrorism suspects, then they suggest Congress “upgrade” these statutes as opposed 
to creating a separate court system: “if expanded detention is determined to be 
acceptable, adjusting the machinery already available within the federal court system is 
infinitely preferable to the government’s current use of military detention to hold 
terrorism suspects indefinitely, beyond the reach of any judicial review.”609  They also 
suggest using alternative criminal charges or delaying certain charges until classified 
material becomes less sensitive, as other avenues for trying terrorism suspects in Article 
III courts.610  
Rosenzweig and Carafano from the Heritage Foundation argue that Congress 
should create a legal architecture for preventive detention.  In their proposal, they 
recommend a narrow definition of terrorism so the “gate” for preventive detention is 
limited.611  They suggest that the Attorney General certify the necessity of preventive 
detention when there is “credible evidence” that: “(a) the individual to be detained 
intends to commit a terrorist act; (b) the individual is affiliated with a terrorist 
organization; and (c) the existing criminal legal justice system cannot be applied to the 
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individual without compromising national security.”612  They also recommend that the 
“certification” be subject an adversarial process and judicial review.  Significantly, they 
would allow a 30-day delay of judicial review for purposes of incommunicado 
interrogation and allow an extension if the government could show by “clear and 
convincing” evidence that a further delay would likely provide additional intelligence.613 
A final idea under this category of modifying existing law is to use a “noncriminal 
detention model” to incapacitate terrorist actors who potentially pose a danger to society 
but are not criminally culpable.  Law Professor Tung Yin advocates this approach in 
Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model 
for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees.  While his specific proposal only 
concerns foreign nationals detained overseas, there is no reason his ideas could not apply 
to U.S. persons detained in the United States – a fact he expressly concedes.614  Under his 
approach, he argues that, similar to how the mentally ill and sex offenders can be civilly 
committed, medically contagious people quarantined, and defendants denied bail and 
held in pre-trial detention before trial, terrorists could be detained non-criminally based 
on their “dangerousness.”615  In order to protect civil liberties so the government did not 
try to prove that every individual poses a danger to society, he advocates a “limiting 
factor” based on Congress defining this approach to only apply to individuals who either 
played a role in planning or carrying out the 9/11 attacks or sheltered those 
responsible.616  As for defining “dangerousness,” he suggests some relevant factors such 
as “the amount of terrorism training that the detainee has received, the detainee’s 
expressed willingness to engage in terrorism and the type of terrorist attack contemplated, 
and the prior violent conduct of the detainee.”617  In fact, Yin states that “the more 
devastating a terrorist attack in which a detainee is willing to take part (regardless of 
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whether such an attack has reached the stage of criminal attempt), the more likely [the 
judge] would conclude that the detainee is dangerous and will remain dangerous for a 
longer period of time.”618  As for the procedural requirements of such a regime, Yin 
would allow counsel, periodic evaluations to measure continued dangerousness, and 
some sort of neutral forum “free from actual bias” either run by Article III judges with 
life tenure or administrative or military judges.619  
Former Deputy Attorney General George Terwilliger also proposes a preventive 
detention regime modeled on federal and state civil commitment schemes: “In light of the 
similar governmental ends sought to be achieved in civil commitment proceedings and by 
the proposed preventive detention regime -- ensuring fair procedures, accurate fact-
finding, and the safety and security of society -- the structure of civil detention regimes is 
worth consideration in constructing a fair and effective preventive detention regime.”620 
Similarly, journalist Wittes also has suggested that terrorists be civilly committed as 
mentally ill because they pose a danger to themselves and others.  As he comments, 
“[f]or a reasonably imaginative Congress, [civil commitment] might be a far better model 
for the alleged al Qaeda operative captured domestically than either the traditional laws 
of war or the criminal justice apparatus.”621  
2.  Analysis  
a. Lawfulness 
While the aforementioned proposals differ in their substantive details, 
most of them would likely be lawful if enacted by Congress, thereby obviating any 
concerns with the Non-Detention Act.  With respect to constitutional concerns, 
Schulhofer and Turner’s proposal of using the criminal justice system with upgrades to 
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statutes such as CIPA, the Speedy Trial Act, Bail Reform Act, should not pose any legal 
obstacles. Their recommendation is similar to the purist approach (discussed in detail 
above and found to be legal) with modifications to current statutes.  Assuming the 
modifications are reasonable, their approach will be lawful.  
Similarly, Rosenzweig and Carafano’s approach in which the Attorney 
General would certify the necessity of preventive detention when there is “credible 
evidence” that an individual intends to commit a terrorist act, is affiliated with a terrorist 
group, and the criminal justice system is inadequate to incapacitate would also likely be 
constitutional as long as there was an adversarial process, assistance of counsel, and 
judicial review, which their proposal specifically allows.  Permitting a 30-day delay of 
judicial review for purposes of incommunicado interrogation would also be constitutional 
as long as any information obtained from the detainee were not subsequently used against 
him to convict him of a crime.  As will be explained in more detail below with the FISA 
court analysis, there is only a Fifth Amendment violation if a coerced confession is used 
at trial – there is no constitutional prohibition to interrogation without an attorney to 
obtain intelligence information.  There would be a substantive due process violation for 
torture that “shocks the conscience” but one assumes their approach does not sanction 
torture. 
Conversely, Heymann and Kayyem’s approach that would allow for pre-
trial detention for an initial ninety days up to two years on an ex parte showing that a trial 
would be “impossible without a severe loss of national security secrets” or that the 
release of the detainee would “significantly endanger the lives of others” may prove to be 
unconstitutional.  Pursuant to Hamdi, the detainees must be able to challenge their 
designation as an enemy combatant in a neutral forum with the assistance of counsel.  To 
the extent that their proposal would allow a detainee to be detained for two years on an ex 
parte showing, without counsel, with no way to challenge the underlying evidence, this 
could prove to violate Hamdi.  Of course, as discussed in Chapter IV, Hamdi did not 
address how long an individual could be held before receiving judicial review, so while 
two years would presumably be too long, a shorter amount of time tied to showings of 
necessity may prove to be constitutional. 
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It is unclear whether a civil commitment scheme to detain terrorists based 
on showings of mere “dangerousness” would prove to be constitutional.  As with most 
things, the devil would be in the details of how it was orchestrated and applied.  The 
concern would be detaining individuals based on past behavior and thoughts as opposed 
to actions and plans.  Certainly Yin’s approach of a “limiting factor” to apply to 
individuals who either played a role in planning or carrying out the 9/11 attacks or 
sheltered those responsible would help limit its scope, which tends to be overbroad, 
discussed below.  Nonetheless, civil commitment schemes are usually employed to detain 
individuals who have a mental disease/illness and cannot control their behaviors.  While 
it is tempting to categorize terrorists – especially suicidal ones – as irrational and crazy, 
most of the scholarly literature addressing the topic suggests terrorists are rational actors 
and fully understand and appreciate what they are doing.622  In sum, it is unclear whether 
a civil commitment scheme to detain terrorists would be constitutional.  
b. Security 
As for the security component of the liberty-security continuum, these 
proposals differ depending on the due process rights afforded the detainees.  To the 
extent that these proposals would allow hearsay, allow for a period of incommunicado 
interrogation, lower the burden of proof for detention, and consider otherwise 
inadmissible evidence (as does the creation of a national security court, discussed above), 
security would rise at the expense of liberty interests because there would be a 
correspondingly greater risk of detaining an innocent person.  This concern would be 
especially acute with civil commitment schemes that were not narrowly-tailored.  The 
more the specific proposal resembles the criminal justice system with its emphasis on due 
process (such as Schulhofer and Turner’s approach), the more the proposal tends to move 
towards the purist approach, where liberty is favored over security.  The more the 
proposal tends to differ from the criminal justice system, such as a civil commitment 
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scheme or Rosenzweig and Carafano’s Attorney General certification approach, the more 
the proposal moves towards the national security courts, where security is favored over 
liberty.  Heymann and Kayyem’s approach, which uses the criminal justice system based 
on probable cause that a crime has been committed after an initial period of ex parte 
detention for purposes of incapacitation and interrogation, appears to provide an equitable 
balance between security and liberty, mainly because it separates out the differing 
reasons for preventive detention.  Their approach recognizes that trials of terrorists are a 
somewhat distinct inquiry from the rationales of incapacitation and interrogation, 
although as discussed above, the two year ex parte detention could prove to be unlawful. 
c. Liberty 
With respect to liberty, the proposals outlined above appear to be 
accountable and transparent.  As for balance of powers, all of these proposals encompass 
(1) Congress amending or modifying a statute and (2) an adversarial process run by the 
judicial branch.  There is no executive usurpation of power as with the enemy combatant 
policy.  As for being narrowly-tailored to meets its objectives, there are overarching 
concerns that modifying the criminal justice system to encompass detention of terrorists 
could gradually infect ordinary criminal law.  Mukasey notes: “If conventional legal rules 
are adapted to deal with a terrorist threat, whether by relaxed standards for conviction, 
searches, the admissibility of evidence or otherwise, those adaptations will infect and 
change the standards in ordinary cases with ordinary defendants in ordinary courts of 
law”623  Thus, there is a concern that by modifying the criminal justice system for 
terrorists, whether by enlarging a civil commitment scheme or upgrading statutes such as 
CIPA, the Bail Reform Act, or Speedy Trial Act, those measures could gradually broaden 
to encompass non-terrorist but other dangerous activity.   
Rosenzweig and Carafano’s recommendation seems to be the most 
narrowly- tailored to meet its objectives in that they recommend a narrow definition of 
terrorism so the “gate” for preventive detention is limited.  To the extent other proposals 
in this section similarly apply a narrow initial definition or “limiting factor,” then 
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concerns with being overbroad would be mitigated.  In sum, upgrading or modifying the 
criminal justice system would uphold balance of power principles and be generally 
accountable and transparent (except for the up to two years of ex parte detention in 
Heymann and Kayyam’s proposal) but has the potential to be overbroad and adversely 
infect ordinary criminal law if care is not taken to specifically define the definition of 
terrorism and other “limiting factors.”  
d. Institutional Efficiency  
There would appear to be low organizational and institutional costs with 
making modifications to existing statutes and laws.  As discussed above with respect to 
the purist approach, using the criminal justice system – even with changes to existing 
statutes – is certainly less cumbersome than creating an entirely new court system. 
e. Conclusion 
The approach of upgrading or modifying the criminal justice system 
encompasses many different proposals that all appear to temper security with liberty 
protections.  They are generally accountable and transparent and abide by separation of 
power principles.  As with the national security court approach, however, the proposals 
all have the potential to be overbroad and not narrowly-tailored to meet their objectives if 
they tend to infect ordinary criminal justice.  This concern can be mitigated by careful 
legislative proposals that focus on narrow definitions of terrorism and other “limiting 
factors.”  Because the proposals would be enacted by Congress, they would appear to be 
lawful with the caveat of possibly Heymann and Kayyem’s two years of ex parte 
detention being found to be unconstitutional, or the civil commitment schemes being 
found to be to overbroad if they encompass mere thought crimes.  The main advantage of 
modifying current statutes – as opposed to creating a whole new national security court – 
is that the institutional and organizational costs are comparatively low. This solution 




medium to high where there are not so many terrorists needing to be preventively 
detained that the criminal justice system, even with the proposed modifications, becomes 
overwhelmed.  
E. “EMERGENCY CONSTITUTION” 
1. Description 
Bruce Ackerman, law professor at Yale University, argues in his book Before the 
Next Attack that new legislation in the form of an “emergency constitution” should be 
enacted that would allow the President to detain terrorism suspects for forty-five days 
based on “reasonable suspicion” after a terrorist attack as a way to prevent a possible and 
unknowable second strike.624  If the suspects turn out to be innocent, then they should be 
compensated $500 a day per confinement.625  While Ackerman acknowledges that the 
“dragnet will undoubtedly sweep many innocents into detention,” he argues that it also 
“may well catch a few key actors: disrupting the second strike, saving lots of lives, and 
deflecting a blow to the body politic.”626 
According to Ackerman, “a terrorist attack triggers pervasive uncertainty 
throughout the country about our collective capacity to maintain the fabric of public 
order.”627  An emergency constitution would reassure the public both symbolically and 
functionally after a devastating terrorist attack when the citizenry does not know if there 
will be second deadly strike.  The emergency constitution would give the executive 
“extraordinary powers” but “only for a short period, with extensions granted reluctantly 
[by Congress] and in response to the evolving exigencies of the situation.”628  Ackerman 
explains that if “we use war to cover emergencies, we will allow our response to terrorist 
attacks to become too oppressive for too long.”  Yet, if we “expand the definition of 
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crime to cover emergencies, we will succeed in normalizing the oppressive use of 
criminal law during periods of relative calm.”629  Hence, he posits that an emergency 
constitution will “permit an effective short-term response without generating insuperable 
long-term pathologies.”630  Under his proposal, which encompasses additional powers 
beyond preventive detention, the executive would be able to act unilaterally for a brief 
period of about one to two weeks – long enough for the legislature to convene and 
consider the issues.  Unless it gained a majority approval by Congress, the state of 
emergency would end.  Every two to three months, any state of emergency would need to 
be supported by “an escalating cascade of supermajorities” such as sixty, seventy and 
eighty percent for each subsequent period.631  In this way, the executive’s emergency 




As Ackerman reluctantly concedes, it is unclear whether detaining 
suspects for forty-five days based on reasonable suspicion – as opposed to the current 
requirement of forty-eight hours based on probable cause – would be constitutional, 
although he makes a detailed and somewhat convincing argument that it would be.  As a 
preliminary matter, Ackerman’s emergency constitution requires Congress to enact a 
“framework statute” – it does not require any formal amendment to the Constitution.632  
Ackerman defines a “framework statute” as a statute that seeks “to impose constitutional 
order on problems that were unforeseen by the Founders.”633  An example is the 
Administrative Procedure Act, which imposed the rule of law on the regulatory state.  
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According to Ackerman, detaining suspects for forty-five days based 
merely on reasonable suspicion would require Congress to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus.  Because his emergency constitution only applies after a serious terrorist attack, 
and because Congress would need to uphold these powers with an increasing cascade of 
supermajorities (the first one to occur one to two weeks after the emergency, before the 
ending of the forty-five days), he posits that Congress could suspend the writ under these 
circumstances.  He seems to argue that because the cascade of supermajorities would 
make it difficult to actually suspend the writ, that it would be done rarely and hence be 
constitutional: “The supermajoritarian escalator provides institutional recognition that 
suspension is a very serious constitutional manner, and that Congress is perfectly 
cognizant of its limited power to act in cases of ‘rebellion’ or ‘invasion.’”634  Yet, upon 
scrutiny, it does not seem that the supermajoritarian escalator is at all relevant to whether 
there actually is an “invasion” or “rebellion.”  The fact that Ackerman’s framework 
statute would make it procedurally more difficult for Congress to suspend the writ (a 
supermajoritarian required instead of a majority) does not have any bearing on the 
substantive nature of the emergency (i.e., whether there is an “invasion” or “rebellion.”) 
Nonetheless, Ackerman’s forty-five days of preventive detention based on 
reasonable suspicion may serve as an adequate substitute for the writ, something he does 
not appear to consider.  According to Ackerman, at the beginning of the forty-five day 
period, there would be an initial preliminary hearing before a judge, and the prosecution 
would have to present some evidence, such as a statement from the security services, to 
merit reasonable suspicion.  Ackerman emphasizes, however, that this would not be a 
forum to “weigh the evidentiary basis for the detention.”635  After forty-five days, the 
prosecution would need to make a case under the standard criminal law.  In essence, the 
forty-five days appear to be identical to Britain’s use of pre-charge detention to detain 
terrorist suspects while an investigation continues to gather more evidence.  Ackerman 
notes that if the evidence meriting the “reasonable suspicion” turns out to have been a 
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mere fabrication, then that can serve as a later basis for punitive damages.636  And, as 
noted above, if a detainee is not charged with any crime after the forty-five days, he 
would be entitled to compensation.  Ackerman posits that while there will be a “reduction 
of due process in the short run” it will be “followed by its enhancement over the long 
run.”637  
While a detailed description of adequate substitutions for the writ is 
beyond the scope of this chapter (it is briefly touched on with respect to the FISA court 
analysis below), an argument could be made – although Ackerman is not making it – that 
his proposal would be an adequate substitute for the writ with enough protections not to 
merit a true “suspension.”  In fact, his proposal seems to be similar to Heymann and 
Kayyem’s discussed above where a detainee can be held ninety days up to two years on 
an ex parte showing of dangerousness and/or necessity after which the normal criminal 
justice system would take over.  The pivotal and unanswered question is how long can a 
detainee be held without adequate judicial review.  Hamdi left that question unresolved.  
If Ackerman’s protections were found to be an adequate substitute of the writ, then it 
would be lawful.  In sum, its lawfulness remains unclear.  
b. Security  
The liberty/security spectrum raises an interesting conundrum because 
there needs to be two separate analyses.  One fundamental drawback to Ackerman’s 
approach is that it does not come into play until after there has been an actual attack 
where thousands of lives are lost.  In fact, Ackerman explicitly rejects having it apply 
based on “an imminent attack” or on a finding of “clear and present danger.’”638 
Surprisingly, he even states that 9/11 “represents the low end for the legitimate 
imposition of a state of emergency.”639  Apparently, more than 3,000 people have to 
actually die before Ackerman’s solution kicks in.  Hence, while all the other proposals for 
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preventive detention are concerned with initially saving lives, Ackerman’s proposal is 
focused on reassuring the public before a possible second attack.  Therefore, before an 
actual attack occurs, his approach is basically identical to the purist approach – i.e., no 
system of preventive detention.  Hence, it protects liberty to the extreme at the expense of 
security, does not balance the two at all, and leaves the United States needlessly 
vulnerable to terrorism.  
After an actual attack – when his solution finally kicks in – another 
analysis needs to be done.  At this point, terrorist suspects are preventively detained – 
similar to Britain – in forty-five days of pre-charge detention based on reasonable 
suspicion, which is a lower standard than the normal criminal law requirement of 
probable cause.  Ackerman’s forty-five days of preventive detention based on reasonable 
suspicion would err on security.  While he acknowledges that his solution will capture 
many innocents, he focuses on the fact that a “few key actors” will be incapacitated 
thereby “disrupting the second strike, saving lots of lives, and deflecting a blow to the 
body politic.”640  In other words, for the first forty-five days his solution prioritizes 
security over liberty.  Yet, ironically, after the forty-five days is over, the balance shifts 
the other direction.  Then, the normal criminal justice system must be applied.  As 
explained with the purist approach, there are situations where the criminal justice system 
is inadequate to incapacitate terrorist suspects.  While those reasons are not repeated here 
(please see analysis of purist approach), those reasons do not evaporate after a mere 
forty-five days.  There will still be issues with compromising sources and methods, 
inadmissible evidence, and other evidentiary issues.  Hence, after forty-five days, his 
approach prioritizes liberty over security.  In sum, Ackerman’s emergency constitution 
alternates between two extremes and does not seem to balance security with liberty.  
c. Liberty 
With respect to accountability and transparency, however, his solution is 
remarkably progressive.  Ackerman argues that congressional oversight committees 
should monitor the President’s decisions under the emergency constitution (which again 
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encompass more than just preventive detention) and that members of the opposition 
political party should be guaranteed the majority of seats on the oversight committees.641  
He further argues that the emergency constitution should require the executive to 
“provide the committees with complete and immediate access to all documents.”  In this 
way, the President and his advisors are “on notice that they can’t keep secrets from key 
members of the opposition, and it serves as an additional check on the abuse of 
power.”642  
With respect to balance of power principles, his solution (after an actual 
attack) also scores high marks.  Congress would be directly monitoring the situation 
every one to two weeks and then every two, three and four months, and continued 
emergency powers would need to be approved by Congress based on increasing 
supermajorities.  The judiciary would also be directly involved in monitoring preventive 
detention. Federal judges would preside over the initial preliminary hearing, which 
appears to be perfunctory, and then would monitor the criminal justice system after the 
forty-five days have ended.  
At first blush, his solution, at least with respect to preventive detention, 
seems narrowly-tailored to meet its objectives.  It is basically forty-five days of pre-
charge detention based on reasonable suspicion and then the normal criminal justice 
system continues.  Yet, after an actual attack, it seems likely that the executive branch in 
an attempt to protect the American public would detain many innocent people for forty-
five days in order to “play it safe.”  In other words, Ackerman’s solution tends to be 
overbroad.  It is unclear that the fine of $500 a day per innocent person would be much of 
a deterrent to the executive who is focused on stopping a possible second attack. 
Furthermore, the forty-five days of incarceration based on reasonable suspicion and 
perfunctory judicial review would likely result in incarcerations of whatever racial, 
national origin, or religious group was perceived to be responsible for the actual attack. 
Considering the Administration detained thousands of Muslims after 9/11 on immigration 
charges, it is not hard to imagine who would feel the brunt of Ackerman’s emergency 
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constitution.  In sum, while his proposal is accountable, transparent, and upholds 
separation of power principles, it tends to be overbroad, which decreases liberty but 
raises security. 
In sum, Ackerman’s approach after an actual attack occupies two places 
on the security/liberty continuum.  For the first forty-five days, it tends to prioritize 
security at the expense of liberty.  After the first forty-five days, where there is essentially 
no system of preventive detention and the criminal justice system is employed, it 
prioritizes liberty over security.  In other words, his proposal swings like a pendulum 
between two extremes and never appreciates the benefits of balance.  
d. Institutional Efficiency 
Like the purist approach, the emergency constitution would pose minimal 
institutional or organizational costs.  Detainees would be preventively detained under the 
criminal justice system for forty-five days based on reasonable suspicion and then the 
normal criminal justice system would operate.  No new institutions would need to be 
created. 
e. Conclusion 
While Ackerman’s emergency constitution may or may not be lawful, it 
does not provide a compelling model for preventive detention, mainly because it does not 
even begin to operate until after thousands of people are dead or dying.  It seems more 
concerned with assuring the public than it is about saving lives.  It does not appreciate the 
need to interrogate terrorist suspects to obtain actionable intelligence and it does not 
adequately provide the tools needed to incapacitate terrorists beyond forty-five days if the 
criminal justice system is inadequate.  Furthermore, during the forty-five days of 
preventive detention, it needlessly errs on being overbroad and detaining innocent people 
all to reassure the public.  Nonetheless, the concept of an emergency constitution and 
escalating supermajorities is intriguing – at least theoretically.  It is recommended that 
Ackerman’s book be studied but not applied to the real world as a solution for preventive 
detention of terrorist suspects.  
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F. DETENTION OF ENEMY COMBATANT ACT (DECA) 
1. Description 
As explained in Chapter V, in 2005, Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced the 
Detention of Enemy Combatant Act (DECA) (HR 1076) to the House of Representatives 
but it never became law.643  The purpose of DECA was to “authorize the President to 
detain an enemy combatant who is a United States person or resident who is a member of 
al Qaeda or knowingly cooperated with members of al Qaeda, to guarantee timely access 
to judicial review to challenge the basis for a detention, to permit the detainee access to 
counsel, and for other purposes.”644  Significantly, the DECA explicitly stated that 
“Congress has a responsibility for maintaining vigorous oversight of detention of United 
States citizens and lawful residents to assure that such detentions are consistent with due 
process.”645  Furthermore, in order to detain an enemy combatant under DECA, the 
President would need to certify that (1) “the United States Armed Forces are engaged in a 
state of armed conflict with al Qaeda and an investigation with a view toward 
prosecution, a prosecution, or a post-trial proceeding in the case of such person or 
resident is ongoing or (2) detention is warranted in order to prevent such person or 
resident from aiding persons attempting to commit terrorist acts against the United 
States.”646  Importantly, the certifications would be effective for 180 days but renewable 
with successive certifications.647  Judicial review would occur in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia where detainees could challenge – with the 
assistance of counsel – the basis of the detention.648  
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DECA, had it passed, would likely be lawful.  The law explicitly provides 
for “timely access to judicial review to challenge the basis for a detention,” and the 
detainee is permitted access to counsel.  Furthermore, judicial review would be in federal 
court.  Hence, there is no suspension of the writ.  While DECA does not specify when 
judicial review must occur, instead relying on the vagueness of “timely,” the plurality in 
Hamdi also failed to specify any particular time-frame.  There is no reason to believe 
DECA would have been found to be unlawful. 
b. Security 
DECA has many provisions that emphasize security and protecting this 
nation from terrorist attacks.  While DECA itself does not contain many of the particular 
and significant details concerning preventive detention, such as the standards for review, 
time-tables for review, how evidence will be gathered, or whether detainees can be 
interrogated incommunicado for a certain amount of time to enhance interrogation 
potential, the Secretary of Defense is supposed to consult with the Secretary of State and 
the Attorney General in creating such standards.649  In other words, as observed by James 
Weingarten from Harvard law, DECA empowers the executive branch, through the 
Secretary of Defense, to create the substantive rules of preventive detention: “Unless 
legislation compels more detailed disclosure, executive discretion alone will determine 
the contours of procedural rights of detainees.”650  In fact, the Secretary of Defense 
decides on the rules necessary to protect the “confidentiality” of information and rules 
that would “assist in the gathering of vital intelligence.”651  Thus, while the Secretary of 
Defense is supposed to consult with the Attorney General and report to Congress, it is 
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really the executive branch that would determine the substantive details of preventive 
detention that the legislative branches in other countries, such as Israel and Britain, have 
decided.  By concentrating authority with the executive branch, DECA accelerates 
decision-making, thereby enhancing security. 
c. Liberty  
With respect to the liberty part of the continuum, however, DECA also 
contains provisions that directly address accountability and transparency.  Significantly, 
the Secretary of Defense is supposed to report the standards to the Senate and House 
Judiciary Committees.652  Furthermore, the President is required to report to Congress 
every twelve months on “each individual subject to, or detained pursuant to, the authority 
provided by this Act.”653  In this way, DECA seems accountable and transparent, and it 
adheres to balance of power principles in that Congress and the judiciary are engaged in 
the process of detaining terrorist suspects. 
Nonetheless, as Weingarten points out, there is a concern that judicial 
review would not be meaningful, especially if the judiciary feels that DECA has 
“Congress’s imprimatur”: “congressional authorization would almost certainly have the 
effect of discouraging courts from undertaking searching reviews of detentions.”654 
Hence, he recommends statutory improvements to include “express language regarding 
evidentiary standards, burdens of proof, and restrictions on interrogation techniques.”655 
Overall, as Weingarten acknowledges, DECA does provide judicial review 
in federal court and protects U.S. persons from arbitrary and solely executive detention. 
Because it allows the Secretary of Defense to decide the substantive details, an argument 
could be made that DECA errs more on security.  But because it requires accountability 
and transparency, it also protects liberty.  Thus, overall DECA appears to strike a good 
balance between security and liberty.  
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DECA also appears to be narrowly-tailored to meets its objectives.  It 
applies only to U.S. persons who are members of, or knowingly cooperate with, al Qaeda. 
Furthermore, the President must certify that the United States is “engaged in armed 
conflict with al Qaeda” and that an “investigation with a view toward prosecution, a 
prosecution, or a post-trial proceeding” of the detainee is ongoing or that detention is 
needed to prevent the detainee from “aiding persons attempting to commit terrorist 
attacks against the U.S.”656  Importantly, this preventive detention scheme is limited to al 
Qaeda, although al Qaeda seems to be have transformed itself into a terrorist movement 
more than a specific hierarchical terrorist group.  Nonetheless, DECA would not apply to 
a solely domestic terrorist threat or another group not affiliated with al Qaeda.  In this 
way, it is narrowly-defined.  
An argument could be made that it is too narrowly-defined in that it does 
not provide a preventive detention regime for other terrorist threats unrelated to al Qaeda. 
Yet, should another terrorist group pose a substantial threat to U.S. interests, Congress 
could simply amend DECA – especially if it had been working well – to encompass 
whatever future terrorist threat occurs.  Hence, the fact that DECA is currently envisioned 
to only encompass al Qaeda, and thereby narrowly-defined, enhances liberty.  If it 
included any terrorist group, it would be overbroad, increasing security at the expense of 
liberty.  In sum, DECA seems to strike a decent compromise between liberty and 
security, even though most of the substantive details concerning preventive detention 
would be decided by the executive branch. 
d. Institutional Efficiency 
DECA would have low organization or institutional costs.  Judicial review 
would occur at the existing United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
Thus, there would no need to create and staff a new court.  In fact, since all judicial 
review would be consolidated in one court, an argument could be made that DECA 
enhances organization efficiency, especially because the judges from U.S. District Court 
of the District of Columbia could then gain an expertise in these matters. 
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e. Conclusion 
Congress attempted to pass DECA in 2005 but it stalled in committee.  
Congress does not seem motivated to create a regime of preventive detention for U.S. 
persons.  While DECA was only an attempt at an interim measure,657 its strengths were 
that it curbed executive unilateralism by providing for judicial review in federal court and 
called for reporting and accountability requirements to Congress.  It would have been 
legal and organizationally efficient in that only one circuit would hear the cases.  While it 
arguably errs on security more than liberty in that the Secretary of Defense would be 
promulgating the standards, it nonetheless has accountability and transparency and 
adheres to balance of power principles.  It is recommended that Congress enact a statute 
to deal with preventive detention.  DECA provides a good start but Congress should give 
thought to providing more of the substantive details into the legislation as have Israel and 
Britain.  
G. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT  
1. Description 
Assuming interrogation and incapacitation are viable justifications for preventive 
detention and policy-makers want to enhance national security, this paper advocates 
using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts (FISC) – a federal court established by 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)658 – to monitor a narrowly-
prescribed regime for preventive detention.  Although some individuals have suggested a 
specialized court system modeled after or similar to the FISC to monitor preventive 
detention, their proposals, as discussed above, concern the creation of a separate court 
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system.659  By contrast, this author advocates Congress amending FISA to allow the 
FISC to directly monitor any system of preventive detention for purposes of interrogation 
and/or incapacitation.  While Terwilliger also advocates use of the FISC as one way to 
monitor a regime of preventive detention660 (he also suggests civil commitment, 
discussed above), the proposal outlined here provides more substantive details of how 
such an approach would operate.  
FISA provides a statutory framework for the U.S. government to engage in 
electronic surveillance and physical searches to obtain foreign intelligence 
information.661  FISA allows wiretapping of aliens and citizens in the U.S. based on a 
finding of probable cause to believe that the target is a member of a foreign terrorist 
group or an agent of a foreign power.662  For U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens, 
there must also be probable cause to believe that the person is “knowingly” engaged in 
activities that “may” involve a criminal violation.663  FISA also provides statutory 
authority to obtain an order from the FISC authorizing the production of tangible things 
including books, records, papers, documents, and other items for an investigation to 
obtain foreign intelligence information.664  Importantly, the FISC has jurisdiction to hear  
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applications for and to grant court orders approving electronic surveillance or physical 
searches anywhere in the United States to obtain foreign intelligence information under 
FISA.665 
The FISC consists of eleven Article III judges appointed by the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court for seven-year terms.666  The FISC is not an adversarial court (much 
like a grand jury) and the federal government is the only party to its proceedings. Its 
hearings are closed to the public.  As Heymann notes, FISA has been used more than 
14,000 times and “worked admirably both in enabling intelligence officials to investigate 
foreign spies and terrorists, and in assuring the public that there are only limited, specific 
circumstances in which the government may use secret, intrusive investigative 
techniques.”667 
This author suggests that the FISC should monitor any preventive detention 
regime during this war on terror.  It is an institution within the judicial branch that 
already exists to deal with foreign intelligence matters based on ex parte showings by the 
government.  While FISA currently only deals with electronic surveillance and physical 
searches – and not interrogation or incapacitation of intelligence assets – under this 
proposal, Congress could amend FISA to include these additional rationales.  
Under this approach, U.S. persons who are detained in a peaceful civilian area 
would not be labeled “enemy combatants” but rather as a “terrorism intelligence asset” 
(TIA).  This approach does not apply to true enemy combatants as understood by the 
Geneva Convention detained on an actual battlefield and held outside the United States as 
a preventive measure until the war ends.  The government would need to prove by 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion – or some standard developed by Congress – that 
that the detainee is an agent of a foreign power or foreign terrorist group, would prove to 
be a valuable intelligence asset, and/or is imminently going to commit a terrorist attack. 
Congress would also need to define what constitutes an “imminent attack” and need to 
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establish how many days (e.g., thirty) the executive branch could hold the TIA before 
bringing him before the FISC for judicial review.  While normally proceedings before the 
FISC are ex parte and the suspect is not entitled to counsel, given the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hamdi that enemy combatants must be allowed to challenge that designation 
before a neutral decision-maker, cleared defense counsel would assist the detainee with 
this process.  The FISC would also require the government to outline its methods of 
interrogation (again, this process is closed to the public) to ensure that torture, however 
that is presently defined, is not used during interrogation.  
Significantly, the executive branch would have to justify to the FISC why the 
criminal justice system in each particular case is inadequate to incapacitate or interrogate. 
Once the executive branch or FISC has determined that the TIA poses no risk of an 
imminent attack and is no longer providing useful intelligence information, the TIA must 
be released or transferred to the criminal justice system with specific charges.  At this 
point, the normal Sixth Amendment rights to counsel would apply.  Any information 
gleaned from the interrogation without the benefit of counsel during the TIA process 
could not be used in the criminal justice system.  If the true purpose of designating an 
individual as a TIA is to gather intelligence information to stop a future attack, then such 
information cannot be used for prosecution.  If it was used for prosecution, it would 
violate the Fifth Amendment and substantive due process as individuals have a right not 
to incriminate themselves.  
Importantly, under this system, absent compelling circumstances, a TIA should 
not be held more than thirty or sixty days intervals, which could be successively renewed 
based on continued showings of necessity or dangerousness.  Again, the rationale for a 
TIA is to incapacitate dangerous terrorists who plan on committing an imminent attack 
but where the criminal justice system proves inadequate to incapacitate and/or to 
interrogate the suspects to gain actionable intelligence.  After those rationales are 




This approach using the FISC system would most likely be lawful.  FISA 
and the FISC system already exist, so Congress would need to amend these statutes to 
allow for detention of TIAs for purposes of interrogation and/or incapacitation.  As 
explained in Chapter IV, it is unlikely that the AUMF provides the necessary statutory 
authority to create a preventive detention regime for U.S. persons arrested in the United 
States and not on a battlefield.  Because Congress would amend FISA as explained 
above, this system would be “pursuant to an Act of Congress,” and the problems with the 
Non-Detention Act would be avoided.  
As for constitutional concerns, the Supreme Court has recognized that we 
are in a war on terror and that the executive has war powers to detain enemy combatants. 
While this FISC approach would not label any U.S. persons as enemy combatants but 
rather TIAs, the same rationale would apply.  The need for TIAs is pursuant to the 
executive’s war powers, approved by an Act of Congress (i.e., modifications of the FISA 
statute), and monitored by the judicial branch.  Moreover, it would likely constitute an 
adequate substitution for the writ of habeas corpus. 
In the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on habeas corpus, it 
stated that the “habeas privilege entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to 
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ 
of relevant law, and the habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release 
of an individual unlawfully detained.”668  With respect to adequate substitutes for the 
writ, the Supreme Court noted that for the habeas writ, or its substitute, to function as an 
effective and meaningful remedy in this context, the court conducting the collateral 
proceeding must have some ability to correct any errors, “to assess the sufficiency of the 
Government’s evidence,” and “to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that 
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was not introduced during the earlier proceeding.”669  This FISC approach would meet 
with these standards as Article III judges would have the power to assess the evidence 
and make substantive rulings and corrections.  Hence, it would likely serve as an 
adequate substitute for the writ.  
It would also comply with the plurality’s concerns in Hamdi.  Meaningful 
judicial review would occur in a neutral forum with the assistance of counsel.  In fact, as 
explained above, Hamdi allowed for the forum to be a military tribunal in the executive 
branch.  This approach, by contrast, would have the judicial review run by federal judges 
thereby enhancing its legitimacy.  Furthermore, while the plurality in Hamdi noted that 
the AUMF did not authorize detention for interrogation but only incapacitation during the 
war in Afghanistan, as explained in Chapter IV, there is no reason to believe Congress 
could not enact legislation allowing detention for purposes of interrogation – a fact that 
Justice Scalia explicitly noted in his dissent.  Importantly, the privilege against self-
incrimination is an evidentiary one – a violation only occurs if the confession is used a 
trial.  In other words, there is no constitutional bar to interrogating a detainee without the 
benefit of counsel if the resulting information is not used against the suspect at a 
subsequent trial.  Thus, this FISC approach allowing for preventive detention for 
purposes of incapacitation and/or interrogation would likely be lawful. 
b. Security  
As for the security part of the continuum, the FISC approach allows for 
preventive detention based on interrogation and incapacitation, which are the main 
justifications for President Bush’s enemy combatant policy.  It just tempers these 
legitimate rationales (see Chapter III) with due process and institutional efficiency, as 
discussed below.  One potential negative of this approach from a security standpoint is 
that TIAs could not be held indefinitely to prevent them from committing terrorist attacks 
in the future.  After their value as an intelligence asset is exhausted and they no longer 
pose an imminent threat, they must be released or, more likely, transferred to the criminal 
justice system.  As Schulhofer and Turner have argued, the existing statutes of CIPA, the 
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Speedy Trial Act, and the 1984 Bail Reform Act, perhaps with modifications by 
Congress, can successfully be used to detain and try terrorism suspects in Article III 
courts.  Therefore, there is no need to create an alternative court system with all the 
institutional inefficiencies (e.g., new jurisdictional issues) to try terrorism suspects once 
they are no longer TIAs.  
While the problems identified previously with trying terrorist suspects in 
federal court remain real, the FISC approach as outlined here would mitigate some of 
those concerns.  If evidence is inadmissible, classified, or there is a concern with 
revealing sources and methods (that CIPA could not obviate), the individual could be 
nonetheless detained under the FISC approach as a TIA.  Yet, actual trials would occur in 
ordinary federal court.  As Moore, Roth, Zabel, and Benjamin noted above, the criminal 
justice system has worked remarkably well, albeit not perfectly, with espionage and 
terrorism prosecutions.  According to Zabel and Benjamin, between September 11, 2001 
and December 31, 2007, there have been 257 individuals charged in terrorism 
prosecutions.670  As of May 2008 when they published their white paper, 97 defendants 
still had pending charges, while the remaining 160 defendants’ cases had been resolved 
either by conviction, acquittal, or dismissal. 671 Of the 160, 145 resulted in conviction of 
at least one count either by guilty plea or guilty verdict after trial.672  Hence, there were 
15 defendants who were acquitted of all charges or had their charges dismissed.  While 
they do not detail the specifics of these 15 people (although they do note that one of the 
15 was al-Marri who the government designated as an enemy combatant after his 
criminal charges were dropped), they conclude that the criminal justice system has 
worked considerably well and does not need to be changed for the extremely few 
anomalies. 
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like al Qaeda.” Zabel and Benjamin, “In Pursuit of Justice, Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal 
Courts,” 22. Their detailed methodology is discussed on pages 21-24.  




This FISC approach as outlined here recognizes the adaptability and 
competence of the criminal justice system in detaining and incapacitating terrorists.  
Nonetheless, it allows for a procedure to be used for those “anomalies” or rare occasions, 
where the criminal justice system proves inadequate.  In other words, the FISC approach 
is all about balance.  There can be preventive detention – monitored by the FISC judges – 
when the criminal justice system cannot incapacitate or when interrogation to obtain 
actionable intelligence is needed.  Trials, however, need to occur in the normal criminal 
justice system with upgrades to statutes if warranted.  
c. Liberty 
The FISC approach does a superior job of balancing liberty and security.  
It clearly upholds balance of power principles as FISA would be amended by Congress 
and federal judges would be responsible for the judicial review.  It would also be 
accountable, especially if it borrowed provisions from DECA requiring annual reports to 
congressional oversight committees on its findings and if the executive branch were 
forced to report to Congress on the details of TIA detainees.  While its proceedings would 
be closed to the public (and hence not transparent, thereby decreasing liberty but 
increasing security), the FISA judges could require the executive officials to specify the 
exact interrogation methods being employed and report every thirty days on progress and 
effectiveness.  In this way, interrogation would be monitored by the judicial branch and 
effectively studied. As eluded to in Chapter III, such accountability might make 
individuals who are squeamish about coercive interrogation more comfortable with the 
concept of preventive detention as a way to gain actionable intelligence.  
The FISC approach would also be narrowly-tailored to meets its objectives 
– in fact, this is one of its overriding strengths.  Significantly, the executive branch would 
have to justify to the FISC why the criminal justice system in each particular case is 
inadequate to incapacitate or interrogate.  As explained in Chapter III, one way to obtain 
intelligence is to offer a deal and attempt to have the detainee cooperate.  The 
government would need to justify to the FISC why such an approach is not feasible and 
that preventive detention as a TIA is necessary to gain actionable intelligence.  If 
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incapacitation is the rationale, the executive branch would need to show why statutes 
such as conspiracy, attempt, or providing material support to terrorists – or alternative 
charges such as lying to a federal agent or credit card fraud – would not be effective in 
any particular case.  For instance, as explained in Chapter III, the evidence may have 
been provided by a foreign intelligence asset, obtained by unsavory means, or be 
otherwise inadmissible in a court of law.  In other words, the executive branch would 
need to justify to the judicial branch why a deviation from the criminal justice system is 
imperative.  In this way, the FISC approach would be narrowly applied only when the 
criminal justice system is inadequate to protect the nation from terrorist attacks. 
Furthermore, the FISC could also be flexible in arranging for alternatives 
to incarceration as a way of preventive detention.  If the rationale for preventive detention 
was incapacitation – as opposed to interrogation – the FISC could allow milder restraints 
such as house arrest, better conditions of confinement, or implantation with a tracking 
device.  Britain employs such methods with its “control orders.”  
Importantly, as discussed in Chapter II, it would be advantageous to have 
a preventive detention regime that can incorporate the present threat level at any 
particular time as opposed to having its underlying legitimacy being based on the threat 
level.  By having the FISC monitor a preventive detention regime for the purposes of 
incapacitation and/or interrogation, the FISC could take into account the threat level in 
making its decisions.  For instance, if a terrorist attack rivaling 9/11 occurred, and the 
executive branch asserted it needed to preventively detain certain individuals for 
interrogation and/or incapacitation – and explained why the criminal justice system was 
inadequate – the FISC could be more deferential to the executive branch during the 
emergency.  Nonetheless, unlike the enemy combatant policy, there would still be 
judicial review, and the executive branch, as in Israel, would need to continually provide 
updated justifications to the FISC for prolonged preventive detention.  
One singular advantage of having the FISC monitor preventive detention 
is that problems with “mission creep” are avoided.  Clearly, arguments could be made for 
incapacitation and interrogation of drug dealers, serial murderers, rapists, and child 
abusers.  By having a court system, whose sole justification is surveillance of foreign 
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intelligence, monitor the preventive detention regime, it would be incredibly difficult, if 
not impossible, to have zealous prosecutors try to manipulate the FISC system to 
interrogate a drug dealer or murderer unrelated to terrorism.  At it stands now, FISA 
requires an executive branch official to certify that “a significant purpose of the 
surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.”673  In other words, by having 
the preventive detention regime run by the FISC, there would be less concerns that the 
ordinary criminal justice system would gradually be broadened or infected by the 
allowances needed to prosecute and detain terrorists. 
One outstanding question that would need to be addressed by Congress is 
whether the FISC approach as described in this paper would only concern international 
terrorism or whether it could concern domestic terrorism.  Given that FISA was created 
for the purpose of foreign surveillance and not domestic surveillance, which is governed 
by The Federal Wiretap Act,674 it is likely that the FISC approach as articulated here 
would need to be limited to international terrorists and true foreign surveillance, which 
would include U.S. persons working or knowingly providing material support to al 
Qaeda.  Ostensibly, this would encompass Hamdi, al-Marri and Padilla but not Timothy 
McVeigh.  
In sum, the FISC approach as outlined here would be narrowly-tailored, 
run by the judicial branch, and could be made accountable with reporting requirements to 
Congress.  It would be less transparent than the purist approach, however.  Given the 
need for secrecy, especially if the exact interrogation methods were revealed, the 
proceedings would need to remain ex parte, albeit with cleared defense counsel assisting 
the TIA during the designation process. Yet, transparency would occur during the 
subsequent criminal trials of any TIAs.  
 
 
                                                 
673 U.S. Code 50, § 1804(a)(7)(B). (Emphasis added). 
674 Federal Wiretap Act, U.S. Code 18 (1968), §§ 2510 et seq. 
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Overall, the FISA approach respects both liberty and security but not at 
either extreme.  By separating out the rationales for preventive detention – and allowing 
TIAs to be detained solely for incapacitation and interrogation but not trials – it has a low 
chance of adversely affecting ordinary crime unrelated to terrorism.  
d. Institutional Efficiency 
It would also be organizationally efficient.  The FISC already exists – 
there would be no need to create a new court system or hire new staff.  Rather, the same 
judges who form the FISC and have an expertise in foreign intelligence matters would be 
making the substantive decisions. 
e. Conclusion 
The FISA approach recognizes that preventive detention may be needed as 
a tool in the war on terror.  It legitimizes to some extent President Bush’s underlying 
rationales for preventive detention.  Yet, it also acknowledges that the criminal justice 
system as it currently exists, or with minor modifications, has done a remarkably good 
job of incapacitating terrorists.  In fact, according to the Department of Justice, between 
September 11, 2001 and June 2008, 401 individuals have been criminally charged in the 
United States in terrorism-related investigations.675  While this is a higher number than 
Zabel and Benjamin’s data discussed previously (presumably because “terrorism” is 
defined differently), it proves that the criminal justice system can primarily handle the 
detention, incapacitation, and prosecution of terrorists.  Nonetheless, the FISC approach 
would serve to operate in those instances – or fill in the gap – where the criminal justice 
system was incapable of protecting our nation but in a way that respects separation of 
power principles, curbs executive unilateralism, and upholds due process.  
Importantly, some policy-makers have recognized the benefits of using the 
FISC to monitor preventive detention, although without a detailed analysis.  For instance, 
Wittes and Gitenstein note: “The national security court approach has worked effectively 
                                                 
675 Department of Justice, “Preserving Life and Liberty,” 
http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/a_terr.htm (accessed June 21, 2008). 
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in the surveillance area for 30 years and could be tailored to the detention arena.”676 
Terwillger attests, “[FISA] has the hallmarks and characteristics of a legal process which 
meets constitutional muster under due process standards, yet at the same time preserves 
the secrecy necessary to avoid the catastrophic consequences of revealing intelligence 
sources, methods and the information produced from them.”677  Heymann observes: “We 
know that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has worked, and worked well. If 
specific additional powers are needed, they can and should be legislated by a very willing 
Congress.”678 
It is recommended that the FISA approach be adopted by the next 
Administration as a way to handle preventive detention of terrorist suspects where the 
criminal justice system is inadequate.  It is lawful, narrowly-tailored, organizationally 
efficient, and adheres to separation of power principles.  Because the FISA approach can 
incorporate the threat level at any particular time, it can be used if the threat from 
terrorism is low, medium, or high.  It also uses a label of “TIA” and stops calling 
terrorists “combatants” which, as explained in Chapter II, glorifies them when they are 
more like criminals.  As Justice Anthony Kennedy recently wrote for the majority in 
Boumediene, “The laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in 
extraordinary times.  Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system reconciled 
within the framework of the law.”679  This author posits that the FISA approach 
reconciles liberty and security within a framework of the law and that the next 
Administration should give it serious consideration.  
                                                 
676 Wittes and Gitenstein, “A Legal Framework for Detaining Terrorists, Enact a Law to End the 
Clash over Rights,” 13. 
677 Terwilliger, “’Domestic Unlawful Combatants’: A Proposal to Adjudicate Constitutional 
Detentions,” 61. 
678 Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom and Security, Winning Without War, 151. 
679 Boumediene, slip op at 70. 
 205
H. CONCLUSION 
Justice Felix Frankfurter wisely observed that “[t]he history of liberty has largely 
been the history of the observance of procedural safeguards.”680  President Bush’s enemy 
combatant policy is devoid of procedural safeguards. While the executive branch is 
supposed to err on security and therefore prefer policies that are arguably overbroad, the 
ingenuity of the Founding Fathers was the balance of powers.  The executive branch can 
zealously try to preventively detain terrorists if their zeal is tempered by procedural 
safeguards and separation of power.  
In this chapter, alternative ideas to President Bush’s enemy combatant policy have 
been categorized and analyzed under a methodology encompassing key democratic 
principles.  While the substantive details between these proposals differ, the unifying 
theme seems to be an urge for Congress to become involved and either suspend the writ 
(purist approach), enact legislation creating a new court system, enact an emergency 
constitution, or modify existing statutes such as CIPA, the Speedy Trial Act, the Bail 
Reform Act, civil commitment laws, or, as this author recommends, amend FISA.  As 
Stuart Taylor from the Brookings Institution notes, “[c]onsidered congressional action 
based on open national debate is more likely to be sensitive to civil liberties and to the 
Constitution’s checks and balances than unilateral expansion of executive power.”681  In 
sum, Congress has been disappointingly silent throughout the past seven years and it is 
time – perhaps with the impetus of new presidential leadership – to enact a 





                                                 
680 Sunstein, “Monkey Wrench, The Supreme Court has always thwarted presidents who demand 
unlimited legal power in wartime.” 
681 Taylor, “Rights, Liberties, and Security: Recalibrating the Balance after September 11.” 
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VIII. CONCLUSION: CONGRESS, WHERE ART THOU? 




After September 11, 2001, the Administration decided to detain certain 
individuals suspected of being members or agents of al Qaeda or the Taliban as enemy 
combatants and hold them indefinitely and incommunicado for the duration of the war on 
terror.  The rationale behind this system of preventive detention is to incapacitate 
suspected terrorists, facilitate interrogation, and hold them when traditional criminal 
charges are not feasible for a variety of reasons.  By employing an armed-conflict model 
that treats terrorists as “combatants,” the Bush Administration argues it can preventively 
detain terrorists until the end of hostilities, despite there being no foreseeable ending 
scenario to an amorphous war on terror.  Furthermore, terrorists are automatically 
unlawful or enemy combatants and hence not entitled to protections as true prisoners of 
war; yet, under the Bush Administration’s approach, they also are not entitled to the legal 
protections afforded criminals.  Significantly, by not filing any criminal charges, none of 
the procedural and substantive rights attaching to criminal prosecutions would occur, 
such as right to counsel, right to a speedy and public trial, right to exculpatory 
information, etc.  While terrorism is a grave threat that should not be underestimated, it 
does not pose the same existential threat as previous conflicts.  It merely requires a novel 
approach and new tools to thinking about the problem instead of relying on outdated 
methods and obsolete thought-processes.  
As Wittes and Gitenstein attest,“Indefinite detention, even of non-citizens, runs 
counter to foundational notions of what this country stands for.”683  Whether it is called 
administrative detention as in Israel, pre-charge detention as in Britain, or executive 
detention as in the United States, preventive detention is based on what could happen and 
                                                 
682 Wittes, Law and the Long War, 133. 
683 Wittes and Gitenstein, “A Legal Framework for Detaining Terrorists, Enact a Law to End the 
Clash over Rights,” 8. 
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not based on what has happened.  Independent of whether terrorists are labeled as 
“criminals” or “combatants,” it is detention based less on conduct than on potential and 
associational status.  Preventive detention may even be counterproductive by alienating 
the very groups of people needed to win this war on terror.  Nonetheless, in a world with 
weapons of mass destruction and determined enemies who want to kill thousands – if not 
millions – of innocent civilians, it may be necessary.  As Rosenzweig and Carafano at the 
Heritage Foundation note “to reject preventive detention in those rare circumstances in 
which it is necessary is to exalt liberty at the expense of security.”684  There should be no 
delusions, however: there is no perfect way for a democracy to create a regime of 
preventive detention.  It will always be over-inclusive; there will always be errors; and it 
will always feel and be troublesome.  Hence, the concept of preventive detention is 
troubling to the tenets of any true democracy. 
So how did we get here?  The Bush Administration reacted to the shock of 9/11 
with several forms of preventive detention before employing its enemy combatant policy. 
First, it detained thousands of Muslims on immigration charges and then applied the 
material witness statute to detain others, including U.S. citizens such as Padilla. 
Ultimately, the confluence of the needs for actionable intelligence and incapacitation 
coupled with a perception that the criminal justice system was inadequate to meet these 
objectives resulted in the enemy combatant policy.  
While the rationale for preventive detention is legitimate and the need for 
preventive detention real, the current Administration’s approach has been reactionary, 
illogical, and probably unconstitutional.  Moreover, the decision-making process to label 
individuals as enemy combatants resides entirely within the executive branch, thereby 
bypassing the checks and balances that comprise our democratic system.  The current 
Administration’s approach also makes no distinction between an accused terrorist and a 
convicted terrorist, thereby undermining a core principle of our democratic system that 
people are innocent until proven guilty. 
                                                 
684 Rosenzweig and Carafano, “Preventive Detention and Actionable Intelligence,” 9. 
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The pivotal question becomes: how do we as a society handle the competing 
interests of liberty and security and pick an optimal solution based on the circumstances 
and threat level?  If the threat level is low – and expected to remain low – then the 
criminal justice system can incapacitate terrorists as it has done for decades.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, however, based on the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate 
and other indications, it does not appear the threat level is abating, despite the fact that we 
have not suffered another terrorist attack since 9/11.  Based on the evidence discussed in 
Chapter III, it appears that several specific plots have been stopped and additional 
terrorists captured based in part on interrogation that was facilitated by labeling 
individuals as enemy combatants.  Assuming that is true does not mean the enemy 
combatant policy is lawful or a sound policy that should be embraced.  Rather, it just 
acknowledges that the United States – as Britain and Israel have recognized – may very 
well need a system of preventive detention to deal with terrorist threats.  To that end, this 
paper has described, classified, and analyzed alternatives to the enemy combatant 
approach by applying a methodology encompassing democratic principles to begin to 
unpack the complicated factors involved in the necessary evil of preventive detention. 
Significantly, as explained in Chapter V, Israel and Britain have shown that 
democracies facing comparable terrorist threats can implement preventive detention 
policies that are not based on unilateral executive usurpation of power.  While their 
policies are no means perfect and frequently criticized by human rights groups, Israel and 
Britain have managed to allow their respective legislatures to play a significant role in 
creating the substantive standards for preventive detention and judicial review.  To get 
out of this quagmire, Congress should address details concerning preventive detention 
such as how long an individual can be detained without access to counsel for purposes of 
interrogation and how long an individual can be overall detained before release or 
criminal changes.  As former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit observes, “Congress is the branch of government directly responsible, along with 
the executive, to the citizenry for the reconciliation of wartime securities and civil 
liberties, and Congress must fully accept this moment of responsibility.”685 
                                                 
685 Patricia Wald, “The Supreme Court Goes to War,” 67.  
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In May 2007, journalist Stuart Taylor presciently predicted that no satisfactory 
resolution of the detention of terrorists seemed likely until at least 2009 when we would 
have a new President who would perhaps take the advice of “moderate-spirited 
experts.”686  This appears to be the case as a Senate hearing on citizen detentions that was 
scheduled to occur in October 2002 was indefinitely postponed.687  While Congress 
appears somewhat more motivated to enact legislation dealing with the aliens at 
Guantanamo Bay (as discussed in Chapters IV and V, it enacted the DTA and MCA in 
response to the Supreme Court decisions Rasul and Hamdan), Congress has been 
virtually paralyzed when it comes to the question of the detention of U.S. persons being 
detained in America as enemy combatants.  Although DECA was proposed, it stalled in 
committee in 2005, and there does not appear any impetus to resurrect it.  In sum, as 
addressed in Chapter IV, Congress needs to enact a preventive detention regime that is 
both constitutional and pursuant to an Act of Congress before the next catastrophic 
terrorist attack.  
As an alternative approach to the Administration’s enemy combatant policy, this 
paper suggests using the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to designate terrorist 
suspects as “terrorism intelligence assets” (TIAs) if the government can prove by some 
standard developed by Congress that the suspect could prove to be a valuable intelligence 
asset to prevent future attacks or that the suspect poses an imminent risk of a terrorist 
attack and hence needs to be incapacitated.  Importantly, the FISC approach would only 
be relevant if the criminal justice system proved inadequate to detain or interrogate 
terrorist suspects.  After the interrogation and/or incapacitation rationales for the TIA 
designation are exhausted (the FISC could monitor preventive detention every thirty or 
sixty days), the TIA must be released or transferred to the criminal justice system.  There 
is no need to create separate tribunals to try terrorist suspects.  The various statutes that 
already exist can protect the secrecy of classified materials and deal with the evidentiary 
issues that arise in trying terrorist suspects in Article III courts.  
                                                 
686 Taylor, “Terrorism Suspects and the Law.” 
687 “(POSTPONED) The Constitution and the Detention of US Citizens as Enemy Combatants,” 
United States Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, October 8, 2002, 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=471 (accessed June 26, 2008). 
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While this author believes the FISC approach is superior to the alternatives 
proposed, the overriding recommendation is that a more balanced solution than the 
enemy combatant policy be enacted.  As this paper described in Chapter VII, there are 
three moderate alternatives to the enemy combatant policy: (1) create a national security 
court; (2) adjust/modify the criminal justice system to incorporate the preventive 
detention and trials of terrorists, or (3) amend FISA and have the FISC monitor a regime 
of preventive detention.  
Option 1, the national security courts, errs on security and imposes huge 
institutional and organizational costs, especially by introducing new jurisdictional issues 
and hurdles best to be avoided given the minimalist nature of the judiciary.  
Option 2, modifying existing statutes, tends to favor liberty (although as Chapter 
VII explains that depends on the specific modifications proposed) but would likely be on 
a slippery slope of gradually contaminating ordinary criminal law.  
Option 3, the FISC approach, seems to strike the optimal balance between liberty 
and security as it allows preventive detention for purposes of incapacitation and 
interrogation but also recognizes that trials should occur in normal Article III courts.  It is 
narrowly-tailored in that the executive official would have to explain why the criminal 
justice system in any particular case was inadequate to incapacitate or interrogate the 
individuals, thus putting pressure on the executive branch to use the criminal justice 
system when feasible.  Furthermore, by having a court system whose sole justification is 
surveillance of foreign intelligence monitor the preventive detention regime, it would be 
incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to have zealous prosecutors try to manipulate the 
FISC system to interrogate a drug dealer or murderer unrelated to terrorism.  The FISC 
approach is also institutionally efficient as the Article III judges that comprise FISA have 
an expertise in foreign intelligence matters.  
Whatever moderate option is selected, Congress needs to enact a preventive 
detention regime. As Attorney General Mukasey eloquently notes: “Perhaps the world’s 
greatest deliberative body (the Senate) and the people’s house (the House of 
Representatives) could, while we still have the leisure, turn their considerable talents to 
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deliberating how to fix a strained and mismatched legal system, before another cataclysm 
calls forth from the people demands for hastier and harsher results.”688  It is time for 
Congress to act.  
 
                                                 
688 Mukasey, “Jose Padilla Makes Bad Law.” 
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